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The Decolonization Crisis in îîew Caledonia
March, 1992 
Joan M. Riley
This paper analyses the origins of revolutionary anti- 
colonialism in Kev Caledonia. The development of capitalism 
in the colony, under direct French imperial control, has cre­
ated a territory with the most advanced development in the 
South Pacific. New Caledonia has served as both a colon/ of 
settlement and as a producer of rav materials, chiefly nickel 
and other minerals. A combination of unique features and 
consequences of capitalist development in Kev Caledonia has 
determined both the abnormally pro-longed colonial status of 
the country and has generated powerful social forces that 
have favored the advent of a revolutionary situation. Unlike 
African settler colonialism, the indigenous population of Kew 
Caledonia has not functioned as the basis of accumulât ion. In­
stead, they have been marginalized and impoverished in their 
own country in the midst of rapid economic growth and moderniz­
ation. The presence of settlers makes a strong contribution 
to the achievement of revolutionary understanding and act n 
in the colonized. The major factor contributing to the anach­
ronistic colonial status of the country is its possession of 
the largest known nickel reserves in the world. The inter­
national political economy of nickel must be understood in 
order to understand why New Caledonia is subject to unusually 
prolonged direct imperial control well into the era of neo­
colonialism.
Data vas obtained from a rev lev of the e:;tcnsivi- litera­
ture on economic and political developments particular to the 
settler colonialism. Data on the development of other {former) 
settler colonics (in Africa) vas compared vith the data on Nov 
Caledonia and this information in turn vas compared to the 
data on economic and political development in select fermcr 
non-settier colonies. An analysis cf this 1i tera L ure led to 
the finding that colonies of vhitc settlement in f;enera] cr.hib'- 
it characLeristically advanced economic devcloprieni and c] as;- 
formation.
The literature on theories of revolution vas also rr- 
viewed. The factors that appear relevant in I !k ' cas.c of v 
Caledonia vere identified and analysed. The major cause. 1 fac­
tor is relative deprivation, but this can oiily he understood 
as being one social force thiat in combination uith numeicui: 
other conditions acted as the revolutionary precipitate.
The conclusion is that vhile the uni cue cliaracter i si. i cx- 
of the development of capitalism in Now Caledonia arc- the 
source of the subjective and objective prcrccuisitr: for the 
revolutionary anti-colonial movement, the superior coercive 
capability of the modern state and the ethnic divix;ionn with­
in the territory vill preclude the possibility of successful 
social revolution in New Caledonia.
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INTRODDCTÎON
Imperialism and DécoIon i rat i on
A complex combination of political, economic and so­
cial forces effect the process of decolonization: its timino, 
nature {relatively peacefully or through war), and place.
While most colonies achieved independence by the 1"CDs, Nam­
ibia remained —  in the official parlance of the Unite c ,Ja- 
tiens —  a "non-self-governing territory'’ until 1990. And New 
Caledonia, a French possession since the 16hOs, has the dis­
tinction of being one of the world's last remaitting cciloniv's. 
In most cases, decolonization proceeded relatively peact'f u 3 1 y . 
But some colonized peoples, for example the Algerians, were 
left no other alternative but war to obtain indcpendem’c ,i 
seven-year long war in which over a million people' ix-rislu'd. 
Understanding why some cases are "deviant" -- why indcpendencc 
comes late and/or only through war -- reveals much atout the 
role of imperial self-interest in decolonization. Also, the 
many factors determining the selective granting of indepen­
dence are important, not least because they continue to efftd 
development in the post-independence period.
Imperial self-interest is the ultimate determining 
factor in decolonization. No imperial "parent-country" state 
bestows independence on its colonies unless and until it is 
confident it will continue to exert considerable political and 
economic influence in the post-independence state. As Tim
Wîtchor points out: "Even though its former territories took 
independence 30 years ago, French influence in Africa is one 
of the cornerstones of its claim to being a world power".* 
Inter-imperial rivalry was a major determinant in 
colonization and continues to be a factor in decolonization 
{Stavrianos, 1981). For instance, a declining imperial state 
cannot afford the "luxury" of permitting its colonies indepen­
dence because it fears a more powerful imperialism will usurp 
its interests. In this respect, refusing independence is a 
sign of a weak imperial state. A case in point was the inabil­
ity of Portugal -- once a great imperial power, but in the con­
temporary era one of the poorest countries in Europe -- to 
grant a peaceful independence to its African colonies. Incred­
ibly, even while Portugal was the only remaining European pow­
er holding colonies in Africa, it resisted granting indepen­
dence to the bitter end. The result has been decades of war 
in Angola and Mozambique. The case of Portuguese colonialism 
in Africa, and of the history of colonization and decoloniza­
tion in general, show that there is no such thing as a "reluc­
tant Imperialist".
It is important to understand that imperial self-in­
terest is not simply a question of relations between "parent- 
countries" and their respective colonies and "spheres of influ­
ence"; although this is a crucial aspect of it. It is also a 
matter of geopolitical considerations and "high jxalitics" a­
* Tim Witcher, "French hold on Africa faces serious threats". 
Mail-star. July 7, 1990, p. A7.
mong advanced developed states. The external factors of geo­
political relations of competition, conflict, (and coopérât ion 1 
among these states continue to effect the dovelopment of the 
modern-day Third World, in both colonial and decoloniicd coun­
tries ,
Internal factors are also important in the proce? i 
of decolonization. Rince the imperial state’s prime con;.jder­
ation is the protection of its own lono-term interests, it re­
gards the nature of the post-colonial state as an issue of the 
greatest concern. In this, the presence of white ‘cttu-rs it 
a major complicating factor as regards decolonization and ilu 
post-independence state. Not only is an indc-'pendi'iit “vlntt- 
state” (such as Rhodesia after its “U n ilater,a 1 Poclarution of 
Independence" in 1965), counter to the intercsti; of imj.ei i„ 1 - 
ism, the very presence of white settlers -- while favori nn a 
"more real" capitalist development "on the spot", -- tend; !o 
have a radicalizing effect on the colonized (Kenneth Good, 
1976). And of course, a social-revolutionary native state i; 
the last thing desired by imperialism. For these reasons, 
white settlers always constitute a great latent threat to im­
perialism and are one of the major complicating internal fac­
tors effecting the time, place, and the nature of decoloniza­
tion.
On the other hand, a native-led, nationalist-roform- 
ist post-independence state is ideal, from the point-of-view 
of imperialist states. Independence can be granted confident­
ly and peacefully to a native-elite-led state (Stavrianos, 
1981; Emmanuel, 1972; Good, 1976; Jeffrey, 1982; Anthony D.
Smithf 198?; Goodwin, 1989). In non-settlement colonies, where 
the creation of a •’westernised® elite (a tiny i* action of the 
colonized population) could not be hindered by settlers and was 
fostered by imperialism, a peaceful and prompt neo-colonial in­
dependence was not only possible but decidedly preferable. It 
was under this condition that most of the Third World was de­
ed on i zed.
Of course, there is always a complex interplay of ex­
ternal world historic economic and political forces, and pure­
ly local, internal forces. According to conventional wisdom, 
the days of colonialism were numbered after World b’ar IT, when 
colonized people were "awakened" by the combined forces of 
their recruitment into imperial armies, exposure to Europeans 
and war-time propaganda celebrating "freedom and democracy", 
nationalism, etc. In commonsense understanding, all these e- 
vcnts prompted movements for independence in the colonies. Na­
tive elites took up their role as leaders of such movements 
and, enlisting the support of the poverty-stricken, disenfran­
chised, landless, and benighted colonized masses, led their 
nations to independence. This is one popular version of how 
decolonization happened. But because it leaves out a concrete 
analysis of specific internal and external factors it cannot 
account for the selective granting of independence.
However, in any case colonialism had already served 
its purpose and had become obsolete. Decolonization was inevit­
able, although it was temporarily delayed in a few places 
due to certain more or less unique factors. With the end of 
the era of high competitive imperialism after World War II,
outright undisguised colonia lism no longer made any polit it\sl 
sense. Kor vas it any longer an eronomic neeet̂ si t y. Neo­
colonialism and the cooperation vith, and cncouraqi-ment of, 
nation^-lism vere the solution to the "unrest" in Mu' col oui ci . 
Thusf external, vorld-historic forces, and internal fact ors 
which varied somewhat from colony to colony, both played a 
role in decolonisation-
Neo-colonial independence is a ruse; in fact it a c t ­
ually strengthens imperialism and increases underdeveiopmi-nt . 
Despite the appearance of change vith the advent of neo-colon­
ialism, what did not change vas the fundamont1 imyM ralisc; 
of center capitalism: the necessity of control of r.iu ma., ri­
als, the need for expanding markets and abundant, chc'ap, sur 
plus-value-creating labour (Koiko, 1988). 1 ndopcnconcc h.,s 
not enabled the cx-colonies to break-out of this i mpor i 1 - i n- 
posed economic structure somotimes referred to ttje iiitii- 
national division of labor.
It is precisely because colonialism has proven t c 
have no long-term political viability or economic usefulness 
to imperialism that neo-colonialism becomes expedient at a 
certain point. The promotion to independence cun be vievcd 
as a type of reform —  completely within the logic of nciiojn,ly 
capitalism —  granted by the imperial states to safeguard 
tl>eir ovn long-term economic intorestE. According to John 
Valorziî* "Each year more money is leaving poor countries in
* John Valorzi, "IMF's lending policy to Third World criti 
cized" The Mail-Star, August 1^, 1990, p. B8.
Africa, Asia and South America about $30 billion last year 
a)one [1989] -- than is foming in". Obviously, imperial ism re­
mains immensely profitable for the advanced capitalist coun­
tries of the center in the neo-colonial era.
In the post-independence era imperialism has taken 
tm new forms- Imperial ism did not stop with the end of formal 
colonialism. The staggering Third World debt is a symptom of 
imperial ism: the Third World now "owes" over one trillion dol­
lars to creditors in the developed capitalist countries.* And 
the vast majority of Third World people continue to live in 
life-destroying poverty- Plainly, exploitation has not ended 
with the granting of independence.
Colonialism inflicts enormous damage on the colon­
ized (Memmi, 1965; Fanon, 1961). If they can survive, the de­
sire to undo this damage -- economic, psycho-social, cultural, 
etc., -- will be realized in some form of nationslist-indepen­
dence movement. Depending on many factors -- internal and ex­
ternal -- these movements can be either national1st-reformist 
or social revolutionary (Goodwin, 1989).
The actions of the imperial state itself go a long 
way in determining the degree of radicalism of colonial inde­
pendence movements, as veil as their outcomes (Sonderland,
1970). For instance, the imperial state —  with or without the 
cooperation of colonial elites (settler or native) —  can enact 
reforms designed to eliminate popular support for revolution-
* John Valorzi, "IMF’s lending policy to Third World criti­
cized", Hail-Star August 14, 1990, p. B8.
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J.
ary change. This can include land reform, granting indepen­
dence, encouraging native cultural expression, and opening 
channels to permit at least some upward mobility to membt'rs 
of the colon!zed. As Bard O'Neill points out:
History provides a number of cases sustaining the proposi­
tion that benevolent treatment of the population and re­
forms designed to meet the basic needs of the people can 
go a long way toward undermining support for iîv> insur­
gents- *
This is the imperial strategy of "pre-emptive counter-revolu­
tion”, which along with decolonization, becomes unavoidable 
for imperialism as the negative effects of colonialism radi­
calize the colonized.
Gramsci** termed state-initiated, top-down reformx a; 
a "passive revolution" ("passive" because the masses give "at 
most only passive consent to the new political order"). State- 
initiated reforms, generally speaking, often come in the after­
math of some crisis and the resulting wide-scale demands for 
change. Reforms serve a multi-faceted purpose: they play a 
very important social control function and thereby ensure the 
long-term interests of the ruling class and the maintenance 
of the mode of production (Galper, 1978; Spitzer, 1975). As 
Anne Showstack Sassoon explains:
The political, social and economic crisis of capitalism
* Bard O ’Neill, "Insurgency: A Framework for Analyses”,
Insurgency in the Modern World, Bard E. O'Neill, William R. 
Heaton, and Donald J . Alberts, eds., Colorado: Westview, 
1980, p. 20.
** See "Gramsci", Anne Showstack Sassoon, Dictionary of Marx­
ist Thought, Tom Bottomore, ed., Cambridge: Harvard Univer­
sity Press, 1963, p. 194.
can, however, result in a reorganization of hegemony 
through various kinds of passive revolution, in order to 
pre-empt the threat of the working-class movement to po­
litical and economic control by the ruling few, while pro­
viding for the continued development of the forces of pro­
duction . *
This has been the main function of one of the major 
reforms of this century —  decolonization- State-initiated re­
forms always have political motives; the state grants them un­
der duress, i.e. in crisis situations. Thus reformist and rev­
olutionary phases occur in cycles . Acute revolutionary poten­
tial is not a constant feature of society. But a passive revo­
lution cannot eliminate social revolutionary potential once 
and for all, because the underlying causes of revolt still 
exist.
Neo-colonial reforms (including independence, land 
reform, citizenship, voting rights, etc.,) —  and all other 
types of reforms within the logic of the needs of capitalism 
for tîiat matter ("social welfare®) -- are irnt.ediate measures 
taken in the face of an escalating class struggle with the 
intent of avoiding all-out ■'class war", which the state de- 
cJares when it is feared that revolution is impending, and 
where reforms have been impossible to implement or have proven 
"too little, too late". There are many examples of this to be 
found in the history of decolonization: Malaya, Kenya, Algeria, 
Vietnam, Mozambique for instance.
Preventing revolution is the rationale behind the
* See "Gramsci", Anne Showstack Sassoon, Dictionary of Marxist 
Thought, Tom Bottomore, ed-, Cambridge; Harvard Dnlversity 
Press, 1983, p. 195.
"liberal" imperial policy of "containment" in its confront­
ations vith the Third World in the post-indep-endence period.
The more "havkish" policy of "roll back" involves direct mili­
tary intervention. The object is to destroy revolutionary re­
gimes/states and replace them vith pro-vestern elites. (Fello, 
et a l , 1985). Independence has neither permitted real devel­
opment nor eliminated exploitative economic relations. The 
negative effects of this imperial-imposed economic and }>ol i t- 
ical relationship for the Third World arc manifest. Ar a re­
sult, revolts against incumbent corrupt regimes arc a frognent 
occurrence. Because of this, active imperial military inter­
vention in the post-independence period is also a frognent 
occurrence.
The Imperial State
To understand the nature of the relations])ip ixitvern 
the advanced capitalist countries and their colonics, former 
colonies, and spheres of influence, it it essential to under­
stand the role of the ate. For one thing, the capitalist- 
imperialist state, operating within and across national bound­
aries, has very definite political motives behind its policies 
and reforms: to safeguard its own economic interests. During 
colonialism, the imperial state policy is directed to preserv­
ing the interests of the metropolitan bourgeoisie. As Hamza 
Alavi points out: "In colonial societies the colonial state is 
the instrument of the metropolitan bourgeoisie and is deployed 
against indigenous classes where their respective rights
10
clash®.* Likewise, according to Broverman: "In the most ele- 
Bwntary sense, the state is guarantor cf the conditions, the 
social relations, of capitalism, and the protector of the ever 
more unequal distribution of property which this system brings 
about**.** The imperial state operates on the global level.
It promotes and defends the ever-increasing unequal relation­
ship between center and periphery.
But continuing to impose outright colonialism in the 
face of wide-spread native rebellion against it, threatens 
this economic relationship because in colonial capitalist so­
cial formations the social (political-ideological) and the ec­
onomic (material) basis for ruling class (imperial) hegemony 
cannot be achieved or maintained. In the revolutionary decol­
onization crisis the state faces a dilemma: how to end the re- 
evolt without ending its effective political and economic dom­
inance in the territory. Neo-colonialism —  a type of reform 
—  is the solution.
On the political-moral-ideological level, the colon­
ized will always view direct imperial control (colonialism) as 
illegitimate (Seton Watson, 1978). They will actively oppose 
it, in the modern sense, as soon as they are able. Feelings 
of cultural nationalism are ineradicable. Native demands for 
independence cannot be ignored, trivialized, and caviled at
* Hamza Alavi, "Colonial and Post-Colonial Societies", in 
Dictionary of Marxist Thought, Tom Bottomare, ed., Cam­
bridge: Harvard University Press, 1983, pp. 82-83.
** Harry Braverman, Labor and Monopoly Capital, New York : 
Monthly Review Press, 1974, p. 284.
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indefinitely. Tlie imperial state that ignores and represses 
nationalism in its colonies —  instead of encouraging it —  
does so at its ovn peril. Attempts to avoid independence or 
countering vith naked coercion is foolhardy from the point-of- 
viev of imperialism as this is very likely to have the unin­
tended consequence of further radicalizing the national libt'r- 
atioD movement- Steinbeck has called this ®the little scream­
ing fact that sounds throughout all history: repression works 
only to strengthen and knit the repressed” (The Grapes of Wrath, 
1972:324).
On the material level, the settler-promoted colonial 
mode of production and class relations, and the lesulting impe­
rial-imposed international division of labour, directly and 
visibly cause the emiseration of the masses in the colonies 
(landlessness, starvation wages). The fact that the cause of 
the miserable material situation of the colonized is easy for 
them to see, is part of what gives colonial exploitation it:: 
revolutionary potential. This, and the increasing inequality 
between settlers and colonized result in the lattertotal op­
position to the colonial system.
On the political level, in the absence of any cons­
titutional (legal) open"ngs for satisfactory reform, the re­
sult can only be violent opposition to the regime. In the 
ensuing national liberation struggle, the westernized native 
elite —  also a product of colonialism —  must enlist the sup­
port of the masses in the independence struggle. The political 
complexion (reformist or social revolutionary) of the movement 
and its outcome depend on many factors. The movement may
12
î;tart out vith a great deal of revolutionary potential bat the 
reeult may be a reformist or even a reactionary post-colonial 
regime. Some of the factors effecting the outcome of indepen­
dence struggles will be discussed below.
Whatever the factors favoring or impeding revolution­
ary change in any particular time and place, once the challenge 
"from below" becomes « fact, the imperial state will counter 
vith a reform program for political and economic restructuring, 
and repression (e.g. the "state of emergency" which the Brit­
ish state declared during both Kenya's and Malaya's indepen­
dence struggle, in which thousands of the colonized vere kil­
led). The crisis will culminate in formal political indepen­
dence only when the state is satisfied that the post-indepen­
dence regime will compliantly serve imperial interests- This 
"flag independence" (neo-colonialism), as Nyerere, former pres­
ident of Tanzania has called it, not only guarantees imperial 
interests, it ensures the continued underdevelopiænt of the new­
ly "independent" nation.
Gaining even limited reforms in the decolonization 
struggle is far from unproblematic because there are fairly 
narrow limits to the types of reforms that imperialism and 
local elites will tolerate- This is why any effort to "con­
tain" revolutionary social change is always waged on two 
"fronts”: reforms —  which emîKîdy an ideological dimension 
and are always limited to the type that will strengthen ex­
ploitative class relations over the long term —  and subver­
sive coercion (counter-insurgency)• When those classes (the 
]ocal elite and the metropolitan bourgeoisie) with a material
13
interest in maintaining/ as much as possible, the status quo, 
fear that reforms have already gone too far, or when the insur­
gent movement has grown so strong that revolution is an immed­
iate possibility, the state declares "class war". Britain's 
declaration of a state of emergency during Kenya's "Mau Mau” 
rebellion, was in effect a declaration of "class wat". The 
seven-year war In Algeria, that is, the French war against the 
Algerian National Liberation Front was "class war"; as was the 
war in Angola, with the imperialist war against the MPLA- In 
the neo-colonial context, for example in Chile, the overthrow 
of the Allende government was a counter-revolutionary class 
war. Likewise with the imperialist-backed ouster of democrat­
ically elected Cheddi Jagan in Guiana.
The neo-colonial nation is, in fact, an imperialist- 
created entity, which is not to say that it is under the com­
plete control of imperialism {Baylson, 1987). Because neo-col- 
onialism eliminates neither imperialism nor underde^'elopment, 
and because of the ethnic plurality (including "tribalism") 
fostered and encouraged during colonialism and then by post­
independence elites, the neo-colonial society remains "crisis- 
ridden and conflict-prone" (Offivedt, 1973; Crary, 1985). But 
the imperialist state has devised ways of dealing with this 
—  from the witholding of aid, to supporting local dictators, 
to direct military intervention and subversion -- in cases 
where it perceives a threat to the status quo (Clive Thomas, 
1984; Stavrianos, 1981:467).
The factors that favour and impede the development 
of anti-imperialist revolutionary class action in the Third
14
World arc determined by both internal factors (the local fea­
tures specific to each case) and external factors (the "gener­
al determinants of the capitalist system"), as noted above, 
as is the outcome of the independence struggle in general. 
Therefore, one roust understand the determining influence of 
local conditions and inanediate imperial motives in order to 
determine the political and economic factors effecting decol­
onization in each concrete case. The outcome of the decolon- 
iztion struggle, in turn, effects the subsequent development 
of the fledgling independent state and its ability to actually 
undo the damage of the colonial legacy.
In order to understand colonialism and decoloniz­
ation, it is obviously necessary to understand imperialism: 
what it is, what "causes” it, how it effects the development 
of subject territories. According to the Leninist interpret­
ation, imperialism involves the accumulation of capital on a 
world scale and the creation of a world market under monopoly 
conditions. The basic "cause" of imperialism is therefore, ec­
onomic. It arises from the "needs" of advanced capitalism 
born out of Its own internal economic contradictions. These 
economic imperatives include the need for cheap essential raw 
materials, cheap laixîur-povar, markets for manufactured goods, 
and profitable Investment opportunities. These are the func­
tions that colonies, neo-colonies, and spheres of influence 
must serve (Gabriel Kolko, 1988; Lipietz, 1982). The major 
function of the imperial state is to ensure the continuance of 
this economic relationship.
Dependency theory has attempted to explain why the
15
introduction of capitalism via imperialism to the pre-capital­
ist world failed to create advanced capitalist societies every­
where. Dependency theorists have noted that underdevelopment 
persists in most of the ex-colonics in the post-independence 
era. Capitalism in the formerly self-sufficient pre-capitalist 
countries has resulted in “peripheraliration"r i.e., the depen­
dence and underdevelopment of the subject territories {Palma, 
1978). This involves the complete or partial destruction of 
pre-capitalist modes of production and the introduction of cap­
italist class relations, albeit in "distorted" forms. The sub­
ject economy is internally "disarticulated" and externally in­
tegrated with the imperial {"core") economy. Capital flows 
are from the subject to the dominant country as profits are 
siphoned-off. The result for the periphery: widespread pov­
erty, lack of industrialization, technological dependence, 
mass unemployment and underemployment, and general mass misery. 
This is typically the case whether the dependent country has 
colonial or "independent" political status {Baran, 1967; Gundcr 
Frank, 1967; Magdoff, 1966; Amin, 1976; b’allerstein, 1979; 
Jalee, 1972).
Petras (1987) describes imperialism as a "political- 
economic phenomenon". The imperialist state, according to 
Petras, operates on an international level. Its intention: to 
put in place the necessary milieu (infrastructure), to "create 
the universe" in which capitalism can operate across the bound­
aries of nation-states. The imperial states* functions arc 
coercive and economic. In this way the imperial state "pene­
trates the social structure of another nation and creates an
16
international division of labour that favors the advanced cap­
italist nations". Thus, the "causes of Third World poverty 
arc structural”. Furthermore, Petras argues, the end of di­
rect political control (colonialism) and the advent of formal 
political independence does not mean the end of imperialism.
In the case of neo-colonialism, imperialism requires "collab­
orator classes” in the periphery. And while imperialism and 
its "client-state" collaborators will try to secure consent —  
hegemony —  for their interests, client-states are of necessity 
authoritarian regii^s because “repression is how imperialists 
and their collaborators try to contain the bad effects of impe­
rialism”. Imperialism is thus, “anathema to democracy"
(Petras, lecture at Saint Mary's University, Halifax, July 21, 
1987).
Imperialism and Decolonization in New Caledonia
The reasons for the abnormally prolonged colonialism 
in New Caledonia are complex. But clear enough is that French 
imperial self-interest has been paramount in every aspect of 
its relationship with its colony. Despite current French 
claims that France has no imperialist interests in New Caledon­
ia, there is ample evidence to show that, on the contrary, 
France is definitely not a “reluctant imperialist".
New Caledonia is W t h  a colony of settlei^nt and a 
colony of exploitation. The development of capitalism in New 
Caledonia has brought a complete transformation of pre-contact 
society and economy. Almost a century and a half of colonial­
17
ism has created a relatively complex ethnic mix and class 
structure. With the most extensive white settlement in the 
South Pacific (except Nev Zealand and Australia), combined 
vith the development of its rich mineral resources, New Cale­
donia has experienced a •'quant’m leap" in development in the 
last century and a half. From tnc stone age, New Caledonia is 
now by far the most developed island (and colony) in the re­
gion.
At the same time, these very features have complicat­
ed decolonization, causing France to refuse native demands for 
independence, and have transformed this remote territory into 
a regional "hotspot", potentially capable of "destabilixing" 
the entire region and thereby threatening imperial interests.
While a complex and unique combination of social, 
political, and economic factors have made New Caledonia a 
"deviant case" (to use Lijphart's expression*) —  a colony in 
the era of neo-colonialism, the most developed and urbanized 
island in the South Pacific vith the largest contingent of set­
tlers, and a violent independence struggle -- it is neverthe­
less a classic example of imperial exploitation, oppression, 
and underdevelopment, and the potential for revolutionary 
class action that these can produce under settler colonialism 
(Good, 1976).
Nev Caledonia's status as both a colony of settle-
* Arend Lijpbart, "Comparative Politics and the Comparative 
Method", American Political Science Review, 65, September 
1971, pp. 653 - 673.
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nient and as a valuable raw material producer are the primary 
factors contributing to its long-drawn and sometimes violent 
independence struggle. Extensive white settlement greatly re­
tards the creation of native elites under colonialism, to whom 
imperialism could confidently offer independence elsewhere, as 
noted above. At the same time, settler colonies experience a 
m)re rapid and complete capitalist development than non-settler 
colonies (BecKford, 1972; Good, 1976). The few among the col­
onized that becoB» "westernized" via this development are often 
radicalized by the almost complete closure to upward mobility 
under settler colonialism. Rather than being conservative sup­
porters of imperialism who are more afraid of their local op­
pressed classes than they are of the metropolitan bourgeoisie, 
these elites can play the role of revolutionary leaders in the 
national liberation struggle. This radical1ration becomes op­
erationalized and widely politicized in the independence move­
ment. Because this predictable event threatens imperialism, 
the metropolitan state quickly intervenes with a counter-insur­
gency program (which Includes reforms). Here, the purpose is 
not only to reduce native support for revolutionary change, 
but also necessarily to weaken the settlers’ political and ec­
onomic dominance in colonial society and economy. Ameliorat­
ing the indigenous population's material situation requires re­
ducing the settlers* privileged position. It is at this point 
that settlers rebel against the agency that until then has been 
the very guarantor of their privileges: the imperial state. It 
is precisely this dynamic that is presently unfolding in New
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Caledonia.
The decolonization of Africa, especially events in 
the white settler colonies of Africa (such as Algeria, Kenya, 
Rhodesia, South Africa, Belgian Congo, and Namibia), indicates 
that it is the settlers —  not the colonized -- that arc the 
real threat to imperial interests especially vhen the inexor­
able transition to independence can no longer be delayed 
(Emmanuel, 1973). The danger settlers pose to imperialism is 
all the greater the more valuable the colony. The mineral pos­
sessing colonies in Africa are an example: oil in Alceriar var­
ious minerals in Rhodesia, gold and diamonds in South Africa, 
copper in Belgian Congo). In these, and other African settler 
colonies, "nationalistic" (as opposed to "loyalist”) settlers 
threatened to secede and form independent "vhite states" on 
numerous occasions, especially vhen they feared an abrogation 
of their privileges at the mere suggestion of imperial stale- 
initiated reforms for the colonized. Everywhere there is evi­
dence to shov the danger settlers pose to imperialism when 
they refuse to accept the state's reforms. Rut when the anar­
chic "settler mode of production" became obsolete —  a drain 
on and a threat to imperialism —  when occupation of the land 
by settlers is no longer necessary to imperialism as it had 
been during the initial competitive "scramble” for colonics, 
vhen settlers attempt to secede from the parcnt-country to 
form independent settler states, and vhen native insurgents 
are radicalized to the point of revolutionary anti-colonial­
ism, the settler societies in Africa experienced their defeat.
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Now Caledonia exhibits all of these processes, but 
has certain unique features conditioning its political and ec­
onomic development. For example, it possesses some of the 
largest known nickel reserves in the "free world". It is im­
portant to understand the international political economy of 
the nickel industry. Nickel is the "most highly concentrated 
major natural resource industry in the world" (Theodore Moran, 
in Blaster and Mesa-Lago, 1979, p. 258). Nickel has been de­
clared a "strategic material" by France; it is, among its other 
uses, a critical war material. Furthermore, and very import­
antly, nickel is found in few areas in the world* and according 
to some reports, is "seriously depleted"** in top First World 
World suppliers (namely Canada). This situation with nickel 
constitutes a "chokepoint": a sort of geopolitical obstruction 
to the trouble-free flow of an essential raw material (Bello, 
et al, 1986). French imperialism has no intention of losing 
one bit of its oligopolistic control of New Caledonia's nickel 
—  not to a vhite-settler state, native insurgents, or a re­
gional "imperial satellite" interloper (such as Australia). 
Nationalism and efforts to promote local development by gain­
ing control of raw materials locally, pose a potential threat 
to transnational corporations that control the supply of raw 
materials on the world market (Moran, in Blasier and Mesa-Lago,
* Guy de Rothschild, The Whims of Fortune, New York: Random 
Rouse, 1985, p. 222.
* Susan Yellin, "Mining risks losing competitive edge", The
Hail-Star, August 31, 1989, p. 9.
1979, p. 259). The imperial state takes the "chokepoint*' prob­
lem very seriously where essential raw materials are concerned 
and intervenes accordingly.
But geopolitical concerns, white-scttler troubles, 
native insurgency, and nickel are not the only considerations 
determining imperial policy in Kew Caledonia. Nuclear testing 
in French Polynesia is also an important factor. France had 
plans to conduct its testing of nuclear devices in the desert 
of Algeria -—  plans that had to be cancelled when Algeria 
gained independence. French Polynesia was then chosen as the 
site for France's nuclear development program. But the inde­
pendence of New Hebrides (an English and French colony) in
1980, increased demands for independence in the other French 
colonies. France needs French Polynesia as a nuclear colony 
and fears the "demonstration effect" of decolonizing New Cale­
donia . *
The history of the decolonisation of white settlor 
colonies, of anti-imperial movements in general, of post-inde- 
pendence development, and of revolutionary struggles everywhere 
in this century, reveals the extraordinarily protean nature of 
the phenomenon of revolution. Any attempt at tracing cut its 
causality demonstrates its very complex nature. A careful 
study of particular revolutions —  both ones that failed and 
ones that succeeded —  contributes to our overall understanding
* Bengt Danielsson, "Poisoned Pacific: The Legacy of French 
Nuclear Testing", The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 
Vol. 46, No. 2, March 1990, pp. 22 - 31.
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of the factors that are conducive and those that delay the ar­
rival of the "revolutionary moment".
In the following chapters I will discuss in detail 
the issues raised above. Chapter one will consist of a de­
tailed framework for the analysis of revolution, social change 
and development in peripheral (especially colonial) social 
formations. I will draw on general scholarly work but will 
place it within the Marxist framework. It will be argued that 
the social and economic structures of certain colonial socie­
ties exhibit a strong potential to generate revolutionary con­
sciousness in some groups/classes, but that the imperial state 
has, except in extraordinary circumstances, the ability to 
cause the "mis-carriage" of this potential.
Chapter two will be a general historical overview of 
the development of capitalism in New Caledonia- This will il­
lustrate the "quantum leap" in development executed via impe­
rialism as the indigenous society and economy was transformed 
from the stone age to revolutionary consciousness in less than 
one-hundred and fifty years. It is the special feature of the 
development of capitalism in New Caledonia that created the 
revolutionary situation of the present decolonization crisis.
Chapter three will consist of an in-depth discussion 
of the respective role of the principle actors in New Caledon­
ia's decolonization crisis- This will include an analysis of 
the role and functions of the state in creating the conditions 
for capital accumulation to take place- Also the roles of the 
settlers, the indigenous population, and the Immigrant popula­
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tion in the decolonization crisis will be considered. And im­
portant also, as it impacts crucially on the decolonization pro­
cess, is the unique position of New Caledonia in the interna­
tional political economy of the nickel industry. The reasons 
for the territory's anachronistic status as one of the world’s 
last colonies cannot be understood without a knowledge of the 
global aspects of the nickel industry. It viil be argued that 
nickel —  a crucial raw material —  is an imperial "chokepoint*.
Chapter four will be a discussion of the states's re­
forms and the likelihood of New Caledonia's neo-colonial future 
in the next century. France’s reforms are designed to “stack 
the deck" in favour of a neo-colonial outcome to the present 
decolonization crisis- The resulting new balance of class and 
ethnic forces and new institutional arrangements will permit 
subsequent social conflict to be "institutionalized® -- channel­
led away from social revolutionary change and confined to re­
formism and "peaceful conflict”. The pre-emptive counter-revo­
lutionary reforms of the state in fact constitute a whole now 
model of development for the territory. This nev model of de­
velopment is, nevertheless, within the capitalist mode of pro­
duction and favorable to the needs of imperialism. The fail­
ure of the oppressed and exploited in New Caledonia to become 
a "class for itself” rather than merely a "class in itself" —  
due largely to the Ideological domination of the ruling class 
and to the ideology of racists so pervasive a part of colonial­




Explaining Revolution; Academic Theories of Revolution
History has demonstrated the protean nature of rev­
olution. For this reason, any generalized, abstract theory 
about the causes and outcomes of revolution is problematic: no 
one theory can explain all cases, but it may serve as a guide­
line for analyzing this extremely complex (and, as is often 
noted, rare) phenomenon. It is difficult to be confident 
about any categorical statements regarding the causes of revo­
lutions. The immediate causes, at least, exist as a unique 
combination in each particular case. Therefore, a concrete 
historical analysis of specific revolutionary situations is 
probably the best approach to the problem, as opposed to in­
sisting upon an unsubstantiated theory and trying to force the 
facts to support it.
This is not to say that no scientific progress has 
been made in the theoretical study of revolutionary phenomena 
and that the student must go into the problem "cold". In fact, 
a huge social scientific bibliography exists on the subject.
But no consensus exists. Nevertheless, the researcher can and 
must begin with a conceptual framework —  modifying it when 
necessary —  with which to analyze the “facts* as he or she 
sees them.
Leaving the difficult problem of causality aside, the 
first step is to define what one means by revolution. It 
is necessary to explain how revolution differs from other
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forms of "collective violence" that may or may not bring soc­
ial change, such as revolts, rebellions (modern and pre-modern), 
and coups. There is also no consensus on this basic issue and 
much confusion surrounds it. Revolution often means different 
things to different researchers.
Beside the issue of causality —  the objective and 
subjective factors conducive to revolution -- one needs to 
knov about counter-acting tendencies, liliat are the social 
forces —  sociological, political and economic -- that impede 
revolutionary social change? Again, it is evident that no one 
answer can explain all cases; it seems safe to say that there 
are both historic and country-specific differences determining 
revolutionary potential and outcomes.
Understanding the objective, structural-material 
factors that determine what is "historically possible", that 
—  in the right combination, at the right time and place, and 
perhaps aided by historical "accident” —  may result in a revo­
lution, is obviously crucial. But on another level, the issue 
of human agency, of the subjective factors in any revolution­
ary situation, of how revolutionary understanding and action 
come about, and the issue of leadership —  these questions 
may be even more difficult. This is reflected in the fact that 
these questions are major points of contention in the compara­
tive, historical and theoretical literature on revolution.
A satisfactory theory of revolution would have to include an 
explanation of how objective and subjective factors interact: 
how they effect the origin of a potentially revolutionary move­
ment and determine the outcome.
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Theories of revolution can be typologicaiized in 
various ways: Marxist and non-Marxist, structural and psycho­
logical, for example. Like any theory, each contains underly­
ing, taken-for-granted (often unstated) assumptions about the 
normative value of certain societal characteristics —  cultural, 
political and economic conditions, etc., —  that a revolution 
could effect. More or less implicit value judgements are em- 
todied in a theory. And some theories are better suited to ex­
plaining social change than others.
An abstract theory, approach or paradigm, at a high 
level of generalization, cannot be expected to explain every so­
cial force involved in every revolution at ail times. An ec­
lectic approach to the problem has definite advantages- An­
alyzing the specific sociological, political, economic and 
psychological factors that seem to be operative in each con­
crete case, comparing this with other historical evidence, 
avoiding categorical claims and single-issue explanations, is 
the most fruitful and scientific approach to the problem. The 
worth of academic theories of revolution should be judged by 
these sorts of criteria-
Within the non-Marxist tradition, the functionalist- 
modernization paradigm has focused on “strains® in the social 
system caused by a too-rapid transformation of traditional so­
ciety. This may cause various psycho-social "tensions” that 
in turn may cause frustration and aggression directed against 
the government. Revolution is taken by modernization theory 
as evidence that some aspects of society are dysfunctional. 
Generally, revolution is viewed in a negative light; an event
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that can and should be prevented.* As Coleman and Cressey ex­
plain f
To functionalists ... when national systems do not work 
smoothly and become increasingly dysfunctional, revol­
ution is one possible result. For example, a society 
might exclude capable people from positions of power and 
distribute its wealth so unequally that citizens become 
bitter, resentful, and revolutionary. Political organ­
isation also beco^s dysfunctional by championing estab­
lished ways of doing things while the citizens' attitudes, 
values, and opinions are changing— - Functionalists 
therefore believe that the best way to head off revolu­
tionary conflict is to implement ... gradual reforms ... 
on economics, government, poverty and ethnic minorities. 
{Coleman and cressey, 1984:491 - 492)
Within the Marxist tradition, revolution is seen as 
the inevitable outcome of contradictions of basic economic laws 
inherent in the economic system —  the mode of production -- 
which is the basis of any society and which influences all 
other (the superstructural) elements of society. The mode of 
production gives rise to classes whose economic interests are 
in opposition. When the oppressed become conscious of the 
real economic and political causes of their suffering, become 
politicized and actively oppose the ruling class and the state 
that upholds the interests of that class, the “revolutionary 
moment" has arrived. If the oppressed succeed in wresting 
state power from the exploiting class, and subsequently estab­
lishes a new, more "progressive" mode of production and demo­
* For more on the nsJdemization perspective see Ankle Hoogvelt, 
The Third World in Global Development, London: MacMillan, 
1982, pp. 116 - 119. And "Warfare and International Con­
flict®, The Functionalist Perspective, Social Problems, Jat^s 
Coleman and Donald Cressey, eds.. New York: Harper and Row, 
1984, chapter 15.
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cratic, egalitarian society, a social revolution has occurred.
For Marxists, revolution is the very essence and manifestation
of social development and is thus vieved positively.* Giddens
outlines the Marxist theory as follovs:
When progressive changes occur in the sphere of productive 
activity ... a tension is set up between these new pro­
ductive forces and the existing relations of production... 
These ^contradictions” becone expressed as overt class con­
flicts, terminating in revolutionary struggles fought out 
in the political sphere.... The outco^ of these struggles 
is either "the common ruin of the contending classes" ... 
or "a revolutionary reconstitution of society at large"... 
The supersession of capitalism ... provides the circum­
stances in which it will be possible for man to recover his 
alienated self within a rational order which has freed it­
self from class domination. (Giddens, 197:44 - 45)
Structural, or "polity centered" approaches to revo­
lutions examine the influence of various social crisSs in cre­
ating revolutionary situations- These theories point to agrar­
ian upheavals, wars, disruptions effecting the military, etc., 
and how these crises may cause the state to lose control of the 
coercive apparatus thereby causing a "power vacuum" that may 
enable a revolutionary party to usurp state power, if it has 
mobilized sufficient resources. While class analysis is em­
ployed it is seen as Insufficient: the focus is especially on 
the
[s]cope and nature of state power vis-à-vis civil society.
Especially important in this regard is the way in 
which the state relates to the voluntary organization of 
social groups for the purpose of redressing grievances.
* For more on the Marxist theory of revolution see Anthony 
Giddens, Capitalism and modern social theory. New York: Cam­
bridge University Press, 1971, pp. 44 - 45. And Barbara 
Salert, Revolutions and Revolutionaries, New York: Elsevier, 
1976, pp. 96 - 123.
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Whether the state tolerates, represses, or sponsors such 
organizations —  and which organizations —  is crucial 
for understanding why mass revolutionary movements emerge 
and (sometimes) seize state power. (Goodwin in Terry Bos­
well, 1989:61)*
Psychological approaches focus on the states of mind 
of those —  both the leaders and the followers —  who rebel 
against governmental authority. Psychologists Brown and 
Herrnstein (1975:274), for instance, argue that "the disappoint­
ment by illegitimate means of legitimate expectations" causes 
people to react violently. The leaders, on the other hand, may 
be presumed to be suffering from mental illness or some sort of 
psychological abnormality or may be motivated by a "syndrome" 
that fills them with a "sense of injustice and a ce responding 
mission to set things right" (Rejai and Phillips, 1979:57),** 
Theda SHocpol (in Coser and Larsen, 1976), offers 
a critique of the "three major approaches" (to revolution), 
which, in her typology are the "aggregate-psychological 
theories . .. the systems/value-consensus theories ... and 
the political conflict theories" (p. 156). Dismissing each
* For an example of the "polity-centered" approach see Jeff 
Goodwin, "Colonialism and Revolution in Southeast Asia: a 
Comparative Analysis", Revolution in the World System, ed., 
Terry Boswell, New York: Greenwood Press, 1989, pp. 59 - 78. 
And for the "structural" approach see Theda Skocpol, "Ex­
plaining Revolution: In Quest of a Social-Structural Ap­
proach", The Dses of Controversy in Sociology, Lewis Coser 
and Otto Larsen, eds., New York: The Free Press, 1975, pp. 
168 - 172.
** On some of the psychological causes of "political violence" 
see "Why hu^n iæings Income violent", Anthony Storr, 
Churchill's Black Itoq, Kafka's Mice and other Phenomena of 
the Humn Mind, New York: Grove Press, 1988; and Mostafa 
Rejai with Kay Phillips Leaders of the Revolution, Beverly 
Hills: Sage Publications, 1979.
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of these theories as incapable of providing satisfactory causal 
explanations for revolution, she argues the case instead for a 
"structural and comparative-hi^torical" approach, of which, 
according to Skocpol, Marxism is one Kind. Nevertheless, she 
is critical of "Marxist-derived theories" (she does not specif­
ically say which ones), on the grounds that they
... cannot he uncritically accepted as rigorous, empirical­
ly validated explanations. [Because] The basic Marxist 
explanation sketch —  which argues that revolutions are 
caused by socio-etxjnomic developments that lead to the out­
break of class struggles which, in turn, transform and mark 
the divide between distinct modes of production —  simply 
does not succeed in laying bare the overall logic of actu­
al historical revolutions, (p. 173)
Skocpol suggests as a corrective to the Marxist ap­
proach, "a new theory":
... one which synthesizes an historically grounded, soc­
ial-structural style of explanation —  with a compara­
tive historical iKthod of hypothesis testing. By thus 
combining ..- that fusion of theoretical understanding 
and historical relevance ... with .. the concern of con­
temporary social science for rigorous hypothesis testing, 
students of revolution can avoid the twin dangers of ab­
stract, irrelevant theorizing and empirical inadequacy 
that have long plagued explanatory efforts in this area 
of inquiry, (pp. 174 - 175)
The usefulness or lack of usefulness of any of the 
above-mentioned theories; the validity of Skocpol’s {or that 
of any one else) criticisms of them; and the value of her "new 
theory" for analyzing revolutions, are of course all issues 
open to debate. But it is important to keep in mind that in 
choosing a theory to analyze a given social pheno^ncn that 
there are different levels of analysis and thus different lev­
els of theories attei^ting to explain the phenomenon in ques­
tion- Relevant to this point is Anton Allahar’s (1989) men­
tion of the distinction between nomothetic totowledge and idio-
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iographic knowledge. According to him, nomothetic knovlcdge is 
aimed at the "discovery of general causal sequences or propos­
itions”; whereas idiographic Knowledge is "generated from
the study of specific- unique events” (p. 7}- One type of 
Knowledge is not "better" than the other. The following an­
alysis of the decolonization crisis in New Caledonia will be 
an attempt to employ and develop both types of knowledge —  the 
nomothetic and the idiographic —  and to make use of theories 
of revolution at various levels of analysis.
The point is that a gi\'en theory may or may not be 
useful for understanding everything there is to know about o 
phenomenon. The student must be aware of this and may find it 
useful to draw on theories from several different approaches, 
which are designed to analyze macroscopic- or macroscopic-level 
phenomenon specifically.
To illustrate this point, take the theory of "rela­
tive deprivation". Relative deprivation refers to the situa­
tion of a group being underprivileged in comparison to another 
group; or of a group having less than it was accustomed to hav­
ing in the past; or of a group having less than it thinks it 
should have by rights. Relative deprivation is often cited 
as being a causal factor in revolution and social conflict 
(see for instance Davis, 1962; Runciman, 1966; Gurr, 1970; 
Coser, 1956). Skocpol (1976) and Salert (1976), for instance, 
place the theory of relative deprivation in the psychological 
theories of revolution. For Skocpol, psychological theories 
explain only (at best) the superficial causes of revolution. 
Skociwîl, citing the evidence of other scholars, rejects the
32
theory wholesale, because (among other reasons) of its sub­
jective, voluntaristic orientation. She argues: “No success­
ful social revolution has ever been “made* by a mass-mobiliz­
ing, avowedly revolutionary movement* (1979:17).
If anyone is saying, categorically, that relative 
deprivation causes revolution, (and none of the theorists 
Skocpol criticizes are making this claim), then they are cer­
tainly wrong. Of course, people who do perceive their under­
privileged condition may well resent it, but they may think it 
is “natural*, normal, and inevitable. They may have been so­
cialized to believe their situation is their own fault, or that 
nothing can be done about it. They may even believe that it is 
God's will that son» are very rich and that others have nothing. 
Obviously, these sorts of beliefs can do nothing to contribute 
to revolutionary understanding or action. But to reject the 
concept as having no relevance in revolutionary causality, 
even if only in some cases, is probably a mistake. This is 
Wcause relative deprivation may, under certain circumstances, 
generate class consciousness. But then Skocpol also rejects 
class consciousness as a factor in bringing about revolution.
Objective, structural factors are at the bottom of 
any potentially revolutionary situation. Objective factors, 
like subjective ones, are necessary, but they ^ y  net be suf­
ficient- But this does not mean that subjective responses 
are unimportant- They are. Both must be included in a caus­
al explanation. As Ritzer (1983:154) puts it: “Skocpol*s fo­
cus on the structural level be right, but that does not 
mean that the other levels are insignificant.*
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The concept of relative deprivation, as a part of a 
theory of revolution, may well have some validity in at least 
sOBæ cases. Used in this way, "psychological" concepts and 
explanations are not inconsistent with a structural, Marxist, 
polity-centered, systems/valuo-consensus, or any other ap­
proach, but can be employed to uncover and understand a partic­
ular variable that may or may not apply in specific cases- A- 
gain, it is a question of the level of analysis that one is 
pursuing.
In any case, for the purposes of this essay, my in­
terest is centered mare on understanding, in general, the 
causes and outcomes of revolutionary situations, specifically 
in the colonial context, than on classifying and criticiîinq 
academic theories about revolution. My focus is limited also 
to the decolonization crisis in New Caledonia, which is further 
more, a colony of white settlement, (perhaps the last such col­
ony remaining in the world). Whatever objective and subjective 
factors that have contributed to the potentially revolutionary 
situation in New Caledonia, and whatever the outcome may be, 
these same factors may or ^ y  not be operative elsewhere.
Only comparative, historical studies can determine that. A 
study of other revolutions (successful and unsuccessful -- 
by whatever criteria one chooses to make this judgement in the 
"backward" areas of the world, can no doubt provide insights 
and clues to the contemporary situation in New Caledonia.
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Part II^Kplainiog Sevolution: The Historical l^terial Approach
Marx vas interested in determining and analyzing the 
causes of social change. For him, the causes are rooted, first 
and foremost, in the objective, material vorld. Ideologies, 
(forms of consciousness) are a reflection of material realities. 
Historically, human beings had distinguished themselves from 
the animals vhen they began producing their means of subsis­
tence (shelter, food, clothing). Early people did this in the 
context of a life-or-death struggle against the forces of na­
ture. At this stage in the development of the human race, the 
level of technology vas simple and consequently little or no 
surplus was produced. Thus, all early societies were tribal, 
non-literate, pre-class, and often nomadic or semi-nomadic.
If geographical, climatic, etc., conditions were particularly 
favorable then the struggle to survive was less precarious; 
people could settle in such locations. Thus began agrarian 
civilizations. When people could settle in one place —  often 
both a result and a cause of their ability to produce a sur­
plus —  a much more complex division of laix>ur tsa.y begin to 
appear. When, in this division of labour, soeæ people coi^ 
to control the use of the surplus, and to control the “forces 
of production® themselves (people and their capacity to work, 
to conceive and to create; the land, tools, natural resources), 
as individuals, then in effect, ownership has come into Wing, 
and with it, classes. The appearance of classes is of world- 
historic significance for Marx; here begins the real history 
of human societies.
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Each mode of production vhich Harx distinguished 
(primitive coEmmnal, the Asiatic, the ancient (slavery), feu­
dal, capitalist- and communist) implies the development of 
human society in stages as the forces of production gain mas­
tery over nature. Any one society will not necessarily pro­
gress through all these modes. All, except the first and the 
last, are class societies, in each næde of production the 
class that owns the means of production (land, tools, slaves, 
for instance), is the ruling class: it dominates politics, and 
presents Its particular world-view (class interests) as the 
same as society's as a whole (including that of the dominated 
classes). Thus, the mode of production (the economic system) 
is the basis of society, and in class-divided societies, the 
ruling class —  which owns the means of production -- also con­
trols the state (the government, the judiciary, the military). 
The elements of the "superstructure" (including law, religion, 
art, theories of morality, etc.,) embody ideologies: they re­
flect the nature of the economic system but also obscure its 
real, true (exploitative and oppressive) quality, and serve to 
propagate and defend the world-view of the ruling class. The 
iKJde of production —  the forces and relations of production 
which characterizes every historic society —  and its corres­
ponding superstructural elements, constitutes the overall 
structure of a society.
According to Ankie Hoogvelt (1982), Marx was not so 
HHich interested in describing each mode of production as he 
was in identifying “the forces of transfor.aation within each 
stage.... Their [Harx and Engels] description of the struc-
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tiiral characteristics of various historical stages ... is sub­
ordinated to a dynamic analysis of the forces of change® {p. 
157). Thus, the theory of historical materialism is a dialec­
tical theory of social change.
At a very high level of abstraction, Marx’s theory 
gives causal priority to the economic sphere in explaining so­
cietal characteristics, specific historic events, and vide- 
scale social change. In each class-divided society, very 
definite ’contradictions® obtain. These contradictions of 
basic economic lavs pit the exploiting class and the exploited 
class against each other. Thus, "class struggle" is necessar­
ily inherent in every class society. According to Marx, vhen 
the material forces of production (technology) develop to such 
a level that the (class) relations of production are nov pre­
venting (rather than permitting, as in an earlier stage of that 
particular mode of production) their further development, an 
era of social revolution follows. In Marx's own words:
The mode of production of material life conditions the so­
cial, political and intellectual life process in general 
... At a certain stage of their development, the material 
productive forces of society come into conflict with the 
existing relations of production-... From forms of devel­
opment of the productive forces these relations turn into 
their fetters- Then begins an epoch of social revolution. 
With the change of the economic foundation the entire im­
mense superstructure is more or less rapidly transformed 
... No social order ever perishes before all the produc­
tive forces for which there is room in it have developed; 
and new, higher relations of production never appear be­
fore the material conditions of their existence have ma­
tured in the womb of the old society itself... (quoted by 
Salert, 1976, p. 99)
Although causal priority is given to the economic 
structure, this is not a theory of social transformation that 
is purely economic deterministic- Objective, material factors
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are crucial in social change, but so are subjective ones. 
Therefore, an adequate overall theory of revolution must in­
clude theories that address both levels of analysis. In the 
subjective realm, people have to become avare of the real na­
ture of the economic and social system. Once they have per­
ceived the oppression and exploitation that characterizes any 
class society and have become politicized and organized to 
fight it, only then does the abolition of the old class sys­
tem become a real possibility. Thus, Marx placed great impor­
tance on the development of class consciousness in the oppres­
sed. As Ankie Hoogvelt (1982) puts it:
How soon and how successfully contradictions lead to con­
flict and revolution depends -eery much on the degree of 
the consciousness of the oppressed class, and this in turn 
is a matter of political organization, leadership, and the 
mass circulation of the historically correct analysis...
(pp. 157 - 158)
Obviously, the theory of historical materialism is 
"grand theory" (in the words of C.W. Mills (1959), par excel­
lence . More specific theories, at a lower level of abstrac­
tion, about revolutionary causality (such as the factors that 
favour the appearance of the subjective conditions for revolu­
tion, i.e. the develOEsnent of class consciousness in the oppres­
sed class(es)) and outcomes (such as the role of the state in 
neutralizing revolutionary tendencies and potentialities) arc 
needed to augment, build upon and advance the general theory of 
historical materialism and social change- Latter theorists 
as well as practicing revolutionaries did just that- It is 
these theories that for the most part, have their origin in 
the Marxist tradition, that will guide my analysis of the do-
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colonization crisis in Nev Caledonia.
In his theory of social transformation, Marx paid 
special attention to and made a detailed scientific analysis of 
the capitalist mode of production. His purpose in this en­
deavor was to identify the specific structural (objective, 
material) characteristics and economic contradictions that 
would eventually cause capitalism to "produce its own grave­
diggers" as he put it, (i.e. create the conditions —  objective 
and subjective —  and classes that would bring capitalism's 
overthrow). Thus, the theory of historical materialism in gen­
eral, and of the development of capitalism in particular, is 
essentially class-centered and class-theoreticalî an under­
standing of class formation and class struggle is crucial to 
Marx's historical-economic theory of social transformation.
An Involved description and analysis of Marx's theo­
ry of capitalist developnent is not necessary here. But cer­
tain aspects of it will be briefly discussed later on, for in­
stance; some of capitalism's specific economic contradictions; 
the necessary concentration and centralization of capital; 
and the social conditions (competition, emiseration), to which 
all this gives rise and that in turn set up the conditions 
for the dialectical transcendence of capitalism through social 
revolution.
Of course, major developnænts and transformations 
have occurred in the vorld and in the capitalist mode of pro­
duction since Marx's day- Theoretical advances have been m d e  
Jxîth in the Marxist and the non-Marxist traditions in an at­
tempt to explain these events. No theory of modern revolutions
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(especially revolutions in the underdeveloped world) would be 
satisfactory without taking into consideration the Marxist- 
Leninist theory of imperialism, in which imperialism is con­
sidered to be the necessary outcome of economic forces and 
contradictions inherent in the capitalist mode of production. 
The causes and consequences of imperialism, according to the 
Marxist-Leninist theory, will therefore be discussed in sobr? 
detail.
Dependency theory has focused specifically on the 
impact of capitalism and imperialism on the colonies and for^r 
colonies (the modern-day "Third World"). Some versions of the 
theory have focused specifically on the question of how this 
has meant, among other things, the transferring of revolution­
ary potential from the developed capitalist countries to the 
underdeveloped world (Stavrianos, 1981, pp. 431 - 437). These 
new advances in theoretical understanding of current political 
and economic developsents and of their implications for revolu­
tion, are of crucial importance. A complete theory of modern 
revolution must take into account and analyze the special ob­
jective and subjective features of underdeveloped/colonial ter­
ritories, where history has so far demonstrated that revolution 
is sxïst likely to occur.
The following is an outline of the Marxist definition 
of revolution and it will be seen how this relates to the theo­
ry of the successive stages of msdes of production and of so­
cial transformation.
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Part IIIThe ^rxist Infini tion of Revolntlon
For Marxists, social revolution is scientifically de­
fined as the total transformation of society: base and super­
structure. A politically, economically, and technologically 
obsolete mode of production (the base of society), is "abolish­
ed® and subsequently the superstructural elements of society 
undergo profound changes (in la%s, institutions, and also in 
ideologies of all kinds), that reflect the interests of the 
new ruling class. This new ruling class came into the ascend­
ant (numerically, economically, and eventually ideologically), 
during the preceding economic system: it was a necessary pro­
duct of it. The first sign of a social revolution is the pol­
itical ascendance (the taking of state prawer), by this new 
class. Thus, a social revolution involves the removal of a 
"decaying" ruling class from state power and the institution 
of a new mode of production, a Ek)re democratic political sys­
tem, and new property relations, that are mire "progressive" 
(permit further development of the productive forces), A so­
cial revolution in modern times ray be either bourgeois (this 
refers to the overthrow of the feudal mode of production and 
its replacement with the capitalist mode of production, e.g., 
the French Revolution); or socialist (this refers to the over­
throw of the capitalist m)de of production and its replaceront 
with the socialist mode of production, e.g., the Russian Revo­
lution of October 1917).
As Abercrombie, Hill, and Turner (1984) put it:
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[In] Marxist theory —  there is a clear distinction be­
tween political changes in governments and radical changes 
in the economic organization of society.... For Marx, a 
revolution involved the replacement of one mode of pro­
duction by another, as in the transition from feudalism 
to capitalism (p. 179).
It is very important to be clear on just what con­
stitutes a social revolution (as opposed to a political revolu­
tion, which will be described below), according to the scientif­
ic principles of historical materialism. There is much confu­
sion on this point as this problem is reflected in the academic 
literature on revolution. This has led some writers to define 
as revolutionary change what would be seen as mere political 
change in historical materialist analysis. For instance, John 
Walton (1984) argues that Kenya’s attainment of national inde­
pendence in 1963 was a revolutionary transformation of society. 
He writes: **I do not see how Kenya’s independence ... can bo 
considered anything else [but a basic transformation]" (p. 32). 
He defines revolution after Lasch as: "an attempt ... to seize 
state power on the part of political forces avowedly opposed 
not Barely to the existing regime but to the existing social 
order as a whole" (p. 31). Walton is, of course, free to de­
fine revolution in this way if he chooses to do so. But this 
is not the Marxist definition of social revolution (as describ­
ed above). Walton seems to making the mistake that Lenin is 
said to have cautioned about when he (Lenin) warned: "Do not 
paint all nationalism red". The point is, there is a big dif­
ference between (political) nationalism and (economic) social 
revolution. The difference between these is reflected in the 
enormous implications that both have for post-independence do-
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velopsænt.
I do not agree with John Walton that the outconæ of 
Kenya's decolonization crisis vas revolutionary just because 
there have been political and economic changes in post-coloniAi 
Kenya. I suggest that it is much m)re accurate to see Kenya's 
attainment of independence as a political revolution, rather 
than as a "basic transformation® in the economic structure of 
the post-colonial social formation. At the most, Kenya's 
promotion to independence, involved a partial bourgeois revolu­
tion- There was no essential change in the nature of the state 
nor in the mode of production that colonialism had introduced 
in Kenya —  at least no progressive change that opened ism^di- 
ate possibilities for the further development of the productive 
forces. There was certainly no change in class power in the 
state and thus no social revolution.
So just what sort of transformation did Kenya's inde­
pendence constitute? Marx's concept of political revolution is 
enlightening in answering this question. Marx's analysis of 
political revolution accurately describes the type of social 
change that occurred (and, broadly, hov it occurred), when 
the former colonies were recognized as independent states by 
the imperial powers. Marx writes:
[a ] partial, merely political revolution ... leaves the 
pillars of the building standing. What is the ïmsis of 
a partial, særeiy political revolution? Simply this: a_ 
fraction of civil society emancipates itself and achieves 
a dominant position, a certain class undertakes, from its 
particular situation, a general emancipation of society. 
(Karl Marx, quoted in Sociological Perspectives, Kenneth 
Thompson and Jeremy Tunstall, eds.. New York; Penguin,
1971, p. 246)
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The "fraction of civil society" that achieved the 
"general einancipation" of Kenyan society vas the "Westernized" 
native nationalist elite that led the country to national inde­
pendence in 1963. Did this "class" {that is, the Kenyan nation­
alist-native elite —  here the term "class" is used loosely), 
actually "emancipate society as a vhoie"? No, it did not!, i>a- 
cause, in the words of Marx, it can do so "only on conditio 
that the whole of society is in the same situation as this 
class, for example, that it possesses or can acquire money or 
culture®. This condition clearly did and does not obtain in 
the case of Kenya: the African masses were totally excluded 
from British culture and certainly had no money. That is the 
nature of colonialism and of the colonial legacy.
All of this points to the importance of understanding 
the role of various social classes and the of state in anti­
colonial struggles- An anti-colonial movement contains a 
great deal of révolu^ ionary potential —  latent or manifest —  
depending on different features of specific decolonization 
crises. But the outcome of any potentially revolutionary situ­
ation is always uncertain. Understanding the role of the state 
and the class interests of non-revolutionary sectors of colonial 
society is crucial to understanding why this is so. Regarding 
the role of classes, Marx's analysis again applies to the case 
of Kenya's nationalist-native elite in the country's anti-colon­
ial "revolution". The analogy is striking.
For a popular revolution and the emacipation of a partic­
ular class of civil society to coincide, for one class to 
represent the whole of society, another class must concen­
trate in itself all the evils of society, [such as the col­
AA
onized masses] a particular class must embody and repres­
ent a general obstacle and limitation [the vhite settlers]. 
A particular social sphere must be regarded as the notor­
ious crime of the vhole society, [colonialism] so that esan- 
cipation from this sphere appears as a general emancipation. 
For one class to be the liberating class par excellence,
[the nationalist elite] it is essential that another class 
should be the openly oppressing class [the British bour­
geoisie] . fSocioliKTlcal Perspectives, p. 245)
A few final points on Kenya. John Walton (1984) 
writes: "I think it fruitless to belabor what is a basic trans­
formation". But it is not "fruitless® if one is trying to per- 
sue scientific accuracy in the study of revolution and to un­
derstand the causes of underdevelopment. If, by "basic trans­
formation" one Bffians the transition from one mode of production 
to another more progressive mode, then plainly no such trans­
formation occurred in Kenya- Capitalist class relations that 
were imjKjsed during colonialism persist in post-independence 
Kenya. It is also probably the case that independence has not 
been particularly favorable to the further develojmjent of the 
productive forces. Nor has it been the harbinger of a "new be­
ginning" for Kenya as far as real improvements in the material 
quality of life for the majority of Kenyans is concerned. By 
all accounts, Kenya remains a very underdeveloped country.
Just as an illustration, consider the following:
[In Kenya] hungry people live in shacks without running 
water. Crime ... robbery is booming in Nairobi, as is 
prostitution.... A 1977 UN survey ... disclosed that 72 
per cent of household heads never attended school, one 
third of the children suffer from malnutrition, less than 
2 îœr cent of the households have electricity and half the 
woB^n trudge at least three times each day between their 
villages and the springs. (Stavrianos 1981:676)
The granting of independence is a type of reform 




White-settler colonialism -- which in Kenya's case lasted from 
1880 until 1963 —  vas on the way out anyway, it had served 
its purpose during an earlier stage of capitalism, na^Iy the 
era of high competitive imperialism. But imperialism and col­
onialism are objectively contradictory. When these contradic­
tions becoHæ acute, independence is the inevitable outcome.
This is because nationalist-reformlst independence, with x̂jlit- 
ical authority handed to a native elite, "guarantees" the long­
term interests of imperialism. Likewise, it ensures the deep­
ening of dependency and underdevelopment. Thus, independence 
as a reform does not weaken imperialism, but strengthens it. 
This is the essence and the imperative of neo-colonialism. Be­
cause of this, in no way is neo-colonial independence capable 
of promoting real development. The history of the post-inde­
pendence Third World has proven this tragic reality. As 
Stavrianos argues;
Throughout the Third World in all centuries, independent 
status was conceded selectively, depending on the prospec­
tive degree of social change. If the expectation was for 
smrely political change, independence was usually conceded 
rather than resorting to extreme repressive measures. But 
if there was any likelihood of social restructuring that 
threatened metropolitan and local vested interests, then 
all possible assures were used to keep the social revolu­
tionaries out of power. (Stavrianos, 1981:669)
This is not to say that no political nor economic 
development has taken place in post-independence Kenya. It 
has. But revolutionary? On the contrary, according to 
Kenneth Good (1976:616). He argues that independence actually 
sæant the "newly initiated underdevelopment" of Kenya. He 
explains :
The enforced intervention of the métropole helps bring an
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end to the settler state.... British imperialism succeeded 
in establishing the African landowning class in political 
power, and it also determined, thereby, that Kenya's sub­
sequent independent economic development would be curtailed. 
As Richard Sandbrook puts it: "It is not only Marxists who 
suggest that the metropolis may now have B»re control over 
the Kenyan economy than in the colonial past, owing to the 
intertwining of the interests of the indigenous political 
class and big (i.e. foreign-controlied) business", (p. 616)
It may be counter to expectations and counter-intui­
tive that the granting of independence actually ensures depen­
dency. But this fact only points to the analytical importance 
of understanding the difference between a change of the system 
(a truly revolutionary change from one mode of production to 
another), as opposed to political change merely within it.
It is very important to grasp the significance of this dis­
tinction because of the enormous implications it has for the 
post-independence state's ability to overcome dependency.
Part IV
Tbe Origins of Revolutionary Anti-Colonialism
It is an historical fact that colonialism did not 
end everywhere at the same time or in the same way and that 
colonialism has had different effects on the level of develop- 
^nt attained- Ghana, for instance, achieved a relatively 
peaceful transition to independence in 1957. Algeria fought a 
seven-year war of independence. New Caledonia remains a colony 
over thirty years later, yet it is much more developed than In­
dependent Ghana. Mozambique and Angola, on the other hand, 
only won inde^ndence in 1974, after fighting over a decade of 
revolutionary anti-colonial war. What accounts for these 
differences?
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Analysing specifically tîie decolonization of Asia, 
Jeffrey (1982) has tried to explain the conditions that deter­
mined a peaceful ("evolutionary*') transition to independence as 
opposed to those that led to revolutionary anti-colonial wars. 
He has identified the following factors:
Evolutionary
1 Long period of rule, which grudgingly fostered educa­
tion and participatory government.
2 Large Westernized élite, sympathetic to existing gov­
ernment structure.
3 Small proportion of Europeans (e.g. 1:1600 in Philip­
pines, 1:3700 in India in 1930s).
4 Large locally-staffed colonial bureaucracy and army.
5 Colonial power willing to release its grip.
Revolutionary
1 Short period of colonial rule. Little Western-stylc 
education.
2 Ko nation-wide Westernized élite until veil into the 
twentieth century.
3 Larger propartion of Europeans (e.g. 1:200 in Indo­
nesia and 1:475 in Vietnam)-
4 Heavy colonial economic interest in country, with lit­
tle participatory government.
5 Colonial power unwilling to release its grip.
(Jeffrey summarized in Third World Atlas, prepared by 
Ben Crow and Alan Thomas, with Robin Jenkins and Judy 
Kimble, Philadelphia: Milton Keynes: 1983, p. 42)
These factors determining the path to independence 
are complex and inter-related phenomena. From Jeffrey's an­
alysis, the following sorts of questions suggest themselves: 
What is it about a Westernized élite that determines so signif­
icantly tbe way to independence? Why was the colonial power 
"willing to release its grip" in some cases and not in certain 
others? And how and why does the proportion of Europeans pres­
ent in a colony impact on decolonization?
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The Radicalizing Effects of Direct Colonialism
The imperial powers employed two different types of 
political control in their colonies: direct and indirect. Di­
rect political control involved administration of the colony 
by an imperial-appointed governor, a European-staffed bureauc­
racy and civil service. Few, if any positions were open to the 
colonized. And of course, all high-level positions were monop­
olized by Europeans. Direct colonialism was a case of almost 
complete social closure. Needless to say, there was no question 
of the colonized being democratically consulted in all this.
It was a naked and crudely imperialist-imposed system intended 
to permit the most rapid exploitation possible of a colony's 
resources: land and labour. White-settler colonies are a type 
of direct colonialism. Malaya, on the other hand, had very 
few settlers, and was ruled under indirect colonialism.
Jeff Goodwin (1989)* has studied the effects of di­
rect colonialism on decolonization in Southeast Asia. He ar­
gues that the type of colonial political control employed in 
Southeast Asia was the single-most significant factor deter­
mining the path to independence and the political complexion of 
the post-independence state. He writes:
The exact nature of Western colonial and Japanese rule in 
Southeast Asia crucially shaped the possibilities for dif­
ferent types of political leaderships in the postwar period.
* Jeff Goodwin, "Colonialism and Revolution in Southeast Asia: 
A Cfnaparative Analysis", in Revolution in the World Svst^, 
Terry Boswell, ed.. New York: Greenwood Press, 1989, pp. 59 
- 78.
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depending especially on whether such rule was of a direct 
or indirect nature.... Where Western colonial regimes or 
the Japanese allowed or even encouraged non~Comjunist lead­
ers to participate in colonial governnænt and administra­
tion —  especially regimes engaged in a transition to self- 
rule —  revolutionary r%)vements failed, {p. 75)
The radicalizing effect of direct colonialism on na­
tional liberation movements was especially acute in the case of 
Vietnam. Goodwin argues that French imperialism's failure to 
foster "compliant elites" (p. 63), allowed the insurgents no 
way forward but a militant path. He explains:
By failing to nurture moderate political croups, French 
rule Inadvertently favored revolutionaries: "the pitiless 
suppression of Vietnamese political powers by the French"
—  both before and during the war —  favored “clandes­
tine organizations totally dedicated to the forceful over­
throw of colonial authority" (Duiker 1976, 184). Co-opted 
or suppressed, non-Communist "nationalist reformists had 
almost disappeared as a political force in Vietnam" in the 
1930s. (Duiker 1976, in Boswell p. 73)
Indirect colonialism, by contrast, in which a Western­
ized native elite or "traditional" chiefs are “groomed" to ad­
minister the territory in the interests of the imperial state, 
helps to permit a peaceful neo-colonial conclusion to colonia]- 
ism. As Goodwin points out:
The Americans and British, in fact, had successfully groom­
ed a conservative "neocolonial" elite in the Philippines 
and Malaya, —  to whom they could "safely® hand over po­
litical power without jeopardizing their local economic 
interests (p. 61).
The Malayan decolonization struggle —  which started 
out with real revolutionary potential —  was savagely repressed 
and rapidly deradicalized after the British declared a state of 
emergency in 1948- The "enærgency", which did not end until 
1960, and "Operation Starvation* resulted in the deaths of well 
over eleven thousand colonized people (Goodwin, 1989: 65 and
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71). In addition to the all-out repression of the insurgents, 
Britain implemented reform policies and took advantage of div­
isions within the anti-colonial movement, especially ethnic 
divisions. Only after this pre-emptive counter-revolution 
succeeded in crushing the revolutionary mavement vas indepen­
dence permitted in Malaya. Goodwin concludes:
In the postwar period, ... the slow movement towards 
Malayan independence also worked against the insurgency. 
Unlike Vietnam, in Malaya a peaceful transition to demo­
cratic self-rule appeared to be a real alternative to 
armed struggle. Had British rule been equally harsh for 
all ethnic groups, and had the British not begun a trans­
ition to self-government, the Communists might have W e n  
more successful in Malaya- (p. 74)
Another reason that direct colonialism has the un-in 
tended effect of radicalizing the colonized is the transparent­
ly, blatantly, nakedly coercive quality of it. The material 
situation of the colonized is not only appalling but the rea­
sons for this condition are only too obvious to the oppressed. 
By totally excluding the vast majority of the colonized from 
even the appearance of opportunities for upward mobility and im­
provement In living standards, the state wins only their un­
mitigated hatred and opposition. The singularly repressive 
nature of direct colonialism delays the creation of an elite 
among the colonizii, and disallows the institutionalization of 
conflict, thus Inadv ^rtently favoring militancy. Left no pos­
sibilities for reforms, the colonized have no other way forward 
but violent overthrow of the colonial state. This brings one 
to the following conclusion: maintaining political control and 
economic dominance through coercion alone has no long-term 
viability. A nakedly unjust system cannot contribute in any
5î
way to the hegemony of any ruling class.
While colonialism is always viewed by the colonized 
as illegitimate, direct colonialism has particularly radicaliz­
ing effects on the colonized. These "by products" of direct, 
colonialism will be the object of a systematic counter-insur­
gency program. The result is usually the gradual defeat &nd 
deradicalization of the anti-colonial movement. It is only in 
this case that the colonial power is "willing to release its 
grip".
White Settlers, Development, Class Formation
and Revolutionary Anti-Colonial Class Action
James Petras (1975)* has made the following import­
ant observation:
Social revolution is not a product of the underdeveloped 
areas of the periphery, but more likely initiated in those 
areas most penetrated ty the metropolis, where capitalist 
social relations predominate and where productivity ap­
proximates that of the metropolis, (p. 306)
The colonies of whit" settlement have been the scone 
of some of the most extensive revolutionary class actions of 
this century. It is no coincidence that these are also the 
areas ®most penetrated by the metropolis", where class forma­
tion, and economic development, have been relatively advanced. 
A number of complex, interrelated, social, economic, and polit­
ical factors combined explain why white settlement colonics
* James Petras quoted by Anton Allahar in Sociology and the 
Periphery, Theories and Issues, Toronto: Gararaond Press, 
1989, p. 133-
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have been noteworthy as “regions of revolt®.
As mentioned above, white settlement colonies are 
under direct imperial political control. The colonized are 
thus systematically excluded from democratic representation.
The tiny fraction of the colonized who are "Westernized® are 
themselves disscrimated against. But the extreme oppression 
of the colonized contributes to the achievement of revolution­
ary action especially because of the relatively and highly 
visible privileged position of the settler .
The relative deprivation of colonized people in white 
settler colonies is a major factor moving them to revolutionary 
understanding and action. This relative deprivation is both 
material and political. Europeans monopolized the running of 
both the political and economic life of the colony. Pierre Van 
den Berghe and Kenneth Vickery have labelled this situation a 
"Herrenvolk deim>cracy®. Vickery (1974i309) has explained it 
this way:
rHerrenvolk democracy is] a parliamentary regime in which 
the exercise of power and suffrage is restricted, de facto 
and often de iare, to the dominant group; a regime dem)- 
cratic for the master race but tyrannical for the subor­
dinate groups. Herrenvolk egalitarianism can be seen as 
the extension of equality in political, economic, or other 
spheres to those within the dominant group but not those 
without.
Vickery goes on to point out that "political forms 
are reflections of economic structures’* (p. 311). Nowhere is 
this more obvious than in the white settler^nt colonial social 
formation where class exploitation and racial oppression neces­
sarily overlap and where Herrenvolk democracy ensures this.
The dominant position in colonial society —  that the settler
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so jealously defends against the colonized —  is not simply a 
reflection of their "sadistic racist fury", as Good (1976:603) 
puts it. The settlers —  with the military and political sup- 
I»rt of the state —  rapidly divest the colonized of their 
land, often leaving them, in the process, virtually landless 
for all practical purposes. This transforms the settlers (and 
a small fraction of the colonized) into capitalist farmers and 
the vast majority of the colonized into a cheap wage labour 
force for plantations and industries. As Good (1976:60<) 
argues :
The late nineteenth-century settler came to Africa ... as 
a “fully developed capitalist man", and vith the forcible 
acquisition of vast supplies of land and labour, a potent­
ially productive combination immediately came into being.
Thus, the relative deprivation of the colonized in 
colonies of settlement is not only extreme —  owing to the 
"more dynamic economic characteristics of settler colonialism” 
(Good, 1975:604) —  it is also highly visible. As Good (1976) 
points out: "Stark Inequalities necessarily result in social 
change under settler colonialism" (p. 607). And revolutionary 
class action has very frequently been the the catalyst of so­
cial change in white settler colonies. The resentment caused 
by class inequalities in white settler colonialism is aggravat­
ed by its overtly racial character. Kuper (1971:105 - 106) 
has argued:
Status resentment seems to be most socially explosive in a 
status system based on race. A recent study of two racial 
revolutions concludes the “racial divisions are the propel­
ling force in the revolutions, the predisposing factors 
that affect racial status in any of its B*any social dimen­
sions, and the dialect of conflict is essentially racial".
The manifest and extreme economic unfairness of
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white settler colonialism generates class consciousness in the 
oppressed colonized masses. Bat, relative deprivation alone 
will not iKJve people to revolutionary action. Relative depriv­
ation is necessary but must be combined with other factors; 
it must be visible, extre^, and furthermore, attempts to ob­
tain reforms must have failed, before people may become revo­
lutionary. Where a class system is incapable of presenting el­
aborate mystifications about itself, the potential for revolu­
tion is present. As the Latin American revolutionary, Che 
Guevara has pointed out:
Where a government has coaæ into power through some form 
of popular vote, fraudulent or not, and maintains at least 
an appearance of constitutional legality, the guerrilla 
outbreak cannot be promoted, since the possibilities of 
peaceful struggle have not yet been exhausted, (Guevera, 
Guerrilla Warfare, quoted in Woddis, New Theories of Revo­
lution, New York; International, 1972, pp. 249 - 250.
The classical sociologist. Max Weber, has observed; 
"The rise of societal or even communal action from a common 
class situation is by no sæans a universal phenomenon”. In 
trying to explain why class action does sometimes arise, Weber 
noted that its occurrence was "especially linked to the trans­
parency of the connections between the causes and the conse­
quences of the class situation®.* He goes on to argue:
The fact of being conditioned and the results of the class 
situation must he distinctly recognizable. For only then 
the contrast of life chances can be felt not as an absolute­
ly given fact to be accepted, but as a resultant from ei­
ther (a) the given distribution of property, or (b) the
* Max Weber, "Class, Status, Party" in Sociological Perspec­
tives , Kenneth Thompson and Jeremy Tunstall, eds., New York: 
Penguin, 1971, pp. 253 - 254.
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structure of the concrete economic order. It is only then 
that people may react against the class structure not only 
through acts of an intermittent and irrational protest but 
in the form of rational association, (emphasis mine)
The rapid economic development (by world standards) 
displayed by white settler colonialism; the resulting relatively 
advanced class formation; ever-increasing relative deprivation; 
closure of all avenues to upward mobility; and exhaustion of 
constitutional paths to reforms, and the "distinctly recogniz- 
zable" existence, unfairness, and "non-inevitableness" of just 
these circumstances —  all observable in settler colonialism 
—  and the revolutionary action this unique combination gener­
ates, is an empirical validation of Weber's argument.
Ami1car Cabral, an anti-colonial revolutionary leader 
in Guinea and Cape Verde, also noted that political understand­
ing and class consciousness could be born out of the misery and 
relative deprivation of the colonized. It is not enough that 
people are, as an objective economic and social fact, highly 
exploited and oppressed. They must also perceive it. By com­
paring their misery with the privileges enjoyed by the colon­
izers, the colonized can come to see both the cause of their 
suffering and that this condition is not immutable. As Cabral 
has explained it:
Many people say that it is the peasants who carry the bur­
den of exploitation; this may be true, but so far as the 
struggle is concerned it must be realised that it is not 
the degree of suffering and hardship involved as such that 
matters; even extreme suffering in itself does not neces­
sarily produce the prise de conscience required for the na­
tional liberation struggle. In Guinea the peasants are sub­
jected to a kind of exploitation equivalent to slavery; but 
even if you try and explain to them that they are teing ex­
ploited and robbed. It is difficult to convince them by 
means of an inexperienced explanation of a technico-oconom-
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ic kind that they are the most exploited people, whereas it 
is easier to convince the workers and the people employed 
in the towns who earn, say, 10 escudos a day for a job in 
which a European earns between 30 and 50 that they are be­
ing subjected to massive exploitation and injustice, because 
they can see. (Cabral, quoted in îfoddis, 1971, p. 56, em­
phasis mine)
There are many illustrations of the above arguments 
that one could mention from the history of decolonization.
Kenya, again, presents a classic example of many of these fea­
tures of white settler colonialism, and how they can produce, 
in combination, revolutionary action.
Only a brief mention of the socio-economic features 
of colonial Kenya can be made here. Kenya was the most devel- 
o^d colony in East Africa: it was the most industrialized, it 
had the most developed infrastructure and the most integrated 
economy. It also had the largest number of settlers in East 
Africa with a ratio of Europeans to African of 1:130 according 
to Good (1976:610), (there were few settlers in Tanganyika and 
Dganda). Kenya had the jK>st advanced elimination of the peas­
antry and consequently the most advanced class formation. It 
also had, by far, the sxsst violent decolonization struggle in 
East Africa.
As Woddis (1972:30) has pointed out: "Armed action 
was a feature of the anti-colonial struggle only in a minority 
of African colonies’*. Kenya, like all the other areas used for 
extensive white settlement in Africa, suffered arred conflict 
to achieve independence. The conditions that determined Kenya’s 
war of independence were, of course, years in the making. All 
the primary resistance nssvements had, as elsewhere, failed to 
repel colonization. And by the 1920s, wage labour was well
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established throughout Kenya. Wages vere very low and living 
conditions appalling (Wolff, 1974; Woddis, i960 and 1971). As 
Woddis puts it: "In colonial Africa, the minimum wage, 
tended to be still lower than what a minimum wage, scientific­
ally speaking, is supposed to represent" {Woddis, 1971:104).
Not surprisingly, the emiseration of African workers was c\- 
trei^:
Dr. H.C. Trowell has drawn attention to the limited amount 
of food constm®d by African workers in Kenya in the 1940s, 
many leaving home without food in the morning, doing with­
out food midday, and only eating once in the day, late at 
night. (Woddis, 1971:107)
Furthermore, living conditions for the "peasants" -- 
really almost landless rural workers —  were no better. In Ken­
ya, by the 1950s, 73 per cent of the income of the peasants came 
from the earnings of migrant workers (Woddis, 1971:112). And, 
according to Good (1976:603):
By 1952, ... some 9,000 settlers had exclusive rights to 
16,700 square miles of land, while several million Afric­
ans tried to exist on congested reserves, as contract labor- 
rers on white farms, and as unskilled workers in the towns.
It is in these deplorable conditions of poverty and inequality
that lie the "roots of revolt" under settler colonialism.
Class conflict in Kenya was wide-scale and state re­
pression was brutal from the beginning. In the early 1920s, 
workers rose up to protest working and living conditions in 
a general strike, "one of the earliest recorded in African his­
tory" (Woddis, 1971:128). Hundreds of protesters were killed, 
and wounded. And literally dozens of violent strikes occurred 
through the 1930s, '40s, and '50s, culminating in the state's 
declaration of a state of emergency in 1952, in the face of
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a “dangerous" revolutionary situation. As Good explains:
Kenyan workers were increasingly forced to try and realize 
their potentiality for revolutionary action. The Mombasa 
strike of 1947 was followed by the banning of the African 
Workers’ Federation and the loss of its leaders, the 1950 
general strike ended only after nine days, a massive show 
of military force, and the arrest of hundreds of workers; 
again, the then main militant organisation was banned.
(Good, 1976:613}
Due to the ensuing ant-colonial war, pKjpularly refer­
red to as the "Mau Mau Rebellion’, at least 10,000 Africans were 
killed and 100,000 were jailed in concentration camps (Woddis 
1961; Good, 1976). In Kenya's decolonization crisis, the state 
declared "class war* in response to a truly revolutionary sit­
uation. Good points out: "This potentially revolutionary move- 
^nt, and the colonial mode of production which caused it, had 
no parallels elsewhere in East Africa" (p. 508).
The Objective Contradictions of White-Settler 
Colonialism and Imperialism and the 
Hadicalization of the Colonized
Of course, strikes were commonplace throughout colon­
ial Africa, including in non-settler colonies under indirect 
colonialism. And workers everywhere in Africa suffered very 
bad working conditions, starvation wages, poor housing, and 
naked repression. These were the conditions in exister e as 
Africans achieved independence. But in the colonies under in­
direct colonialism, a small Westernized elite had been for^d 
by Imj^rialism. Political independence vas granted fairly 
peacefully to these conservative nationalist reformers. In 
this way revolution was dii^rted and imperial interests were 
also thereby preserved-
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In contrast to this, were the extremely violent de­
colonization straggles in colonies under direct imperial con­
trol (including colonies of white settlement). This can only 
be understood in light of two main interrelated unique condi­
tions: the anti-imperialism of the settlers and the radical­
isation of the colonized. The belated independence of Port­
ugal's African colonies can be understood in part as due to the 
effects of direct colonialism. But there were other factors 
involved there as well. In any case, throughout the history 
of colonialism, settlers and imperialism have been objective!y 
in opposition. In the American war of independence, for 
example, the American settlers broke with British imperial 
control to form an independent nation state. The Africaners 
tried to do the same in the Anglo-Boer war. White Rhodesians 
illegally unilaterally declared independence from Britain in 
1955. Settlers in Algeria, Kenya, Congo-Katanga, Rhodesia, 
Angola, New Hebrides, and New Caledonia, had on occasion 
threatened to declare independence to the alarm of their res- 
î^ctive imperial “parent-states®.
Why is this so? And why did independence permit the 
U.S., South Africa, and Rhodesia (temporarily), to become ad­
vanced capitalist (“center®) formations (according to Samir 
Amin —  see Good, 1976:609), while the remainder of inde^n- 
dent Africa, for instance, continues to suffer varying degrees 
of onderdevelop^nt? Frederick Engels noted: “To get rid of 
national oppression is the basic condition of all free and 
healthy develoj^ient'' (quoted in Smith, 1984:99). But why has
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independence allowed only some countries to develop? For the 
majority of the world's countries, inde^ndence has meant rel­
egation to the “periphery": continued dependency and under­
development -
Thus, a number of questions present themselves out 
of a study of decolonization crises in white-settler colonies: 
Why has independence allowed only some countries to develop, 
but not others (U.S., and South Africa, for instance, versus 
Zimbabwe and Kenya)? Why do the settlers oppose imperialism 
to the point of threatening to make a "radical break" with 
it by declaring independence? And why does the imperial 
state oppose both settler-led independence and the revolu­
tionary anti-imperialism of the colonized?
The raison d'etre of imperialism —  and its con­
sequences —  begins to reveal itself in a closer examination 
of these problems. Arghiri Ei^ianuel (1972) has offered a 
forceful and convincing argument about the imperatives of de­
colonization and the contradictory and contentious relation­
ship of settlers to both imperialism and the colonized. On 
the settlers* relationship with imperialism, Emmanuel writes:
They [the settlers] benefited from colonialism and there­
fore promoted It, without reserve or contradiction —  and 
for this reason they were basically anti-imperialistic.... 
From the beginning they were in conflict with their re­
spective parent countries and therefore with Imperialism 
itself —  objectively so at all ti^s, subjectively so 
at times of crisis, going so far as to take up arms ag­
ainst it.... {p. 39)
In addition to the economic contradictions between 
imperialism and colonialism in which imperialism Imposes an 
international division of laTxsur and seeks to keep the colon-
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les as reserves of raw materials whereas settlers seek to 
promote economic development "on the spot®» are conflicts be­
tween settlers and imperialism over the "native problem". Ac­
cording to Good (1975) serious conflicts between imperialism 
and settlers arise from demands by the colonized for reforms. 
But since the privileges of the settlers are based on the op­
pression of the colonized, settlers will brook no reforms. 
Thus the colonized are radicalized and imperialism is thus en­
dangered. Good explains:
Settler societies display a strong and early drive to­
wards political autonomy from the imperial métropole, 
and seek unimpeded action against the colonised.... Set­
tlers seem to believe, with considerable justification, 
that the greater their degree of independence from the 
métropole, the more easily will their control over land 
and labour be maintained.... The long-term and imre 
general aim is to ensure that the métropole makes no 
liberalizing concessions to the black majorities, and 
the basic method is constant reactive clamour and block­
ing manoeuvres, (pp. 510 - 611)
Imperialism does not, of course, try to enact re­
forms out of genuine concern for the well-being and advance­
ment of the colonized. The object of reforms is to eradicate 
support for revolutionary change. This is one of the main 
reasons for granting independence. It is important to grasp 
the real political significance and purpose of reforms.
When imperialism is endangered by the inability 
of the settlers to tolerate amelioration of the colonized's 
condition, the overthrow of settler colonialism is at hand.
The defeat of settler colonialism often necessitates a war 
because, in the words of Emmanuel (1972): "The settler com­
munity ... could only be saved by succession from the metro-
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polls and by setting up an independent white state* (p. 39): 
a prospect not acceptable to the metropolis. Meanwhile, the 
situation is complicated by the simultaneous guerrilla anti-col- 
onial war. When imi^rialism succeeds in defeating both fac­
tions seeking independence, neo-colonial reform concludes the 
decolonization struggle. The aim of defeating the revolution­
ary anti-colonial movei^nt is to preclude the withdrawal of the 
country from exploitative economic relations with the advanced 
capitalist center by transition to a socialist mode of produc­
tion. The necessity of defeating the settlers is to prevent 
the creation of an Independent capitalist H|^rrenvolk republic 
(like South Africa) which also ^ans the end of imperial ex­
ploitation of the country.
Neo-colonial Independence and Underdevelopment
Both Marx and Lenin thought that colonialism and the 
"export of capital" would transform the recipient nation into 
a developed capitalist country (Allahar, 1989:104). For this 
reason, they regarded capitalist expansion into the pre-capital­
ist countries as progressive —  without ever denying the misery 
and degradation it i^ant for the exploited in the oppressed na­
tions. The expansion of capitalism into the "backward" areas 
of the world was a necessary evil if they were to develop and 
eventually undergo social revolutions.
Most observers agree that the recipient nations 
have BO far failed to becoaæ the "mirror Isage" of the develop­
ed capitalist countries. While independence brought renewed
63
hope for Third World nations to improve their standards of liv­
ing, these hopes were sorely disappointed.
As a result of this fact, numerous theories appeared 
that have tried to locate the causes of continued poverty in 
the post-independence period. Modernisation theory, world 
system theory and dependencey theory are all theories of dev- 
elopement (or underdevelopüænt) and all try to explain why 
the Third World fails to become like the advanced capitalist 
countries.
Dependency theory sees a "structural link" between 
development and undexdevelop^nt; the economic mechanisms 
that have permitted the development of the "center" have had 
the opposite effect in the "periphery". The center imposes 
an economic system that permits the exploitation of the peri­
phery and i^cause of this the periphery remains "backward" 
and "dependent".* According to Ankie Hoogvelt (1982); "In 
its original form the Frankian dependency paradigm had cate­
gorically denied the possibility of any capitalist develop- 
^nt anywhere or at any tii^ in the periphery of the world 
capitalist system" (p. 171).
Whatever the validity of Frank's argument, Irving 
Zeitlin (1972) has tried to explain why history has proven 
Marx's and Lenin's prediction wrong. According to Allahar
♦ For an in-depth discussion of dependency analysis see:
"De^ndency: A Formal Theory of Underdevelopment or a Method 
ology for the Analysis of Concrete Situations of Underdevel- 
ops^nt"? World Development, Vol. 6, pp. 881 - 924.
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(1989):
Zeitlin argues that if left to itself (as both Marx and 
Lenin assumed would happen) the spread of capitalism to 
the periphery would indeed have resulted in some measure 
of balanced industrial growth- However, capitalist dev­
elopment was not "left to itself." At the level of pol­
itics, the imperialist interests realised that the free 
and autonomous development of the colonies could ulti­
mately lead to political independence and economic nat­
ionalism, and pose serious threats to their own continued 
high profits, (pp. 104 - 105)
Likewise, as Baran (1957:26) has argued:
What is decisive is that economic development in under­
developed countries is profoundly inimical to the domin­
ant interests in the advanced capitalist countries.
The history of economic development and decoloniza­
tion of white settler colonies and subsequent post-independence 
development seems to provide strong support for Zeitlin’s and 
Baran‘s arguments. As described above. Good also (1976) notes 
that the imperial powers soon came to realize that relatively 
independent internal capitalist development was possible in 
the white settler colonies and that this opposed imperialist 
interests. The political root-causes of underdevelopment come 
to the fore.
Decolonization involved fairly long-drawn, complic­
ated (and violent) political wrangling in order to defeat 
secessionist settlers. Neutralizing the radicalized native 
nationalist movement was relatively the easier task for Impe­
rialism (though no less crucial). The counter-revolution was 
won on two fronts: superficial economic and political restruc­
turing (i.e. reforms), and the violent elimination of the 
state’s class enemy. The removal of the enemies of imperial­
ism thereby precluded further industrialization of the colony.
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That was the whole point- Thus the real objective of defeat­
ing the settlers and the revolutionaries becomes clear; the 
maintenance of the imperial-imposed international division of 
labour and the security of continued control of raw materials.
Part V
The Determinants of Oatcosss of 
Reirolutionary Anti-Co Ionia liai
We have reviewed some of the factors that can con­
tribute to revolutionary understanding and action in the colon­
ial context. But it remains to lue explained why, more often 
than net, the revolutionary movement is defeated. The main 
causal factor is the unequal relative abilities of the state 
and the revolutionaries to mobilize resources for the class 
struggle-become-class war. For those opposing the state, these 
resources include obtaining the support of the majority of the 
population for revolutionary change (or at least a majority of 
the "functionally indispensable" population —  more on tins 
below); a revolutionary party or leadership; armaments and log­
istical support to counter state-initiated violence in the face 
of the hegemonic crisis; and conditions favourable for waging 
guerrilla warfare.
Where the state can garner and apply the greater 
force —  which it usually can -- it defeats the revolutionary 
insurgents. This happens in the vast majority of cases because 
the state has a monopoly on the legitimate us of the means of 
violence. Also, the ruling class’s control of ideology and 
mass media permits it to impose its definition of the insur-
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gents as "terrorists**, a "threat to democracy", etc,, thus the 
state has a better chance of winning on the ideological front. 
In the advanced capitalist countries the nædia is important in 
discrediting revolutionary movements in the Third World. This 
helps to preclude the creation of international solidarity for 
revolutionary struggles. In any revolutionary challenge, the 
role of the state is decisive.
Trotsky identified "four conditions for the victory
of the proletarian revolution":
The bourgeois impasse and the resulting confusion of the 
ruling class; the sharp dissatisfaction and the striving 
towards decisive changes in the ranks of the petty bour­
geoisie without whose support the big bourgeoisie cannot 
maintain itself; the consciousness of the intolerable situ­
ation and readiness for revolutionary actions in the ranks 
of the proletariat; a clear program and a firm leadership 
of the proletarian vanguard,*
Trotsky goes on to explain that these conditions seldom reach 
the necessary level of "maturity" simultaneous. That is why 
most revolutionary situations fail to conclude with the oppres­
sed class taking state power. Trotsky adds that war very 
frequently generates revolutionary situations because it:
"rocks superannuated régimes to their foundation, weakens the 
ruling class, and hastens the growth of revolutionary indig­
nation among the oppressed classes"- Thus, the misery that 
war visits on most sectors of society can bring on a hegemonic 
crisis and detract from the state's ability to put down a revo­
lutionary challenge.
* Leon Trotsky, "The Second World War", in The Age of Perman­
ent Revolution: A Trotsky Antholcxiy, Isaac Deutecher, ed..
New York: Dell, 1964, p. 261-
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Revolutionary leadership has long been recognized as 
as crucial (Graasci ̂ 1971:97; Allahar, 1989:134). Trotsky saw 
it as essential in winning a revolution although not as any 
more important than the actions of the masses. He explained 
it this way:
[Without the revolutionary party, revolutionary organiza­
tion] the energy of the masses would dissipate like steam 
not enclosed in a piston-box. But nevertheless, what moves 
things is not the piston or the box, but the steam.*
Thus, numerous factors figure prominently and inter­
act in determining the state's ability to succeed in the coun­
ter-revolution. The lack of a dedicated, creative, capable 
leadership of the insurgents with a profound knowledge of mod­
ern scientific thought on revolution, only gives the state 
more leverage in co-opting the revolutionary movement. A 
state not weakened by an external war can crush, fairly easily, 
revolutionary insurgents- Where the proletariat cannot win the 
support of the petty bourgeoisie in a revolutionary "bloc" 
(Gramsci) of classes the state has a sufficient social base to 
continue its rule- This situation constitutes no real hege­
monic crisis for the ruling class and conflict can be contained 
and channeled to reforms. This is usually the case in a colon­
ial situation, where the colonial petty bourgeoisie (native or 
settler) "naturally" sides with the imperialists —  not with 
the propertyless supporters of revolutionary change. Further- 
a»re, the colonial bourgeoisie proves incapable of carry
* Trotsky quoted by Raj Desai and Harry Eckstain, "Insurgency, 
The Transformation of Peasant Rebellion", World Politics, 
Vol. XLII, No 4 July, 1990, p. 453.
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through even a bourgeois revolution against imperialism. The 
result: capitalist development remains " b a c k w a r d ( S e e  also 
Trotsky on this point in "Oj^n Letter to the Workers of India").* 
Another factor going against the success of the revo­
lutionary movement is divisions (ethnic and ideological fac­
tionalism, for example) within the society in general and the 
movement in particular. Factionalism can seriously reduce 
th? movement's ability to constitute a real threat to the 
status quo. On the other hand, according to Bard O'Neill 
(1980:13)Î
Although unity is usually important for insurgent move- 
i^nts, its absence has not always resulted in failure.
Despite ideological divisions and internecine violence 
within the Alg3rian revolutionary ranks and between Tito 
and Mihailov!tch factions in Yugoslavia, both insurgent 
groups achieved their political goals. But in each case 
other major developments offset the lack of cohesion.
Looking at the potentially revolutionary situation 
from the point-of-view of the insurgents, their ability to 
mobilize certain resources determines whether they constitute 
a real danger to the state. Obtaining outside political and 
material support can mean the difference between winning and 
losing. Also, getting and keeping popular support, as mention­
ed above, is crucial, but far from unproblematic. As Bard 
O'Neill (1980:5) argues:
The significance attributed to civilian support can be 
understood by viewing it as a means to offset advantages 
the government possesses by virtue of its control of the 
administratif api»ratus of the state, and ^ s t  specific­
ally, the army and police.
* The Age of Permanent Revolution: A Trotsky Anthology, pp. 
246 - 252.
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Another oft-mentioned factor impacting on revolution­
ary situations in the modern era is the suitability of the 
country for waging guerrilla war. Bard O'Neill (1980) points 
to such factors as; "terrain, climate, road and communica- 
tiens network, ethnicity, religion and culture, size of the 
country, and the quantity and distribution of the people” (p. 
16}, as important determining factors favoring either the in­
surgents or the state.
The role of reforms in diffusing a potentially revo­
lutionary situations has been cœntioned above. This is such a 
crucial point it merits in-depth examination. The role of re­
forms in countering a revolutionary challenge was recognized 
by Lenin. Lenin called Stolypin's reforms in the aftermath of 
the 1905 crisis in Russia a "counter-revolution" (See Lenin's 
"The Student Movement and the Present Political Situation"). 
Recognizing a potentially revolutionary situation in Russia, 
Stolypin (the Tsar's prime minister) saw the need to initiate 
a rapid process of social, economic and political reforms in 
order to avoid revolution. In commenting on the political 
significance of the reforms for aborting revolution, î,enin 
commented : "our reactionaries are distinguished by the extreme 
clarity of their class consciousness. They know very well 
what they want, where they are going, and on what forces they 
can count" (quoted In Palma, 1978, 894).
One could cite nus^rous instances illustrating the 
role of reforms In ending colonial revolutionary crisis. 
Guinea-Bissau is a case in point- Reforms (the "Better Guin­
ea” policy), including the granting of independence, put an
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end to the revolutionary wing of the national liberation move- 
ment in that country (the PAIGC). It is much easier for the 
state to effectively apply a counterinsurgency program, (in­
cluding reforms) where there are no or few white settlers, as 
noted above. This was the case in Guinea-Bissau- As Chaliand 
(1977:81) explains;
It was much easier than it would have been in Angola or 
Mozambique for them [the Portuguese] to institute reforms, 
because there was no white settler class around to feel 
its privileges threatened.
An important step the state takes in the colonial 
context is cooperating with (conservative) native nationalism. 
Encouraging reformist-nationalism and conservative nationalist 
leaders weakens support for revolution and diverts attention 
from radical change. But reforms must also be of a material 
nature in order to læ effective. As Bard O'Neill (1980) has 
argued :
The material demands of the people [can be] distinguished 
from the political power aims of the insurgent leadership. 
While the government cannot accommodate the latter, it may 
well be able to deal with the former, and by so doing, de­
prive the insurgent movement of its main source of 
strength and resources —  the people... (pp. 20 -21)
But reforms are problematic in the colonial context 
in that they cannot eliminate cultural nationalism. According 
to Hugh Seton-Watson (1978:89 and 101), the "law of Colonial 
Ingratitude" ensures that no matter how "generous" the imperial 
state is in bestowing reforms on the colonized, colonialism 
will always be viewed as an illegitimate and intolerable situ­
ation —  especially by the native elites. According to Seton- 
Watson:
It was precisely the good things the colonial rulers did
7Î
that raised up opposition to them among their subjects, hs 
long as they ruled them with a rod of iron, there was no 
nationalism to seen. When they gave them civil liber­
ties, schools, universities, and factories ... new elites 
canæ into existence whose members becasæ more and more 
discontented with what they had because it was less than 
their rulers enjoyed, and explained all the continued pov­
erty and backwardness of their less fortunate compatriots, 
as well as their own “relative deprivation®, by the fact 
that they were ruled by members of another nation, (p. 89)
Thus, granting independence remains unavoidable —  sooner or 
later it will have to be done. Bard O'Neill (1980) also recog­
nizes the limitations and problematic nature of reforms in the 
colonial context:
Clearly, it will be more difficult to design an effective 
counterinsurgency program in colonial situations where not 
only the insurgent leadership but also the people are moti­
vated by the nationalist aim of independence. Faced with 
such circumstances some regimes have sought to contain the 
situation by Improving the well-being of the population in 
the hope that the latter would support the existing polit­
ical order in return for short-term benefits, (p. 21).
Part VI
StuBBmry and The Perspective of this Paper
Class and Race in Analyzing Decolonization Crises
When analyzing national liberation struggles there 
is a tendency to discuss the situation using non-class terms 
such as the "colonized®, the "colonizer®, "settlers", the "op­
pressed nation®, the "oppressing nation®, etc. Similarly, it 
is often noted that in the colonies and ex-colonies the cities 
are "developed® and the countryside is "underdeveloped", and 
this is taken as evidence that the city somehow "exploits® the 
countryside. It is a serious analytical error to think only in 
terms of non-class entities and furthermore to endow inanimate
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objects and places (cities, countryside, countries) with agency. 
A national liberation struggle is in a very real sense a class 
struggle, although this is often obscured by the conflagration 
of the anti-colonial crisis itself —  seemingly, a "war of all 
against all".
If a certain sector of a colonized people rises up 
in defiance of the imperial state and a var betveen the two 
follows, this may not be only a national liberation struggle, 
it ^ y  also be a class war. This is the case there the proper­
ty-less classes in the colonies (the urban and rural proletar­
iat, the lumpen proletariat), having achieved class conscious­
ness and having organized politically, are putting forth de­
mands for reforms that in fact amount to a revolutionary chal­
lenge. The actions of the state in response to these demands 
—  if properly understood by the analyst —  reveals that the 
state very clearly sees the situation in class terras and acts 
accordingly.
As mentioned above, Lenin observed that Stolypin not 
only understood that the events in Russia in 1905 constituted a 
potentially revolutionary threat to the state, he also initiat­
ed extensive political, economic, and social restructuring in 
response —  in order to avoid a revolution. Lenin noted the 
"extrenffi clarity of their [the reactionaries] class conscious­
ness” as revealed in the political content of their reforms.
Not only did very rapid economic development (including indus­
trialization) and class formation follow in Russia as a direct 
consequence of Stoyipin’s policies, but classes were deliberat­
ely created that would have material reasons to Iæ  staunch.
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conservative supporters of the state. One of these classes vas
the Kulaks —  rich peasants —  whose numbers rapidly increases
with Stoylpin’s agrarian policy which was designed to break-up
the peasant communes —  a policy that the peasants opposed-
It was the Kulaks who later proved to the implacable enemy
of the Bolsheviks. As John Bradley (1988) writes:
To cut the ground frcm under the Socialist Revolutionaries, 
[stolypin] aimed to make agriculture prosperous by making 
peasants private holders of land and thus transform the 
restless and rebellious peasants into pillars of the 1906 
establishment, (p. 18)
As Palma (1978) points out it was the counter-revolutionary
effects of Stolypin's policy that led Lenin to muse: "we of
the old generation will perhaps not live to see the decisive
battles of our own revolution" (Lenin quoted by Palma, p. 895).
We saw above the parallels between Stolypin's counter­
revolutionary creation of a Kulak class in Russia and Britain's 
decolonisation policy to do the same thing in Kenya both before 
and during the "Mau Mau" Rebellion. And just like the earlier 
Russian Kulaks, the Kenyan landowning class has proven to be 
—  in the post-independence period —  a conservative property- 
minded "pillar" of the state and thus profoundly anti-progres­
sive and of course, anti-revolutionary. Woodis makes the same 
point about the "stabilising^ influence of the "buffer class of 
African landholders". He writes:
Part of the intention of British imperialism in introducing 
private ownership of land in Africa was to facilitate the 
emergence of an African "middle class" on the land, which 
would act as a conservative force in society, tending to 
support the status cmo, .. It is this stratum ... which is 
able to accumulate sufficient capital to branch out into 
commerce and transport, and thus establish an African 
bourgeoisie, (pp. 70 - 73)
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This is the class that Imperialism counts uj»n to maintain and 
support the system, and it is this situation that ensures the 
continued underdevelopment of Kenya. Whereas Stolypin’s poli­
cies successfully promoted the rapid development of capitalism 
in Russia [Palma, 1978:895; Bradley, 1988: 18 - 19), the Kenyan 
landowning class and global imperialist economic structures 
mean that the same thing will certainly not happen in Kenya 
—  despite "independence®. Kenya's (and any other former col­
ony's) inability to break out of dependency is not just a re­
sult of the "lateness" of its attempt to industrialize: it is 
a political and an economic phenomenon. The necessity of keep­
ing Kenya as an underdeveloped supplier of raw materials and of 
cheap labour power was the real purpose of decolonizing that 
poverty-stricken country.
Though racial oppression is undeniably a part of 
colonialism and decolonization, thinking only in terms of the 
racial aspects obscures the essential class nature of anti­
colonial struggles and the imperatives of decolonization.
This is illustrated, for instance, by the fact that none of 
the "white states" —  the advanced capitalist countries —  
(except South Africa) "recognized" Rhodesia when it illegally 
unilaterally declared independence in 1965. The advanced 
capitalist states were not about to do this in the name of 
"racial solidarity" just because fellow whites wanted to end 
colonialism and thereby establish an independent, developed 
nation-state. On the contrary, it was for this very reason 
that classes in the advanced capitalist states op^sed Rhod­
esia. A white Rhodesian state would and did permit the fuller
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developnent of capitalism In that country, as Samir Amin has 
argued. But this vas against the material interests of the 
ruling class in the advanced capitalist (imperialist) coun­
tries and for this reason they vere irreconcilably opposed to 
Rhodesia. Hence the D.N. sanctions, the trade embargo, etc., 
that finally defeated the settler state in 1980, and resulted 
in the establishment of independent Zimbabwe.
Likewise, it would be naive (and wrong) to suggest 
that the advanced capitalist countries opposed the white 
Rhodesian state because of moral outrage at the white's treat­
ment of the blacks, although, no doubt, it vas often portrayed 
this way in the popular media. But as Marx taught: “our opin­
ion of someone is not based on what they think [or claim] about 
themselves". The advanced capitalist countries did not oust 
the white settlers and place blacks in political power in 
Zimbabwe out of moral feelings and the desire to a good deed 
for blacks. The decolonization crisis in Rhodesia consisted of 
the white bourgeoisie taking state power and a section of 
blacks —  radicalized by white-settler repression —  threaten­
ing revolution- The advanced capitalist countries intervened 
and succeeded in replacing whites with conservative, national­
ist native elites. From a new center social formation under 
the white settler régira, Zimbabwe is now an underdeveloped 
Third World country with '’flag® independence. Thus, while 
white Rhodesians certainly oppressed (and merciless exploited) 
their African population (it was on this basis that the Rhodes­
ians achieved their remarkable capitalist development), to 
think in tertœ of the decolonization crisis as some sort of
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"race war” obscures the essential class forces underlying the 
crisis. Thus, while not all anti-imperialist struggles or 
actors are social revolutionary, {not all nationalism is "red* 
as Lenin put it), all a smvement has to be is "too* national­
istic, i.e., wanting and intending to make a break with exploit­
ative economic relations with the a^tropolis, to provoke the 
retaliation of imperialism.
If one correctly understands the real motives behind 
the state's policies it is evident that the ruling classes in 
the advanced capitalist countries were very definitely think­
ing and acting in class terms and out of class interests. This 
was true in Rhodesia and the same was true of Algeria's decol­
onization crisis, and Namibia's, Kenya's, New Caledonia's, etc.
Nevertheless, as Lenin pointed out, there is no such 
thing as a "pure revolution". The racial divisions and their 
intertwining with class distinctions cannot be ignored in the 
anti-colonial crisis. Race solidarity has almost always prov­
en stronger than class solidarity. This division in society 
is one of the reasons for the defeat of revolutionary move­
ments that come out of colonial crises. It cannot be ignored 
that there are class divisions within the white community in 
white settler colonies. But the white proletariat in colonies 
does not side with the native proletariat in supporting revo­
lutionary change. Instead, it invariably sides with the forces 
of reaction —  the white colonial ruling class —  in op%K)sing 
revolution. In the colonial context it is the white proletar­
iat and other non-indigenous exploited sectors of the "plural® 
social formation that typically play the role of the “bribed
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tool of reactionary intrigue". Likewiser the native proletar­
iat is frequently fooled into believing that with members of 
their "own" race in political power, life will got better 
after independence. Thus, due to racial distinctions, the 
colonial proletariat —  while being a class “in itself" —  
fails to become a class “for itself". It is the class config­
uration of the post-colonial state —  not its racial make-up 
—  that has enornrous implications for subsequent development.
Levels of Analysis in Understanding Revolutionary Situations
The different levels of analysis employed in theoriz­
ing about social phenomena were mentioned above. Some analysts 
focus mainly on the macrosociological level, Theda Skocpol, 
for one, is interested in the structural/objective factors 
that cause revolutions (and that "prevent" them). One of 
the factors making revolutions rare occurrences, according 
to Skocpol, is the formidable coercive power of the modern 
state. This is certainly true, but nevertheless revolutions 
did occur in Cuba and Nicaragua. A complete theory of revo­
lutions would have to be able to explain the special character­
istics in those countries that permitted the revolutionaries to 
defeat superior military forces. Thus, while structural fac­
tors that prevent revolution must be taken into consideration, 
one may have to proceed to other levels of analysis in order 
to explain exceptions, (For instance. Why and how did the 
coercive powers of the state succeed in preventing revolution 
in El Salvador, for instance, but not in Nicaragua and Cuba?)
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To illustrate the middle-level of analysis one 
could mention Robert Dix’ (1984) comparison of the Nicaraguan 
ano Cuban revolutions with several other Latin American revo­
lutions that failed. He cites two factors that favoured the 
success of the TJicarguan and Cuban revolutions: (1) the exist­
ence of a "broad negative coalition" of classes opposing he 
dictators in each country and (2) the inability of the latter 
to reverse this legitimacy crisis. Picking up on Dix' vork, 
Shaw (1989)*, also concentrating on middle-level theories, 
adds that the existence in both countries of a well-established 
and long-term history of organized political opposition to 
dictators favoured the chances of successful revolution. Shaw 
argues :
The rapid mobilization of many groups from ail classes of 
Nicarguan society in 1978 and early 1579 was due at least 
in part to the great number of political and politicized 
organizations that had developed in the late 1960s and 
early 1970s. These organizations formed the basis for the 
loose negative coalition that vas critical tc the success 
of the revolution, (p. 95)
Other theories of the causes of revolution concen­
trate on the microsociological/psychological analytical level- 
According to Shaw:
The leading psychological theory of revolution proposes 
that relative deprivation is the essential background 
variable.... A number of theorists believe that rela­
tive deprivation is the most basic precondition of any 
revolution, (p. 84)
John Booth (1982), for instance, argues that the main cause
* Royce Quinton Shaw, "Dependency and Revolution: A Perspec­
tive Nicaragua", in Revolution in the If or Id System, Terry 
Boswell, ed.. New York: Greenwood Press, 1989, pp. 81 -97.
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of the Nicaraguan revolution was relative deprivation (see 
Shaw, p. 89). But it is certainly the case that relative 
deprivation was experienced elsewhere yet no revolution nor 
even revolutionary situation followed: revolutionary potential 
either remained latent or the state's coercive powers again 
proved decisive- It remains to be explained why relative dep­
rivation allegedly caused the Nicaraguan revolution; while, 
despite the ubiquitous existence of relative deprivation, revo­
lution is such a very rare occurrence.
rfhctever the va’idity of the above-mentioned theo­
rists' interesting analysis of the causal factors in the Cuban 
and Nicaraguan revolutions, the point is that all of tliere 
levels of analysis have to be considered in order to formul .ite 
a satisfactory general theory of revolution and to explain revo­
lution in each concrete case. The analysis of revolution at 
any one of these levels alone, cannot allow us to underitand 
why specific revolutionary situations occurred or succeeded.
The necessary objective pre-conditions arc not suffii.'it-nl for 
a revolution actually to happen: no revolution ever simply 
takes place "automatically"; people have to late action if 
there is to be any possibility for a revolution to occur.
The mid-range and micro levels of analysis allow uc to try t.o 
explain the factors that motivate people to oppose the state 
and how and why they did so (successfully or unsuccessfully) 
in specific instances. An historical material analysis of 
the origins of the objective social forces that generate revo­
lutionary consciousness and action is essential in understand­
ing the factors that cause revolutionary situations and also
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that determine their outcome-
The Development of Capitalism in New Caledonia 
And the Decolonization Crisis: The Focus of this Study
As noted above/ the development of capitalism in 
white settler colonies often tends to be characteristically 
more advanced than in non-settler colonies. This and the re­
sulting class structure have important implications for revo­
lutionary potential- While the reasons that capitalist develop­
ment is more advanced in white settler societies is an import­
ant question, it is not the primary focus of my analysis of the 
decolonization crisi:- in New Caledonia- Going backward a step, 
to the question of the causes of imperialism itself, is also 
not the main purpose of this study. I will focus on the causes 
and effects of Imperialism but not in order to explain these 
"for their own sake” but instead to show how they explain the 
French state's reasons for continuing to hold New Caledonia as 
a colony well past when most of the former colonies were grant­
ed independence. This is Important because the factors that 
ore causing France to hold New Caledonia have also contributed 
to the radicalization of the colonized. Thus the main focus 
of this study is to determine the factors that favor the devel­
opment of revolutionary situations in colonial social forma­
tions -
Since revolutionary potential is seldom translated 
into a successful revolution, in order to know why this is so 
it is necessary to understand the role of anti-revolutionary 
actors —  including the state —  in countering revolutionary
B1
threats. As an off-shoot of this sort of analysis, much is 
revealed about the causes and consequences of imperialism, its 
characteristics in the late twentieth century, the imperatives 
of decolonization, and the implications of all these for the 
post-independence development of the Third World and future 
potential for social revolutions.
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Chapter 2
The Development of Capitalism in Nev Caledonia: 
Background to the Present Decolonisation Crisis
Introduction
In December 1986, the United Nations officially recog­
nized Nev Caledonia as a "non-self-governing territory** but on­
ly after all constitutional attempts to achieve independence 
had failed and consequently the Melanese had reached a new lev­
el of militancy. The radicalization of the independence nrove- 
EK?nt and several years of complicated "diplomatic pressure" —  
from the South Pacific Forum, the South Pacific Commission, 
the Nev Zealand Federation of Trade Unions, the Melanesian 
Spearhead Group, the World Council of Indigenous People, the 
Nonaligned Movement, and others —  convinced the D-N. General 
Assembly that it was time to force the French state's hand to 
begin preparing the colony for its long-overdue independence. 
Even so, tlie vote to put Nev Caledonia back on the list of the 
Special Committee on Decolonization (full name: The UN Special 
Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation 
of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial 
Countries and Peoples, also known as the Committee of 24) was 
not unanimous. The U.N.'s reluctance to re-list Nev Caledonia 
and its recently expressed approval of France’s policy in New 
Caledonia reveal vhat could be considered a pro-imperialist 
bias.
The French government put a great deal of effort into 
trying to prevent New Caledonia’s re-listing with the Special 
Committee, using coercive tactics and other “behavior contrary
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to diplomatic practice". Of the countries sending delegates to 
the Conanittee at that time, tventy-one of them were from poor 
Third World countries, two of them from former French colonies. 
France is alleged to have threatened to cut-off aid to those 
governments that did not vote against the motion to declare 
Kew Caledonia a non-self-governing territory. The then-Prime 
Minister of Australia also revealed that Chirac had written to 
him asking that he use his influence in the South Pacific Form 
to prevent support for re-listment. l/hon all those effort;, 
failed, France blamed Australia for supporting decolonination 
and subsequently broke diplomatic relations, accusing Australia 
of "interfering in the internal affairs of France" (sic Koo- 
sinq’s Contemporary Archives, pp. 34996 - 35001 and p. 35325).
It is an obvious double standard that the great and
democratic state of France, that would co to any lengths u. 
defend its own national sovereignty —  and makes, no a;wloiiy 
for that —  denies another nation the right to self-dctoriuina­
tion. France also denies that New Caledonia is beirsg he ld 
against its will —  it is argued that the majority of the 
people in the territory support the continued presence of 
France —  and the state has never said that it ever intends to
grant New Caledonia independence. As a French statesman re­
marked at the replacement of New Caledonia on the Special Com­
mittee's list: "France is in the right and Is convinced the 
ÜN does not know the dossier of New Caledonia" (Keesinq's, p.
DN does not know the dossier of New Caledonia" (Keesinq's, p. 
35001).
While the next legal opjKsrtunity to gain independence
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is the referendum set for 1998, France's policies in Hev Cale­
donia reveal that the former most definitely would prefer to 
maintain the status quo —  but with some reforms as it is ob­
vious that going back to the old style of colonialism with the 
complete exclusion of the Melanese from political and economic 
life is no longer possible. From the late 1960s, when the Mel- 
ancse were beginning to organize and were adamant that indepen­
dence was their ultimate and uncompromising goal, to the next 
referendum in 1998, will be a period of some twenty years. It 
is difficult for the Melanese of New Caledonia to understand 
why they are not entitled to independence while their brothers 
and sisters in Vanuatu, Papua New Guinea, Fiji, and the Solomon 
Islands had their colonial status ended years. The French 
state's double standard in New Caledonia is so blatant that 
the Melanese are well justified in accusing the colonial power 
of double-dealing hypocrisy. The state's bad faith has served 
to embitter the colonized further.
For its part, France maintains that it supports dem­
ocracy, development and the advancement of the Melanese in New 
Caledonia. But its tactics of continuously putting off indepen­
dence, violent repression of the leaders and supporters of the 
pro-independence parties, and its attempts to win the consensus 
of the Melanese with promises of good jobs, educational advance 
m?nt, better housing and health care, etc., raise the question 
of the state's real motives in its colonial policies.
Obviously, we cannot base our opinion of the French 
state on what it claims about itself. We need to ask: What are 
France's real motivations in holding New Caledonia as a colony
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into the twenty-first century? Why is New Caledonia a "deviant 
case"? And we need to make a rounded assessment of the good 
things that France has pledged to do for the Melanese: ï'That are 
the political reasons and significance for the state’s reforms? 
Reforms are not simply given when the state suddenly sees the 
error of its ways and admits its former moral laxity. Reforms 
are not merely granted out of the goodness of the reformer’s 
hearts. In the case of New Caledonia a careful examination of 
the situation reveals that reforms only came in the face of a 
serious legitimacy crisis that had the potential to threaten 
long-term imperial interests in an extremely valuable colony.
The Introduction of Capitalism in Kev Caledonia:
From the Stone-Age to Revolutionary Consciousness
In our brief analysis of the decolonization crisis 
in Kenya and Rhodesia we saw how white settlor colonialism dis­
plays a marked tendency to promote more advanced capitalist 
development internally. New Caledonia is no exception -- it. 
is by far the most developed island in the South Pacific. A 
look at the usual economic and social Indicators of development 
reveals that it is more developed than the vast majority ol 
countries that received independence decades ago. Overall, it 
scores higher on the Physical Quality of Life Index (PQLI) 
than Ghana, Benin, Chad, and even Singapore and Malaysia. But 
it has many features that ^ k e  it quite unlike the white-sct- 
tler colonies in Africa and these help to explain why it is 
still a colony. These, and the present situation can only be 
understood from an historical point-of-view.
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Starting in the 1960s, the Melanese in New Caledonia 
ceased being a "passively rotting mass" of g^ople, fatalistic­
ally submitting to their almost unbelievable poverty and fringe- 
dweller status. They are now on the move, becoming organized, 
they are beginning to understand imperialism and colonialism, 
and they were ready to fight back. Throughout this time —  
up to the present —  there was a feeling among the Melanese 
that they would rather die on their feet than keep living 
with the injustice and humiliation of colonialism. The late­
ness to which they have come to their national liberation 
struggle serves to make the need for independence to be felt 
even more strongly and urgently. Everything the Melanese have 
done In their struggle —  from the throwing of rocks at cars 
driven by whites, setting-up road blocks, killing settlers' 
cattle and burning their houses to more dramatic political 
gestures like kidnapping French statesmen, smashing ballot 
boxes, going to Libya for guerrilla warfare training, and 
appealing to international forums for support —  illustrates 
the depth of their rage and bitterness, and the pain they have 
suffered and endured from being colonized. The readiness to 
fight one's oppressor is an encouraging sign; it is a sign of 
psychological health. As Galper (1978) puts it:
If publicly funded mental health centers were to take 
seriously the mission of helping people to become mentally 
healthy, they might well encourage a revolutionary spirit 
in their clients- After all, it may be a healthy response 
to a corrupt and oppressive social order to struggle to 
change that order- (p. 17)
For those who feel this way, the problem in guestion 
goes well beyond a ^ r e  conflict of wills or the desire to
87
make a point. The state’s reforms may assuage the Melanese* 
embittered state; this is an open question and remains to be 
seen. In the s^antime, one wonders: How did the Melanese get 
to this stage of awareness? Obviously, it is a necessary by­
product of settler-colonial ism and the colonial-capitalist mode 
of production. A colonialism that —  like everywhere else -- 
has sent generations of colonized people's lives to wrack and 
ruin. It seems unlikely that the Melanese can forgive and for­
get this, as the state apparently expects.
In light of this one can see how really preposterous 
is the French state’s contention that Nev Caledonia is an In­
tegral part of France -- as much a part of France as Paris it­
self —  that just happens to be 1C,000 miles away. France 
has kept putting the Melanese off. Plainly, the intention is 
to "stack the deck" in favour of neo-colonialism or, even bet­
ter as far as France is concerned, to avoid having to oive 
independence at all. The French state is making every effort 
to try to create the appearance of democratic consent for its 
presence in New Caledonia- It has also brought more settlers 
—  who reliably vote pro-France. The state and the white set­
tler elite have engineered the most flagrant election jerry­
mandering during the frequent référendums on the question of 
independence- These elections have been denounced by the pro­
independence parties and the Australian government as "not in 
accordance with UN standards". The anti-independence propa­
ganda of the state took on a new low with the comment that 
the people of New Caledonia had to "make a choice between 
Jesus and Marx". The majority of people in New Caledonia of
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European, Polynesian and Asian backgrounds have been manipu­
lated by the state and the white settler elite —  which con­
sists of 20 very wealthy families —  to vote against indepen­
dence. The national and metropolitan bourgeoisie have, in all 
probability, reached an agreement concerning the independence 
question and how i^st to handle the "native problem". Several 
independence leaders have been assassinated and many supporters 
of independence are in jail. Thus, reforms and repression 
have been applied to counter the legitimacy crisis that is now 
facing French rule in New Caledonia. With all constitutional 
attempts to gain independence failing, the anti-colonial strug­
gle has predictably become more radical.
Indigenous society and economy in New Caledonia has 
been profoundly effected by colonization. The imperial pene­
tration of the territory has meant a "quantum leap" in develop­
ment on every level, but the suffering of the colonized has 
been enormous. Before annexation in 1653, the people had 
lived there for centuries in tribal stone-age societies 
(Terrel, 1986). There was no private property. There was a 
complex system of usufruct on the land. Colonial contact was 
a catastrophe for the colonized, as everywhere else. According 
to Susanna Ounei*, founding leader of the Kanak and Exploited 
Noon's Group in Struggle —  a pro-independence group —  the 
population decreased from 200,000 in the 1850s to 26,000 by
* Susanna Ounei, "The Kanak people's struggle for independence 
in New Caledonia", Auckland: Labour Publishing Co-operative 
Society in conjunction with the New Zealand Association for 
International Relief, Rehabilitation and Developsænt, 1985.
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the 1920s. (Harold Brookfield gives the following figures: 
42/000 Melanese in 1887/ 27,000 in I9l8, see Brookfield 1972, 
p. 24). With the coming of settlers the Melanese were confined 
to reservations on land of poor agriultural quality where the 
majority of Melanese live to this day. While the size of the 
reserves has increased only slightly throughout the years, the 
population on the reserves has grown steadily. This demograph­
ic change has contributed to the crisis. Many thousands of 
people starved and suffered from sickness brought on by poverty: 
malnutrition, leprosy, tuberculosis, maternal and infant deaths, 
blindness, mental illness. Education of Melanese vas mostly 
neglected, schools were segregated. Social Darwinist ideas 
led settler’s to believe that the Melanese were a dying race.
On the role of religion in colonization, Susanna Ounei has com­
mented :
The bible was the beginning of our colonisation. In their 
bible it said, never steal and never kill because God will 
be unhappy. While we believed in God, they massacred our 
people and stole our land. Now we end up with nothing but 
the bible, and they have our land.
According to Ounei, about 7,000 Melanese worked out­
side the reserves in 1984, The remainder of the 60,000 Melan­
ese are employed in subsistence and cash crop production (the 
main crop is coffee) on the reserves. The average annual in- 
con» for Melanese is $3,000 —  about one-quarter the income 
of European New Caledonians- Colonization has meant not only 
class formation and inequality it also i^ans that the tradi­
tional way of life is gone forever- So it is not "tradition® 
that is preventing the Melanese from enjoying the benefits of 
development as modernization theory would have it. Instead,
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it is the structural location of the Melanese in the economy 
that has condemned them to poverty.
Modern Anti-Imperialism and State Reaction
Primary resistance movements to colonization all 
failed and only provoked more brutality from settlers and the 
imperial state. The contemporary independence movement has 
little resemblance to these early attempts to repel imperial 
penetration, although not all archaic reactions to coloniz­
ation are gone. But the anti-colonial struggle in Nev Cale­
donia is essentially a modern anti-imperialist, potentially 
revolutionary movement. The movement has its origins in the 
political, economic and social conditions of colonial society. 
The state reaction to the opponents of imperialism is also 
much more sophisticated than in the days of initial contact. 
The massacre, confinement, and terrorism that virtually de­
stroyed the native society and economy is replaced in the 
contemporary era with a well-planed scientific counter-insur­
gency program.
Social classes, inequality, and private property 
were introduced from outside with colonization. Direct colon­
ialism and white settler reaction precluded the creation of 
an indigenous elite who could administer the colony for the 
colonial power and take over the running of local affairs at 
independence. The French state —  as the colonial power —  
faces a serious and chronic inability to legitimate itself. 
Furthermore, relative deprivation has increased in New Cale-
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donia vith development, especially with the nickel boom of the 
1970s. The Melanese —  having historically been marginali?:cd 
to a very extreme degree —  have not been under the ideological 
embellishments of a ruling class. There is strong evidence to 
support the contention that they see the colonial system for 
vhat it is: unjust —  they have "named" the problem, that is, 
they have understood the causes of their poverty, misery and 
humiliation and they have come to the conclusion that it is 
possible that by organising they can change the system and 
improve their condition. They are no longer unconsciously 
searching for the solution to a problem only half-understood. 
This level of understanding is the essence of class awareness. 
In addition, population growth on the reserves makes living 
there more and more impossible. With Europeans flaunting 
the luxuries development has brought, the Melanese —  who 
lack decent living conditions on the reserves (most Melanese 
homes do not even have electricity) are naturally resentful 
of their underprivileged status. Knowledge of a better way 
of living lœans they are utterly dissatisfied with the old 
status quo. A Melanese intellegentsia have given voice and 
leadership to the aspirations of their people. With no organic 
link to the system —  with no HSterial stake in it —  this 
elite has proven to be the unshakable opponent of the imperial 
state. The colonial capitalist system actually creates its own 
"monster®. Repression and denial of independence way past 
the time it should have been granted —  all these have favour­
ed the development of a potentially revolutionary situation at 
this particular time.
92
But acute revolutionary situations are not a constant 
feature of any societyr even a colonial one. While proletar­
ianization, social inequality, an increasingly complex division 
of labour, demographic change, etc., are all necessary corre­
lates of capitalist development, they do not necessarily nor 
"automatically" lead to revolutionary situations —  usually 
revolutionary potential remains latent. But in the rare his­
torical conjuncture when the development of capitalism does 
generate revolutionary situations, the state is prepared and 
willing to take defensive (and offensive) measures. Very ac­
ute class conflict that endangers the state will provoke a 
state declaration of "class war". The structural characteris­
tics of white-settler colonies —  the unique political and ec­
onomic dimensions of such social formations -- present a spec­
ial challenge to both the national liberation forces and a 
state seeking to impose its hegemony, legitimate itself, and 
preserve its long-term interests, ifhite settler colonialism 
conditions a unique pattern of development and complicates the 
political situation before and after independence- Under such 
social conditions revolutionary potential has a strong likeli­
hood of becoming manifest-
French policy in New Caledonia has had slot to do 
with causing the present crisis the state faces there. The 
state plays a major role in causing or preventing revolution­
ary situations in society. The New Caledonia crisis could have 
been prevented. It was not prevented only out of sheer neglect, 
which was certainly at odds vith the state's avowed aim to make 
New Caledonia a permanent part of France. But there was a lag
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between the relatively advanced level of capitalist development 
achieved in New Caledonia and the creation in civil society of 
the social institutions that are characteristic, typical (and 
indispensable) features of any “modernizing" society- The 
present crisis would have been prevented had the state created 
the structures that are required to channel and institutional­
ize conflict in non-egalitarian societies. In this way, class 
conflict —  a cor. .tant feature of class societies —  while not 
eliminated, is rendered harmless to the state or at least in­
capable of overthrowing it. As Barbara Salert puts it : "It is 
entirely possible that an enlightened bourgeoisie can grant 
premature concessions to other groups that actually hinder the 
development of revolutionary potential" (1976:123). Yet only 
now France is embarking on a "crash program" of reforms in an 
attempt to put a new face on colonialism- These efforts to 
secure hegemony for French control of Hew Caledonia have an 
excellent cliance of succeeding where they could not have suc­
ceeded in the decolonization of Africa, for demographic reasons, 
for instance-
Whatever our theories about the sources/causes of 
rebellion and revolution, it is evident by the nature of the 
state's policies that relative deprivation is viewed as a ma­
jor factor. While officially the state sees the insurgents as 
criminals and has applied the law accordingly, there is a recog­
nition that this alone cannot solve the problem. A key policy 
initiative has been to improve the material condition of the 
colonized by creating opportunities for upward mobility for 
them- It is not necessary that opportunities for upward m 3-
9<
bility really in fact exist and they need not be available im­
mediately f although some real material improvements will have 
to be felt, even if only by a minority- Thus the state's major 
undertaking in opening channels to upward mobility has been 
in expanding educational opportunities specifically for the 
CO Ion i zed-
Schooling performs numerous functional political 
services for the state. Schooling is not indispensable in 
capitalist societies because a highly skilled laixjur force is 
essential to the economy as is sometimes alleged: on the con­
trary, the development of capitalism creates a majoritv of jobs 
that require only the simplest skills from workers (Rravorman, 
1974). The political functions of education are what is really 
important. It sanctions and legitimates social inequality by 
making it appear that all have equal opportunity for upward 
mobility. "Losers” can, therefore, be blamed for their situa­
tion: the "fault” for failure can be shifted from the system 
to the individual. Society can be made to appear meritocratic 
because schooling provides a supposedly "fair" and "equal" op­
portunity for individuals to compete for and obtain the best 
jobs and positions in society. Those who do "make it” arc 
presented as the most able and deserving. Thus, the system 
is just, and those who do not "i^ke it” should suinnit to the 
way things are and accept their "place" in the system. It 
thus appears that upward mobility is open to all.
Of course, on closer examination, it is plain that 
in class societies, where inequalities are structural, not 
everyone can 1% upwardly mobile. Even if every ixirson in a
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capitalist society achieved advanced levels of education, the 
economy is structured such that not everyone will receive good 
wages or even a "living" wage. Many will receive no wages at 
a]1 as a certain percentage of people will find themselves re­
dundant: relegated to the reserve army of labour. No aEK>unt 
of education can change these structural features of capitalist 
social formations. But history shows that even the appearance 
of a chance for upward mobility —  however small —  is enough 
to channel peoples* efforts and energies into non-revolutionary 
and time-consuming activities, such as "getting an education". 
People who continue to complain about their poverty can be 
dismissed as "troublemakers" who have no one but themselves to 
blame for their condition. They can then be managed simply as 
ordinary deviants by being singled-out for further victimiz­
ation.
Furthermore, schooling allows the state to instill in 
children the values of capitalist society and the world-view of 
the ruling class. Thus, schooling not only destroys revolution­
ary potential —  even before it can be developed —  in the 
working class and those "thrown-off" by the on-going develop­
ment of the capitalist mode of production, it helps to propa­
gate pro-status quo ideologies and thus contributes signific­
antly to the hegem>ny of the ruling class. Education cannot 
eliminate classes/groups that constitute a potential threat to 
the prevailing order but it can help to "regulate and contain" 
them {Spitzer, 1975, p. 645). In these ways, schooling helps 
to pull the wool over people's eyes and prevents them from 
perceiving the real causes of the social problems that effect
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their lives. To illustrate the point: relative deprivation 
is certainly not objectively done avay with by education, but 
it ceases to generate revolutionary understand!n ; in those 
effected because, through education, people have been taught 
to blame themselves for their poverty or to view inequalities 
as "normal*. Relative deprivation remains but the subjective 
response to it is now non-revolutionary (and may well be re­
actionary or, typically, some form of self-destruction). Thus, 
a public education system oj^n to all children is an essential 
social institution to channal conflicts away from revolution­
ary activities thereby serving a very important social control 
function (Bowels and Gintis, 1976; Galper, 1978).
Education is, of course, only one of the reforms 
that can be applied to nip revolutionary potential in the bud. 
The function of education in class societies is the same every­
where, but more on the specifics of educational reforms in New 
Caleaonia will be discussed below. Since education reproduces 
the contradictions of capitalist societies, the effects of its 
expansion in New Caledonia remain to be seen and analyzed. For 
instance, can education overcome the “Law of Colonial Ingrati­
tude"?
Melanese' Role in the Colonial Economy
Besides the role of reforms in impeding revolutionary 
change there are the problems in New Caledonia of the economic 
role played by the Melanese in the colonial economy and their 
growing minority status in terras of actual numbers. On these
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two points, Nev Caledonia's situation is unlike any that had 
ever existed in vhite-settler colonies in Africa. Throughout 
colonial Africa, it vas African labour that vas the basis —  
the source —  of capital accumulation and hence profits- 
Capitalists considering investing in Africa were {and are) at­
tracted by —  among other things —  some of the cheapest labour 
in the vorld-
But in Nev Caledonia this has never been the case 
with native labour- Europeans and "imported" labour from 
other colonies and underdeveloped regions have been used in­
stead. Most Melanese are underemployed —  really unemployed —  
on their reserves. Thus, striking has no meaning. Not being 
employed as productive (surplus-value) creating workers, the 
strike weapon could have no effect in helping to drive out the 
settlers or bring down the state. Thus, on the one hand the 
Melanese, l«ing marginalised, have no stake in the system and 
have every reason to oppose it and support revolutionary change, 
but on the other hand they are unable to weaken it by depriving 
it of functionally necessary labour.
Spitzer (1975) explains the problem of being "func­
tionally dispensable" to the capitalist class:
Although problem populations are defined in terms of the 
threat and costs that they present to the social relations 
of production in capitalist societies, these populations 
are far frcm isomorphic with a revolutionary class. It is 
certainly true that sonæ members of the problem population, 
may under specific circumstances possess revolutionary 
potential. But this potential can only be realized if the 
problematic group is located in a position of functional 
indisoensability within the capitalist system. Historic­
ally, capitalist societies have been quite successful in 
transforming those who are problematic and indispensable 
(the proto-revolutionary class) into groups who are either
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problematic and dispensable or indispensable but not 
problematic .... On the other hand, simply because a 
group is manageable does not mean that it ceases to be a 
problem for the capitalist class. Even though dispensable 
problem populations cannot overturn the capitalist system, 
they can represent a significant impediment to its main­
tenance and grovth. (p. 642)
The case of Nev Caledonia shows that a collectivity 
(such as the Melanese) which is part lumpenprolctariat, part 
middle peasant, part poor peasant, part proletariat (reminis­
cent of the ^fantastic forms" that Lenin described as the re­
sult of the effects of the development of capitalism in Russi }, 
can in fact achieve class consciousness and undertake revolu­
tionary activity- But no group/class, even if it is in the 
majority, can bring down the state as long as it is economical­
ly dispensable to the ruling class- This is the profound prob­
lem faced by the Melanese and that comes out the historic devel­
opment of capitalism in Nev Caledonia. But as Spitzer points 
out above, this does not mean that they are utterly powerless 
in the situation either. They can still cause sufficient 
"trouble** that the state will be forced to grant reforms.
But again, it is evident that throwing the doors of 
educational institutions open to Melanese will likely have the 
desired effect (from the state's viewpoint): the "problematic 
and dispensable" can be rendered unproblematic —  even as they 
remain dispensable. In this and other ways a group's potential 
to initiate radical social change can be neutralized.
As for the ability of education to increase social 
mobility for Melanese, this will likely occur, but only to a 
very small degree. Education often increases Inequality within
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a minority group and between ethnic groups. Lopreato and 
HazDlrigg (1972:408) found that "the better educated a person 
is, the more likely he (sic) is to either experience mobility 
from a lower to a higher occupational position or retain a high 
initial occupation position". On the other hand, many sociol­
ogists of education have argued that the structure of social 
nrability is not altered by education (Jencks, 1972; Boudon,
1973; Collins, 1971 and 1974; Carnoy, 1974; Rocher, 1975; 
Richardson, 1977a; Lockhart, 1979; Gilbert and McRoberts, 1977). 
As Martin and Macdonell (1982:268 - 269) point out:
It has been argued that the cultural and economic obstacles 
to social mobility are such that education not only helps 
maintain social inequality, but also creates wider dis­
crepancies in the present social stratification within so­
ciety   Educational systems are shaped by the prevailing
patterns of social inequality and, rather than causing so­
cial mobility, educational qualifications help to legiti­
mate inequality.
The affects of social class on educational achieve­
ment and social mobility are further complicated by the affects 
of ethnicity on these. In New Caledonia, like other white-set- 
tler colonies, social and occupational stratification has a 
very strong ethnic basis. Most high-paying, high-prestige jobs 
are held by Europeans and most low-paying, low-prestige jobs 
are held by the colonized- According to Lionel Jospin, French 
Minister for National Education in 1988, only 38 per cent of 
Melanese go to highschool, and only 14 jær cent of these stud­
ents go on to university (see Keesiag's Record of World Events, 
p. 36702). It seeims vory unlikely in the highly-prejudiced, 
discriminatory colonial setting that the educational system 
can single-handedly eliminate cultural, ethnic, and class dis-
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tincfcions and their negative effects on academic achievement 
even inside the classroom let alone in society-at-large. And 
even if it could, experience shovs that dominant classes have 
many methods of advancing their own Interests. Perhaps most 
important, education alone cannot make up for the material dis­
advantages that children experience at home from the time of 
their birth.
Educational reform in New Caledonia will not have 
a major positive impact on intragenerational or intergoncra- 
tionai social mobility, at least not as long as white settlers 
remain in the country. But, as in the advanced capitalist 
countries of the center where educational reform was also the 
historic by-product of class and ethic conflict and of the on­
going development of capitalism, it will have served its latent 
function in New Caledonia if it succeeds in institutionalising 
conflict and rendering "problematic" groups/classes ’unproblem­
atic". Education, predictably being projected as a panacea 
for the Melanese by the state, will very likely not lead to 
their structural assimilation into white-settler-dominated 
society. Even in the present transitional phase of change in 
New Caledonia, promises of reforms have already lessened sup­
port for more radical social change. Still, such reforms may 
not necessarily legitimate or make possible the territory’s 
perpetual colonial status.
Desasgraphic Factors
The demagraphic situation of New Caledonia is also
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unique {compared to that in former colonies) and may permit 
the imperial country the option of not granting indepent'c: ce.
In New Caledonia the Melanese are now outnumbered by the com­
bined populations of the Europeans and ^others® (mainly Pac­
ific Islanders from other French colonies and former Frencn 
colonies, but also Indonesians and Vietnamese). But in the 
colonies of settlement in Africa the colonized always remained 
the overwhelming majority. For instance, the ratio of colon­
izers to colonized was 1:130 in Kenya, 1:10 in Algeria, 1:23 
in Rhodesia, and is 1:5 in South Africa (Good 1976:610).
These demographics made decolonization imperative when the pre­
conditions for anti-colonial movements coalesced. The current 
situation of being a numerical minority is why the indigenous 
people have never been able to get independence by the half- 
dozen or so référendums held so far. France points out that un­
der the French constitution, all people living in a French col­
ony are permitted to vote on such questions. But under the UN 
regulations, only genuinely colonized people have the right to 
vote on the question of colonization (UN Resolution 1514, see 
Dornoy 1984:43). France anticipated growing demands for inde­
pendence starting in the 1960s. In preparation for this pro­
blem the state took defensive measures by encouraging an in­
flux of settlers (Europeans and people from other parts of the 
Pacific). Europeans and ”others“ have always voted against in­
dependence as it is conceived of by the Melanese. Plainly, vot­
ing will never get independence for the Melanese in New Cale­
donia, because they are a nu^rical minority and they are cur-
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rently the only group that supports independence at present.
The state can point to the results of référendums as “proof“ 
that French rule in New Caledonia is by democratic consent.
On the other hand, the Melanese, who have had little 
stake in the system and plenty of incentive to want to change 
it, are not about to go away. They reject the suggestion that 
they are French citizens with the same rights and obligations 
as someone horn in France to French parents. Their numbers are 
growing at a faster rate than the European population due to 
their higher fertility rate —  they will have to be “pacified” 
in sot^ way and the only really effective way to do that is to 
integrate them into the political, economic and social life of 
society. This implies a major structural change of colonial 
society. And that inevitably implies confronting settler op­
position, which is the real problem as far as the long-term 
interests of imperialism are concerned. Whatever happens, it 
is evident that the old colonial system in Now Caledonia is 
no longer tenable- If France intends to make good on its vow 
to retain a presence in New Caledonia "forever", it has to make 
on all-out effort to legitimate Itself and/or prepare the coun­
try for neo-colonial independence.
The Problem of Land Ownership 
And State-initiated Land Reform
The problem of land ownership is a critical immediate 
issue in New Caledonia. It is a major factor determining the 
militant outlook of the anti-colonial nævesient. Land owner­
ship is highly concentrated in the hands of a few European
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settlers. European occupation of the land has, of course, 
long aroused the bitterness and resentment of the indigenous 
population who naturally view the occupation of their ancestral 
land as illegal. In light of the present crisis, the state has 
recognized that land reform is an essential element in stopping 
the *tidal wave" of revolution. But land reform throughout the 
Pacific is an extremely complicated issue as pre-contact con­
ceptions of land rights conflict with the capitalist conception 
of land ownership (Crocombe, 1971).
The situation is especially complex in New Caledonia 
because a system of reservations was created in 1868 (Saussol, 
in Crocombe, 1971:240). This served the needs of the colonial 
system well —  at the time —  when it was thought that the 
Melanese were a dying race anyway: it made policing and con­
trolling the colonized easy and it cleared the land for settle- 
nœnt and later for mineral prospecting, mining and forestry.
But the reservation system has come back to haunt the state 
and the local land-owning bourgeoisie; it is no longer the 
best way to deal with the "native problem". This is due to
demographic change and to the fact that the Melanese are ada­
mant that all of their lands must be returned to them as the 
original inhabitants of the islands. In the opinion of the 
Melanese, true independence can only 1% realized when they 
have regained all of their lands and when only they decide to 
what use the land will be put. The old way of eking out a
bare hand-to-mouth subsistence on the reserves, which have al­
ways had very limited potential for agricultural developn^nt, 
is no longer going to be passively accepted by the Melanese
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people. The state recognizes clearly this aspect of the crisis 
and in response to it has initiated a type of land reform that 
has, nevertheless, not met with the approval of the leadership 
of the anti-colonial movement.
Since colonization and the Institution of the re­
serve system, occasional enlargements of the reserves (onc- 
tenth of the land area of the main island), have been granted 
by the state. (Reservation lands have also been taken ava 
and people have been moved to other lands all over the island 
at the government’s discretion). As Alan Ward (1982) reports:
At the end of the Pacific war there were at least two very 
distinct and separate communities in New Caledonia: about
31.000 Melanesians living on the reserves, without politic­
al rights, following a version of their traditional custom, 
prone to epidemic disease, to demoralisation and drunken­
ness, and soB^ 18,000 French who enjoyed in varying degree 
the fruits of the land and the nickel mining. [p. 8) ... 
The reserves on the Grande Terre were increased from 127,- 
000 hectares in 1946 to 162,000 in 1969, but much of the 
land granted war poor and mountainous. In addition, a fur­
ther 20,000 hectares, approximately, were made over in 
leases or grants to individual smallholders. None of 
these measures kept pace with Melanesian population growth 
or with rapidly mounting Melanesian aspirations to leave 
the reserves and find salaried empioyj^nt. {p. 13)
And, according to Marion Dornoy (1984):
By the 1970s, 25,000 (sic) Kanaks were living on 155,000 
hectares in reserves while less than 1000 settlers owned
370.000 hectares, and half of this land surface was in the 
hands of 40 of these owners (many of whom were absentee 
owners) in the form of vast holdings of 2000 or more hec­
tares. (p. 3)
Judging by the current land reform policies being en­
acted in Nev Caledonia, the state favors gradual abolition of 
the reserves and a transition to individual, private ownership 
of land according to French laws. This is "Stolyin” land re­
form par excellence. While sosæ land is going to Melanese,
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this is actually a multi-ethnic land reform. Europeans and oth­
er ethnic groups are also becoming private landowners - The ob­
ject of this land reform is to create a class of kulaks who 
will support the state. This type of land reform is being un­
dertaken for purely political purposes: to coopt those who have 
opposed the state and to create a class that will allow the 
state to legitimate itself into the next century. This emerg­
ing new configuration of land ownership will contain the present 
hegemonic crisis and may prevent sanm in future. It will also 
permit a neo-colonial solution. Either way, the long-term in­
terests of imperialism are not threatened.
Predictably, both the small landholding settlers and 
the large land holders have opposed reform. It is the settler's 
bitter and obstinate opposition to reforms, including especially 
land reform, that has been the single-biggest obstacle standing 
in the way of the state's efforts to deradicalize and contain 
the anti-colonial movement. Thus, the state has directed ap­
peals and proposals specifically to settlers in an attempt to 
win their approval or at least to get their cooperation with 
the state's policies. Settler cooperation, the state has recog­
nized, is absolutely essential if a neo-colonial solution is to 
be possible for New Caledonia. And land reform is a central 
feature in engineering a neo-colonial set-up, as is plainly un­
derstood by the state. One French statesman flatly explained 
the reality of the situation in an address to a settler group;
change is necessary ... there is no other way which leads 
to internal peace and security. The past 40 years in the 
world teach us that from the moment when plans for sover­
eignty are expressed by an authentic ïÆople, they can only 
finish with Independence. [The statesman asked that the
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settlers accept his proposals] which [would] allow them to 
stay on the land they love and which [they] have made fer­
tile. France would guarantee independence, and independ­
ence would guarantee continued French presence. (Edgar 
Pisani quoted by Dornoy 1984, p. 29)
The case of New Caledonia appears to confirm Good's 
(1975) theses on the political significance of white settle­
ment: it not only radicalizes an independence movement but the 
resulting crisis subsequently leads to the intervention of the 
imperial parent-state with preparations to decolonize.
By the late 1970s the land problem had reached open 
crisis proportions. A Marxist-inspired Melanese political 
party, known as PALIKA (Party for the Liberation of the Kanaks), 
and led by Nidoish Nalsseline, a Melanese chief who had been 
a unversity student in France during the 1968 uprising and who 
was influenced by Marxist-Leninism and the black power move­
ment, began organizing the systematic occupation of settler- 
held land. t3nder the leadership of this party, young Melanese 
set-up road blocks, broke settler's fences, burned some farm 
houses, and killed cattle. This led to confrontations between 
Melanese and police and several Melanese were shot to death.
This turn of events convinced the state that land reform could 
no longer be put off indefinitely. These violent confront­
ations between Melanese and settlers and between Melanese and 
the police, and also a Melanese organized protest to the set­
tlers* annual celebrc ;ion of "colonization day" (known offic­
ially as New Caledonia Day) in September 1977 that turned vio­
lent, mark the turning-point 1%tween the gradual, peaceful, 
constitutional methods of achieving independence that had been 
favoured throughout the 1960s and early 1970s and the new grow-
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ing radicalized thrust of the anti-colonial movement.
The proposed land reform led to differences of opin­
ion immediately over the form it should take. Alan Ward (1982) 
reports :
[In the early 1980s] land reform became the subject of in­
creasing debate. The pro-independence parties developed 
claims consistent with their assertion of Melanesian cul­
ture and Melanesian primacy —  that is, for all land to be 
returned to the clans on the basis of traditional associ­
ation with it. The approved method in the interim was the 
enlargement of the reserves, not the allocation of land to 
individuals ... because this was seen as a further threat 
to the Melanesian culture. The administration, on the oth­
er hand, while willing to enlarge some reserves, argued 
that traditional Melanesian tenure favored subsistence 
rather than commercial agriculture and wanted to return 
the land either to cooperatives of Melanesian farmers or 
to individual small holders of all races, including Wallis 
Islanders, not just Melanesians. To many independence 
leaders this multi-racial approach threatened a renewed 
colonisation —  a "black colonisation" —  and their con­
tinued subordination in their own country, (p. 18)
A "socialist" government in power in France with 
the election of Mitterrand in 1981, that paid lip-service to 
the demands of the Melanese, brought a brief wait-and-see at­
titude to the independence movement, which by that time had 
formed an "independence front® —  a coalition of political 
parties, church groups, women’s and cultural organizations —  
that supported immediate independence to be granted to the 
Melanese- But the continued lack of movement toward acceptable 
land reform and to independence led the independence movement 
to step up its occupation of land and in general brought in­
creased radicalization.
The state response was to bring in more police and 
to step-up land reform. The intent, according to Ward (1982) 
was to "transfer land at about three times the pace and scale
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of that already legislated for” (p. 30). Decisions concerning
land reform vere now solely in the hands of the metropolitan
state, as Ward points out;
It is one of the ironies of the land reform that at a time 
when greater devolution of responsibility to New Caledonia 
is essential in the process of decolonisation that the 
French state has aggregated power to itself in a crucial 
area. This is clearly necessary to overcome local resis­
tance to land reform on any scale likely to satisfy Mel­
anesian demands, {p. 34)
The failure of the state’s land reform to satisfy 
the Melanese led the latter to continue their policy of haras­
sment of settlers. According to Ward, this has been success­
ful especially on the east coast, where the population is pre­
dominantly Melanese (p. 39). The purpose of this was to get 
as many settlers to abandon the land as possible. As Elol 
Machoro, a leader of the anti-colonial movement explained:
The reconquest of New Caledonia will begin here. When we 
have cleaned up this area we will move on to Thio, La Foa 
and Boulapari. Each tribe must draw up a list of those 
they want to leave. This is going to be a trial of strength 
Everyone should know that we are determined to nse guns if 
necessary, (quoted by Ward, p. 39)
This “clean up” has led to a situation of Increasing geograph­
ical segregation and ideological polarisation between the two 
groups. It also provoked the wrath of the state; more polic­
ing, the arrests of Melanese, and unprovoked attacks by the 
police- Meanwhile, land reform did not proceed at anything 
near the expectations of the Independence move^nt.
The 1980s brought the rapid radicalization of the 
anti-independence forces. First, Vanuatu (New Hebrides) be- 
caaæ independent from Britain and France in 1980, convincing 
the Melanese in New Caledonia that they too must become in-
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dependent. Land reform vas too slov. And even the minimal 
program of land reform being administered by the state resulted 
in dangerous settler reaction. ^Dangerous" to the state be­
cause of the growing radicalism of the anti-colonial forces.
To show disapproval of the state's slowness to produce the de­
manded *clear timetable* for transition to independence, the 
Independence Front fors^d a "parallel government*. Leaders 
of the independence ffiovesœnt appealed to the Organization of 
African Unity, the Non-aligned Movement, the South Pacific 
Commission, etc., to sup^rt the Independence Front's bid to 
have their country placed back on the list of the UN Special 
Committee on Decolonization. Violence spread throughout the 
territory, mostly initiated by the forces of reaction. Ac­
cording to Ward (1982:40):
Regular exercises involving amphibious naval landings, 
helicopter-borne troops, supporting heavy artillery, and 
mobile armored cannon, are held in the bush. These kinds 
of conventional forces have not been able to prevent covert 
harassment of the outlying settlers, but they could cer­
tainly contain an oirert rising.
Hegemonic Crisis and State Reaction: 
The "Third Path" to Independence
By the mid 1980s there were almost 10,000 French mil­
itary and police stationed in New Caledonia. At the end of 
1986, when the Melanese declared a provisional government, the 
UN finally had to respond to the crisis. It placed New Cale­
donia on the list of the Special Committee —  to the chagrin of 
France, which continues to deny that New Caledonia is still a 
colony, and to the alarm of the anti-independence settler i»r-
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ties. A full-blown hegemonic crisis vas now in effect and a 
well-known harbinger of revolution had occurred: “dual sover­
eignty* .
The state's reaction has since proven the situation 
"manageable” nonetheless, at least until 1998, when the next 
(and the state hopes, the last) referendum on independence 
will be held. If a majority vote for a continued "French 
presence” is obtained, the state will put the matter to rest 
—  "permanently”. And even if the 1998 referendum legitimates 
the state's neo-colonial solution with a majority vote for 
“Independence within the French Community", ”A Treaty of A s s o c ­
iation”, "Associated Statehood”, "Associated Independence", 
"Enlarged Autonomy", "Independence in Association with France®, 
or any other euphemism for neo-colonialism the state can offer, 
history has clearly demonstrated that independence in the pe­
riphery does not result in "any marked impoverishment of the 
great imperial parent states or any reduction in their capacity 
to exploit the rest of the world” as Arghiri Emmanuel (1972:35) 
has put it. This is the purpose of the famous "troisiem voie” 
(third path) that France sought to lead Algeria and Vietnam on 
during their decolonization crises: neither revolution nor 
white-settler independence but a non-revolutionary national- 
ist-reformlst post-independence state with a conservative 
native elite in political power backed by an equally conserv­
ative middle class of kulaks who will support the state. This 
is the ideal political solution as far as the requirements of 




A concrete historical analysis of the special fea­
tures of the development of capitalism in New Caledonia is nec­
essary in order to gain an understanding of the political, ec­
onomic and social forces that have contributed to the genesis 
of revolutionary consciousness and action in the indigenous 
population- Nev Caledonia markedly exhibits the relatively ad­
vanced capitalist developaœnt and class formation that is often 
typical of territories of white settlement. As mentioned a- 
bove, it is by far the most developed country of the South 
Pacific Islands, even though it is one of the last remaining 
colonies in the region- This fact is counter to the expect­
ations of bourgeois development theory in which results and 
causes are frequently confused and appearance is taken for 
reality and only in commonsense terms can it be viewed as para­
doxical .
One of the main features of the economy of New Cal­
edonia that makes it unlike any of the former white-settler 
colonies in Africa (Kenya, Bhodesia, Algeria), is that native 
labour in New Caledonia has not Wen, for the most part, func­
tionally integrated into the dominant (capitalist) mode of 
production. This has resulted in the marginalization of the 
indigenous population- But submissive acceptance of “fringe- 
dweller" status and —  for all intents and purposes —  near­
landlessness on almost-barren reserves was not destined to 
go on indefinitely. The world-wide trend to decolonization, 
the inevitable demographic change (rapid population growth on
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the reserves), the nickel boom ot the late 1960s and early 
'70s (caused by the increased demand for nickel on the world 
market used primarily for the manufacture of armaments during 
the Vietnam War) that widened the socio-economic gulf k:tween 
the European and indigenous populations {Ward 1982:14), and 
the belated appearance of educated native people who wore not 
organically linked to the system and thus able to act as cata­
lysts and leaders of the anti-colonial struggle, all contrib­
uted to the decolonization crisis of the 1980s. Thus, "collec­
tivities which are highly organized and have weak links to 
the power structure will be most rapidly and intensely mobilized 
to collective action" {Himelfarb and Richardson, 1982:371).
While these changes contributed to the rebellion by transform­
ing a formerly non-problematic population into an embittered 
and enraged group of people, the "functional dispensablity" of 
the Melanese as a collectivity render them incapable of carry­
ing through revolutionary social change alone. Social segmen­
tation along ethnic lines means that the "proto-revolutionary" 
classes: the proletariat, "poor peasants" and lumpenproletariat 
remain divided and impotent. As long as the bonds of "race" 
are stronger than the bonds of class, social revolution is not 
possible. As Himelfarb and Richardson (1982) argue:
Ethnic conflicts inhibit class consciousness by making 
cultural (and racial) what is roost often, at base, econ­
omic.... Ethnic conflicts sight be viewed as a kind of 
primitive political expression of what are ultimately 
class conflicts.... Ethnicity may be a useful resource 
in expressing the collective discontent of disadvantaged 
groups, so too is it a resource available to the powerful 
to minimize and channel social discontent... Ethnicity 
is a resource which can be used either to organize dissent 
or to divide and rule.... (pp. 318 - 319)... Segmentation 
... [^ans] social cleavages in society, cleavages which
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inhibit communication and cooperation between groups. Such 
cleavages often serve to divide the working class and to in­
hibit the formation of broadly based working class movements 
... While ... the recognition of conmajn interests in terms 
of ethnicity may eventually lead, for some, to class con­
sciousness, ethnic identification may also serve to inhibit 
the development of class consciousness, and co-operative re­
lationships among the working class. Such internal divi­
sions may often lead to competition and suspicion within the 
dominated class, (p. 372)
Furthermore, the broad '’loose negative coalition", (a 
collectivity that cuts across class and ethnic distinctions) 
that Dix (1984) and Shaw (1989), above, identify as an essential 
precursor to a revolution, is far from existing in New Caledon­
ia. In the very segmented milieu (along class, color, national, 
"life-style", cultural, language, and gender lines) of the col­
onial society, it is highly unlikely that such a collectivity 
will come into being. Defacto segregation and little integra­
tion between the two main ethnic groups since the beginning of 
colonization has resulted in a huge gulf of social distance be­
tween black and white people who objectively may well be of the 
same social class. And while the state certainly faces a chron­
ic inability to legitimate itself, this only applies to the in­
digenous population- Thus, there seems little chance that a 
broad negative coalition can form around the issue of the legit­
imacy of the rule of the French state- For its part, the state 
is taking every advantage of this complex social segmentation 
and class forces to play one group off against the others, for 
its own political purposes.
For instance, while the state has prtmlsed that it 
will do everything it can to protect the sanctity of the prop­
erty and vay-of-llfe of its settlers in post-independence New
1
Caledonia, this claim is only slightly true. In reality, the 
vast majority of the settlers are, in fact, expendable, as far 
as the long-term interests of the state are concerned. Small 
settlers are already being •’sacrificed". It is not, for the 
roost part, (as far as 1 have been able to determine) the big 
landowners who are having their land expropriate^. The set­
tler bourgeoisie will continue to maintain its productive pro­
perty and positively privileged status after independence as a 
very important class ally to French imperialism in the region.
In sum, it was out of the on-going development of 
colonial capitalism in New Caledonia that the particular so­
cial/structural forces emerged that in the 1960s, 1970s and 
1980s coalesced to favour the appearance of a potentially revo­
lutionary movement- Nevertheless, the state's by far superior 
capacity to mobilize social resources (including ethnicity) 
and to apply more nakedly coercive tactics (new military instal­
lations with nuclear capabilities are planed for New Caledonia 
and elsewhere in the region) in order to counter the challenge 
will, in all probability, bring a non-revolutionary resolution 
to the decolonization crises-
The too-long colonial status of New Caledonia and 
France's apparent attempt to avoid granting independence in­
definitely while all of the other Melanese countries have inde­
pendence, has been a major contributing factor to the present 
crisis. Feelings of cultural nationalism are very real and 
very strong and cannot easily be gotten rid of. But they can 
coopted by teing functionally integrated into the existing 
system- The state clearly recognizes this and has attempted
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to integrate nationalism by creating opportunities for Melan­
ese to enter into formal institutionalized study of indigen­
ous culture and by offering the education of children in their 
own native languages. Thus, as Obershall (1973:44) has argued, 
social conflict may originate "from the demands for greater 
authority, rights and recognition by those vho are excluded 
from the polity and from full citizenship rights” (quoted by 
Himelfarb and Richardson, 1982:366). But the creative policies 
of the state can turn cultural nationalism around actually to 
serve its own interests. The present denKjgraphic trends mean 
that the old method of colonialism of simply ignoring and sup­
pressing native culture can no longer work. Oppression of 
people's legitimate and understandable needs and demands to 
keep, value and express their own culture as an important 
source of identity can only lead to the unintended (and unwant­
ed) radicalization of those people- The French state’s pathetic 
gerrymandering of several référendums on independence during 
the eighties —  which the insurgent leadership denounced as 
an "anti-democratic swindle, not in accordance with 0N reg­
ulations" —  can only a^tdd the issue in a very temporary way. 
Again, Himelfarb and Richardson stress this important point:
Allen Grimshav (1970) points out that as excluded groups 
gain in number, as they becon^ organized and recognize 
their strength, they will Increasingly participate in the 
struggle for power. The attempts of the ruling group to 
block them will only serve to increase their discontent. 
Political turmoil and collective violence are K)st likely 
to result if the ruling groups are perceived to be abusing 
their power —  rigging elections, the continued use of 
force —  in their attempts to block the excluded groups' 
demands, (p. 366)
Educational reforms provide one of the clearest ex-
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amples of a state’s capability to coopt and to ostensibly pro­
vide an avenue for the upward mobility and structural assimil­
ation of disadvantaged and radicalised ethnic groups or other 
collectivities. In this way, conflict can be institutionalized 
and directed into activities that help to form non-revolutionary 
consciousness so that supporting and participating in militant 
action becomes virtually unthinkable. Khen education appears 
to provide a modality for improving one’s material situation, 
in which every group supposedly has the equal opportunity to 
compete, "people may strive individually rather than collectiv­
ely to improve their position through [this] legitimate chan­
nel for upward mobility” (Himelfarb and Richardson, 1982:364).
While education can provide a path to upward mobility 
for a few individuals from lower-class backgrounds, it remains, 
after all a reform within the system and as such it can do noth­
ing to "cure" the larger structural contradictions that arc the 
bases of social conflict and inequality and which are merely 
the "symptoms" of these contradictions. Significantly, the 
French state is currently putting a very high priority on insti­
tuting its educational reforms for the indigenous people. As 
experience demonstrates, the resulting new native elite will be 
simply another group of social climbers, cut-off from their 
own people, seeking to identify and ingratiate themselves with 
the dominant (white) group. The political effect: "upward mo­
bility siphons off the most articulate and competent of the 
lower and working classes, thus leaving them without effective 
leadership or spokespeople” (Himelfarb and Richardson, 1982: 
285).
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The political functions of land refers must also be 
understood. In buying out small settlers —  most of vhom are 
leaving the colony to retire elsewhere —  the state is freeing- 
up land for Melanese, Wallis Islanders, and Javanese. These 
people will simply take the place of the departing white set­
ters as private-property owners who will become the new social/ 
class basis for the legitimacy of the state. In this way, as 
in Russia during the Stolypin period, a “restless, rebellious" 
group (the Melanese) as well as other ethnic groups (who al­
ready firmly oppose revolutionary change) will be transformed 
into reliable allies of the status quo. Land reform implies, 
of course, a redistribution of the surplus and of income. But 
the mere fact that money will be “changing hands" is not what 
is of essence in the situation- It is not an end in itself.
The essential purpose of the reforms is "protest absorption". 
With this accomplished, it is likely that further serious pol­
itical conflict and violence can be avoided for the foresee­
able future. Thus, with political complications aside, permit­
ting at least a modicum of social peace and consensus necessary 
for the continued extraction of nickel and other minerals —  
the demand for which is expected to rise —  phenomenal profit- 
making opportunities are on the horizon. (For projections on 
the future desand and increasing profitability of various min­
erals —  “if developing nations accelerate their industrializ­
ation pace" —  see “Non-living Resources of the Oceans” in 
Ocean Yearbook 1, Elisabeth Mann Borgese and Norton Ginsburg, 
eds., Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978).
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I have singled out for sosewhat lengthy analysis 
the examples of educational and land reforms in New Caledonia 
mainly to show how reforms within the system invariably have 
the ultimate effect of impeding fundamental structural change. 
This isf in fact, what such reforms are intended to do; this 
is why they take the form they do; and this is why the state 
is the agency and originator of the reforms. Many other re­
forms —  of an economic, political and social nature —  arc 
being proposed and implemented in New Caledonia in an attempt 
to accommodate the demands of the colonized and to prepare for 
the changing social forces that will be brought by continued 
demographic shifts. The French state's reforms cannot end -- 
or even reduce —  inequalities in New Caledonia. But, as men­
tioned above by Weber, how oppressed people actually react in 
the face of class inequalities has alot to do with their per­
ceptions of society. Where the conditions exist that allow 
people to clearly perceive class oppression and exploitation, 
where people have subsequently “named" their problem, the first 
prerequisite to their undertaking deliberate activities to ob­
tain change also exists. As I have argued, and as numerous 
historical examples seem to confirm, white-settler colonial 
societies have a marked tendency to generate the kinds of so­
cial forces that permit at least some sectors of the colonized 
people to develop class consciousness. With colonial capital­
ism comes Increasing inequalities and social tensions. This 
eventuates in a decolonization crisis -- frequently with revo­
lutionary potential. A decolonization crisis is a manifest
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hegemonic crisis —  a crisis of legitimacy —  for the imperial 
state. If the demands of the oppressed masses are more than 
the state and local elite groups are willing or able to toler­
ate, the real (coercive) character of the state reveals itself. 
This is overt class warfare. As Antonio Gramsci described the 
source of the hegemonic crisis: huge masses ... have pas­
sed suddenly from a state of political passivity to a certain 
activity, and put forward demands which, taken together, albeit 
not organically formulated, add up to a revolution® (Gramsci 
quoted by Taylor, 1983:9). The only real long term solution 
to the crisis is to construct the appearance of a democratic 
society. Only in this way can political stability and social 
peace be achieved.
The type of post-independence state coming out of the 
decolonization crisis has enormous implications for future ec- 
nomic and political developments and for this reason is of 
paramount concern to the imperial "parent-state”- In the face 
of the crisis, the state’s actions will be designed to prevent 
a "radical break" —  a termination —  of core-periphery rela­
tions. This necessitates —  perhaps above all, but not only 
—  deradicalizing a native revolutionary insurgent movement 
with co-opting "protest absorbing" bourgeois reforms, it also 
requires preventing the declaration and establishment of an in­
dependent "white state". The imperative of decolonization for 
the imperial state is that post-independence development con­
tinues to be within the logic of core-periphery economic rel­
ations. Thus, reforms are designed to "stack the deck" in
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favour of a neo-colonial outcome to the crisis: the "third 
path®. This "nev face® of core-periphery relations ends 
neither inequality nor exploitation —  nor necessarily even 
social conflict —  but it can and frequently does change peo­
ple’s perceptions of these fundamental realities that continue 
to characterize society and that underlie the system —  both 
"internally® and "externally".
New Caledonia’s great mineral wealth, the "choKc- 
point" situation with nickel in particular, the likelihood of 
increasing demand and prices for these minerals on the world 
market, growing demands for independence in France’s "nuclear 
colony" French Polynesia, the growing economic value and polit­
ical importance of the Pacific region, and the competitive and 
contentious nature of advanced "core" state relations in the 
Pacific, are all very relevant factors effecting the decolon­
ization of New Caledonia. Because of all this, France had to 
become more aggressive and more sophisticated in the drive to 
establish its hegemony in the region. Ian Taylor (1983) ex­
plains how and why the state pursues this goal:
HegeaKjny ... is achieved by displacing the reality (or 
the essence) of capitalist domination with the appearance 
of liberal democracy. The successful accomplishment of 
this ideological prioritization of the political realm 
over the economic obviously requires an adequate perform­
ance by the capitalist mode of production, and also the 
successful construction of the appearance of real demo­
cracy- Real concessions of economic and political re­
sources are required on the part of ruling groups in order 
to ensure the long-term reproduction of capitalist domina­
tion as a whole. The only alternative form for capitalist 
rule ... [is] to resort to the use of naked coercion over 
the subordinate, labouring classes, and that always carries 
with it the danger that it could provoke mass resistance 
and/or rebellion.... [Hegemony necessitates] the expan­
sion of state provision in areas of health, education and
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welfare, and for a substantial reduction of earlier levels 
of class [in New Caledonia —  ethnic] inequality. In a 
social-democratic hegemony ... labour [thinks] that it [is] 
... represented iji the State, (pp. 8 - 9)
Achieving imperial-state hegemony in the colonial 
setting is highly problematic. The state's challenge is the 
chronic inability to legitimate colonialism and the "Law of 
Colonial Ingratitude". The result: granting national indepen­
dence becomes all but unavoidable. But this is the preferable 
political solution when those at the bottom have become mili­
tant. Yet, before nominal political independence can be con­
ceded the state must not only "break the back" of the militant 
m)vement but also take steps to prevent its future reappearance. 
This is the all-important function of the state's educational 
reforms: to neutralize revolutionary potential by providing the 
appearance of equal opportunities for upward mobility. De­
scribing the political consequences of social mobility Himel- 
farb and Richardson argue:
Social mobility ... dilutes social conflict and undermines 
the forces of social change.... Mobility has, asrong other 
consequences, the effect of retarding the development of 
class consciousness and awareness of class interests. 
Mobility striving deflects people away from collective 
action to improve the lot of everyone towards privatized 
or individual efforts to raise oneself and one’s family 
in the existing class structure. (pp. 284 - 285)
If the state's policies succeed —  and there is every 
indication that this will be the case —  the achievement of a 
broad negative coalition —  recognized as essential for the 
successful revolution —  seems a dim possibility. Instead, 
the successful institutionalization of conflict will create new 
groups and social forces entrenched against fundamental social
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change and the on-going development of capitalism in Nev Cale­
donia will continue in a new, more complex form.
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CHAPTER 3THB STATE AHD THE "S%;IAL BASIS OF OB2DIEKCE AHD BETOLT"
The Metropolitan State’s Sole in Colonial Development
The state has played and continues to play a central, 
even leading role, in capitalist develops^nt, both vithin the 
boundaries of the metropolitan nation-state and overseas in its 
“spheres of influence”. The "peripheralization" of the Third 
World —  the penetration of formerly self-sufficient “natural” 
economies and their structural subordination to the advanced 
economies —  is the basic source of underdevelopment. Due to 
the forces generated by capitalism’s internal contradictions, 
the advanced capitalist states created the Third World and now 
must seek aggressively to maintain this unequal, exploitative 
economic relationship between themselves and the periphery as a 
whole. But broad movements of opposition were bound to emerge 
in the periphery because of the terrible misery the system 
causes for the majority: the exploited, oppressed and marginal­
ized- For these reasons, the political and economic functions 
of the state are focused on and directed by the necessity of 
preventing fundamental structural change within the global cap­
italist system.
The imperialist state, according to the Marxist-Len- 
inist interpretation of the theory of capitalist development, 
arose historically in the several decades before the first 
world war. Coming out of the crisis of the “long depression” 
of the 1870s, the early years of the present “monopoly" stage 
of capitalism were characterized by t W  very rapid increase
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in the rate of the concentration and centralization of capital 
—  an ongoing phenomenon. The era was distinguished especially 
by the export of capital and the search all over the world for 
i^rkets, raw materials and cheap labour. A related phenomenon 
of the time was the competitive "scramble” for colonies result­
ing in the colonial subjugation of 1,300 million people in 
1945 (Barratt Brown, 1960:42). This early era of monopoly cap­
italism —  high cornetitive imperialism with inter-imperial 
wars and formal colonialism —  was born out of the need of each 
resj^ctive imperial state to defend the interests of its rul­
ing class against its imperial rivals but importantly also to 
forcibly transform indigenous modes of production and thereby 
establish capitalist class relations in the colonies- All 
this could only be accomplished by a militarily aggressive 
and economically powerful state. As John Rex observes: "Cap­
italism always moves towards being a world-wide phenomenon and 
the capitalist system alway has to be understood as a world 
economic system“.*
Nowhere is the various functions of the modern cap­
italist state so obviously illustrated as essentially inherent­
ly contradictory than in the colonial context. The political 
and economic functions of the state must reinforce and comple­
ment each other. But contradictions in the economic sphere —  
within the imde of production itself —  lead to conflicts and 
crises within society: social problems of all kinds and class
* “Race”, John Sex, A Dictionary of Marxist Thought, Tom Bott- 
omore, ed., Ccimbridge: Harvard University Press, 1983, p. 405,
125
conflicts. If these problems are very acute and wide-spread, a 
legitimacy crisis is a likely prospect for the state. Dealing 
with the resulting disorder is a political as well as an econ­
omic challenge to the state- The state is constantly struggl­
ing with a "balancing act" of trying, on the one hand, to fa­
cilitate the rapid, orderly, and ever-increasing rate of capit­
al accumulation, and, on the other, of coping with the serious 
social problems that arise as a result. Colonies must play the 
role of efficient generators of surplus value which is then 
"drained" out of the colony and appropriated as profits by cap­
italists elsewhere. If wages are low, as they usually are in 
colonial {and neo-colonial) settings, purchasing power remains 
very limited as does the market for consiu^r goods. This means 
both a "realization" crisis for capitalists, in which goods 
cannot be sold and so profits cannot be made, and possibly a 
political challenge to the state's continued rule.
The familiar situation in the periphery of "economic 
growth without development" is bound to lead to deimnds for re­
forms by disadvantaged groups, and possibly even a revolution­
ary situation. Kefonas cost money; and local entrenched re­
actionary classes may not be willing to tolerate this- Or, if 
the TOtropolitan state and local elites cannot "afford" wel­
fare-state reforms, due to crisis, they will repress Instead, 
Thus, underdevelopment may and often does, cause revolutionary 
situations in the periphery.
The recurrent and worsening economic crisis of the 
capitalist system, on a world scale, has resulted in the appear­
ance of authoritarian military regimes throughout the decolon-
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Ized world (Clive Thomas, 1984). The state needs legitimacy 
to perform its economic functions, yet cannot legitimate it­
self because of on-going economic crises.
Claus Offe (1975) points out that the capitalist 
state does not directly control the production process. But 
the state will “fall" if accumulation does not continue with­
out major interruptions. Offe argues: "The state does not 
only have the authority, but the mandate to create and sustain 
the conditions of accumulation" (Offe, 1975:126). But crises 
of accumulation are inevitable and the resulting social con­
flicts can escalate, in certain circumstances, to full-blown 
hegemonic crises and revolutionary situations. It is often 
pointed out that since the advent of the monopoly stage oi 
capitalism, many of the major contradictions of the capital­
ist BK>de of production have been transferred to the periphery 
and with them, the potential for revolution (Stavrianos, 1981; 
431). Thus, the imperial state is characteristically interven­
tionist and overtly anti-revolutionary in the periphery. Its 
chief political function is counter-revolutionary. Thus, there 
is a relationship, albeit a very complex and indirect one, be­
tween underdevelopment (caused in the last instance by impe­
rialism), and revolutionary situations. As Royce Quinton Shaw 
points out:
Uneven economic development and inequalities caused by the 
world-historic development of capitalism do not by them­
selves create "revolutionary situations." However, if one 
distinguishes between background variables and précipit­
ants as causes of revolution, then clearly ... uneven ec­
onomic develoiH^nt (and the resulting inequalities) [is) a 
principal background variable (Shaw "Dependency and Revol­
ution" in Boswell, ed., Revolution in the World System, 
1989, p. 84).
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Stavrianos (1981) explains “economic grovth without 
development” —  characteristic of peripheral capitalist socie­
ties —  and argues that this economic phenomenon generates the 
economic and social pre-conditions for revolutionary situa­
tions :
The dependent and underdevelojÆd economy ... has the dis­
tinctive quality of economic growth without development —  
grovth in the volume of raw materials exported and of nanu- 
factured goods imported, but no integrated national econom­
ic development... (p. 328}... Third World countries 
experience economic growth without economic development... 
This form of industrialization everywhere involve(s) for­
eign control of the key sectors of the national economy, 
and the enrichment of foreign investors and the small local 
elite at the expense of the masses of the native popula­
tion... (pp. 341 - 342) ... Whereas the earlier revolu­
tions were predominantly nationalistic, those of the future, 
because of the de^nstrated unviability of neocolonialism, 
will be predominantly social revolutionary,... (p. 456)
However, this has to be qualified; the particulars 
of each country and of the background variables of each revolu­
tionary situation differ in important ways. A souæwhat differ­
ent economic pattern is observable in (at least some) white- 
settler colonies. In addition to the usual horizontal linkages 
îætveen colony and parent-state that fetter comprehensive local 
economic deveiop^nt in the colony, is an extremely “lopsided” 
econfmic pattern between ethnic groups within the colony. In 
most white-settler colonies, the indigenous population func­
tioned as cheap laixsur —  so cheap that their wage was less 
than what a wage, scientifically speaking, is supposed to do 
(that is, provide for the reproduction of the worker's lal»ur 
power and for the biological reproduction of the worker's fam­
ily), as Marx and Hoodis (above) pointed out, —  providing the 
basis of accumulation for not only the metropolitan bourgeoisie
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but also the vhite settler “ethno-class". This “polarized ac­
cumulation® {as Stavrianos calls it, see also Ehrensaft in 
GutKind and Wallerstein, 1976, p. 58 - 89) can permit accumu­
lation "on the spot" and thus allows a more extensive capital­
ist development in the white settler colony than in the non­
white settler colony. Stavrianos points out, for instance, 
that the independent white-settler state of South Africa "ach­
ieved an independent, comprehensive and self-generating econ­
omic developcænt, in direct contrast to the foreign-dominated, 
lopsided and encapsulated economic growth typical of Third 
World countries" (p. 571).
The metropolitan state provides the repression that 
maintains this extre^ly inegalitarian system —  at least until 
the inevitable decolonization crisis necessitates a "change of 
the regii^ in order to save the state". This becocæs unavoid­
able because under these socio-economic-political conditions 
the metropolitan state cannot legitimate itself. If it can­
not legitimate itself, it cannot carry out its economic func­
tions of facilitating capitalist accumulation- In the extreme 
and manifestly visibly unjust system of white settler colon­
ialism (and especially in these where indigenous labour is the 
source of surplus value production), revolutionary crises are 
a virtual certainty, and as such this social formation poses a 
serious danger to imperialism. This is what Good (1976:619) 
means when he says: "The South African state today represents a 
great latent threat to imperialism in Africa and the Third 
World".
Stavrianos offers several examples of polarized ac-
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cumulation to illustrate the political consequences this econom­
ic situation has and the effects of all this on the subsequent 
actions of the state. The end result was the same in each case ; 
the end of settler colonialism with neo-colonialisa. Since 
the presence of settlers radicalizes the colonized/ the former 
must gOf and since the metropolitan state cannot legitimate 
itself it must (appear to) withdraw from the scene. Stavrianos 
gives some examples of "polarized accumulation® in Africa:
In Northern Rhodesian mines, European truck drivers re­
ceived thirty pounds per BKinth as against seven shillings 
paid to African drivers doing the same work.... In South­
ern Rhodesia in 1949, Africans employed in municipal areas 
were paid a minimum wage of 35 to 75 shillings a month, as 
against white workers (working 8 hours a day to the 10 to 
14 hours of the Africans) who received a minimum wage of 
20 shillings a day plus free quarters and other benefits.
Of course, wages were low for African workers all 
over the continent, including in the non-settler colonies.
But in the non-settler colonies, capitalist development was 
less extensive and so, therefore, was class formation. Also, 
in cases where low-paid African workers were not working along­
side highly-paid white workers doing the same jobs, the extreaæ 
injustice of the colonial system ray not have been as obvious 
and thus the exploited may not have hecome as enraged and rad­
icalized as African workers in settler colonies. And, though 
indej^ndence move^nts did eventually arise, these were mostly 
conservative nationalist, led by native elites, with much less 
overt or latent revolutionary potential than in the settler 
colonies- (For example: Kenya, with white settlers, was much 
more developed and had much m>re proletarianization of Africans 
than neighboring Uganda and Tanganika, which had few settlers.
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The two latter colonies made relatively peaceful transitions to 
independence —  there were very violent strikes in the years 
leading up to independence in Uganda and Tanganika —  but Kenya 
had a war lasting several years in which many thousands of peo­
ple died —  (most of them Africans.)
The state finds itself in a much more politically com­
plex diiemaa and contradictory situation in a settler colony 
than in non-settler colony (or for that matter than it normally 
does in a neo-colonial country or within its own boundaries). 
This is not to say that chronic turmoil disappears for good 
with the simple granting of independence- It does not because, 
in the words of Stavrianos (1981:185): "The colonial pattern of 
dependence upon, and exploitation by, the European metropolis 
was continued into the post-colonial era”. But the frequent 
economic and legitimation crises, settlers threatening to sec­
ede, the appearance of revolutionary movements, regional intcr- 
imperial conflicts over colonies —  all these are serious, im­
mediate potential threats to the imperial state and thus re­
quire special "coping strategies" in order to preserve core/ 
periphery relations. It is within the context of this politic­
al-economic bind that the actions of the imperial state during 
the decolonization crisis must be analyzed and understood,
Eav Material Extraction and 
The Imperial State in New Caledonia
Since the colonization of New Caledonia almost one- 
hundred and fifty years ago, the French state has played a fore­
mast role in "creating the universe® in which capitalist in­
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vestment, production and development can take place. As 
Brookfield (1972:81) observes: “There is almost no stage from 
i860 on during which we can say that the government had no role 
in the economy anywhere in Melanesia. Its role was of major 
importance in New Caledonia." Today, this situation still ob­
tains. Currently, one of the French state's major activities 
is in the field of repression of anti-colonial dissent and in 
active counter-revolution, not only in New Caledonia but also 
in French Polynesia and throughout Francophone Africa. Accord­
ing to Stavrianos (1981:470), France is one of the most active 
counter-revolutionary states in the world today. This is evi­
dent in its policies in New Caledonia's decolonisation crisis. 
Here too is illustrated just how contradictory are the state's 
various functions: in defending the rights of capitalists to 
accumulate unencuml^red by concerns for the conflicting inter­
ests and needs of the indigenous population, it has created 
the unwanted by-product of a disruptive anti-imperialist wsve- 
ment with revolutionary potential. Now the dilemma facing the 
French state is how to create consensus and stability in a very 
valuable colony and in a region where all of the countries dis- 
aprove of France’s policies and activities, particularly its 
unwillingness to decolonize and its nuclear experiments.
The major reason for French imperialism's interest 
in New Caledonia is its extraordinary mineral wealth. Geo- 
1 epical surveys re^mal that the island is a treasure trove of 
mineral resources: iron, cobalt, chro^, coal, manganese, anti- 
miny, copper, lead, gold, and esj^cially nickel which has been 
declared a "strategic material" by France- New Caledonia has
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the largest known nickel reserves in the world. It is not just 
that the mineral wealth is there that is important; but that 
there are certain features about it that make it especially 
attractive to capitalists given the realities of the inter­
national political economy of mining. These realities have a 
great impact on France’s reluctance to decolonize and on the 
state’s categorical rejection of both settler-led independence 
end native-led socialist revolution independence.
What is important to understand about New Caledonia's 
mineral wealth is that it is of a quality and quantity that 
makes it particularly profitable to extract. Also, the nickel 
especially is easy to access, again making it particularly 
profitable. Nickel mining in New Caledonia is open pit and 
is considered easy to excavate.* Mines are located near the 
coastline (and on the east coast -- where mostly Melanese live). 
Here the nickel mining is very highly mechanized; power shovels 
and bulldozers remove the ore and it is trucked short distan­
ces to conveyer belts which dump it directly into the holds of 
ships for transport to France, Japan and the D.S. Furthermore, 
as mentioned above, nickel is found in few places in the world 
(in economically-vorthwhiie quantities). Significantly, it is
* For more about mining see, for instance: “Is mining in Canada 
collapsing? All easily accessible deposits developed”, Mail- 
Star, Tuesday, March 3, 1992, p. B3; Susan Yellin, “Mining 
risks losing competitive edge", Mail-Star, Thursday, August 
31, 1989, p. 9; Theodore Moran, "International Political 
Economy of Cuban Nickel Develop^nt“ in Cole Blaster and 
CELTtælo Mesa-Lego, eds., 1979; B.W. Mackenzie, Nickel:
Canada and the World, 1968; Guy de Rothschild, 1985, pp. 219 
- 231; and Elisabeth Mann Borgese and Norton Ginsburg, 1978.
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thought to be depleted/ or nearly depleted/ in First World coun­
tries. Or, if it is there, it is not profitable to mine the 
ore. This is the "choTcepoint® phenomena: a comradity that cap­
italists must have that can not easily be substituted by alter­
native materials and that is geographically situated predomin­
antly in one region. Under these circumstances imperialism 
will be especially aggressive: it is imperative that it has 
secure control of strategic "chokepoint" materials. This is 
one reason why pro-imperialist regimes are installed and sup­
ported throughout the Third World, and why nationalist or so­
cial-revolutionary regimes that seek to gain control of their 
own natural resources in order to finance local social and ec­
onomic development are opposed and vilified by imperialism.
Nickel mining and smelting are necessarily capital- 
intensive industries- Certainly, nickel, in usable form, can­
not bo obtained in an "artisanal® manner, like lead, bronze 
and gold, for example, can. Enormous sums of capital are re­
quired to get into the nickel business and for this reason 
oligopolistic transnational corporations control the world 
market for nickel- In fact, according to Moran (1979:258) 
"Nickel is the most highly concentrated major natural resource 
industry in the world.... Three companies controlled more than 
60 percent of capacity outside the Soviet Union in 1975." In 
New Caledonia, 75% of the nickel industry is now conducted by 
transnational corporations while 25% is owned by local (set­
tler) capitalists, the petit mineurs —  several millionaire 
families. Since nickel was discovered in New Caledonia in 
the late 1800s, the French mining corporation Société Le Nickel,
13A
owned principally by the Rothschilds, had dominated the indus­
try there until recent corporate changes, in both extraction 
and local smelting operations.
All of these facts about mining and mineral resources 
in Nev Caledonia have had —  and continue to have —  a great 
impact on the course of economic and political developments in 
the colony and in the region- These are highly relevant fac­
tors in understanding the course of development, the role of 
the state in development, the political and economic consider­
ations of the state in decolonization, and the factors that 
have contributed to the radicalization of the anti-colonial 
struggle. The actions and motivations of all actors involved 
in the decolonization crisis in New Caledonia —  that is, the 
French state, the indigenous population, the settlers, the 
other ethnic groups, Australia and Nev Zealand —  are related 
directly and indirectly to the economic and geopolitical re­
alities of the mining industry.
Transnational corporations have enormous political 
and economic power in their own right. And the state has not 
failed to facilitate the interests of the mining corporations 
in Nev Caledonia. In the present decolonization crises, it 
is clear whose "side" the state is on: that of the big mining 
interests. It has not failed to defend mining interests ag­
ainst those who demand reforms. In theory, the French state 
owns all of the miner..! resources in New Caledonia- The state 
grants licenses —  "soft property" —  to companies wishing to 
engage in mining there. Thus the state reserves the right to 
decide who profits and Wnefits from the New Caledonia's nat-
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lirai wealth* Mot only that, it coerces and disciplines those 
who disagree with this form of development, namely the indig­
enous population.
Under the circumstances, it is no wonder that the in­
digenous people of New Caledonia have become the enemies of 
the mining capitalists and of the state that represents them. 
Due to the present system of resource ownership, the mineral 
wealth of New Caledonia and the mining industry have been a 
curse for the indigenous population. It can truly Iæ  said 
that it has caused them nothing but suffering since the min­
erals were discovered. Policy has always been not to hire Mel- 
anese for jobs in the industry. The Melanese have had their 
land taken out from under their feet so that mining could be 
conducted. The open-pit method of mining has been very des­
tructive of the natural environzmænt: it has destroyed unique 
plant-life and has polluted rivers on which many Melanese on 
reserves depend for water and food {fresh-water prawns, for in­
stance). On balance, Melanese have suffered much more than 
they have benefited from the mineral resources of their own 
country, due to capitalist property relations. Interestingly, 
environmental damage caused by the mining corporations has 
helped the Melanese to get international attention and support 
in their struggle for independence. "Green" {ecologist) organ­
izations, such as the Green Party in West Germany, have declar­
ed their support for the FLNKS {French initials for the Kanak 
Socialist National Liberation Front).
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Rav Materials r Inter-itaperial Rivalry 
and Decolonization
According to Stavrianos (1981;668) competition among 
the advanced capitalist states {inter-imperial rivalry) is “one 
of the three factors determining the time and place for confer­
ring Independent statehood". Denying independence to the bit­
ter end can be interpreted as a sign of imperial veakness in 
certain circumstances. Portugal's inability to grant its 
African colonies independence, vhich led to protracted war, is 
a case in point.
A certain element of inter-imperial rivalry is def­
initely an important factor in the case of New Caledonia- But 
this is not because France is a weak imperial force in the 
world in general or the Pacific region in particular. Never­
theless, state relations between France and Australia have 
been decidedly tense concerning French activities in the re­
gion. Australia has declared its support for the decoloniz­
ation of New Caledonia and has voted for the colony's re-enlist- 
n^nt on the ON Decolonization Committee's list. (The Austral­
ian and New Zealand governments also favour the granting of 
independence to French Polynesia where thirty years of cons­
titutional attempts to gain self-government have so far failed). 
France subsequently accused Australia of "interfering in the 
internal affairs of France" (a reference to the Australian gov- 
ern^nt'B disapproval of French policies in New Caledonia).
At one point, diplomatic relations between Australia and France 
broke down completely over the decolonization crisis in New 
Caledonia when foreign ministers were recalled-
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French nuclear testing in the region has been a major 
cause of bad relations with Australia and New Zealand for many 
years. Both Australia and New Zealand (as well as small is­
land states) are in complete opposition to French nuclear test­
ing on Mururoa and Fangataufa Atolls in French Polynesia (see 
®France resumes nuclear testing® Mail-Star  ̂Friday, May 12, 
1989). There is strong scientific evidence that shows the un­
derground explosions are causing serious environmental and ec­
onomic damage (to the fisheries, for instance) and rising rates 
of cancer deaths throughout the Pacific — - a result also of the 
explosions in the atmosphere in the 1960s and early '70s (see 
Danielsson, "Poisoned pacific: The Legacy of French Nuclear 
Testing", The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, March 1990, 
pp. 22 - 31).
France has a strong military presence in the pacific 
which it is bolstering in the face of anti-colonial opposition 
in New Caledonia and French Polynesia and increasing antagon­
ism toward France by New Zealand and Australia. (There are no 
anti-colonial movements in France’s other territories in the 
Pacific: Wallis and Futuna with a population of 10,000 and 
the Antarctic Territories —  which are uninhabited of course), 
France and the United States "are the powers most directly in­
volved in the security of Oceania" (Craig and King, 1981:213). 
France has the second largest armed forces in the region- This 
is so despite the fact that France is not a signatory on the 
Pacific Security Treaty of 1952 (also known as ANZtfS) In which 
the United States’, Australia's and New Zealand’s security in­
terests are seen as one (Bello, et al, 1985:270). France is
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clearly taking steps to preserve its long-term interests 
throughout the Pacific, in spite of regional opposition to 
its initiative.
What accounts for New Zealand and Australia's appar­
ent growing antagonism toward the French presence in the 
Pacific? The Australian government has declared its moral 
outrage at the condition of the indigenous population of New 
Caledonia and has condemned France for perpetuating the atroc­
ity. Yet# (and France has not failed to point out) New Zea­
land and Australia are blatantly hypocritical in criticizing 
France's treatment of "its” indigenous people (see Keesinq's 
Record of Word Events, p. 35777). Australia can hardly be 
proud of the treatment of its indigenous j«>pulation: over sev­
enty per cent of aboriginal Australians live in shanty towns 
(The Big Book of The Pacific# p. 266). It would be naive 
to assume that Australia's conflict with France is simply due 
to ethical concerns for native people.
In addition to Australia's and New Zealand's concern 
over the negative environmental and health impact of nuclear 
testing (for which the two countries brought charges against 
France in the International Court of Justice), there may be 
economic competition between the "imperial satellites" on the 
one hand and the "imj^rial aætropolis" on the other- Aust­
ralia may well view that part of the Pacific as its "backyard". 
Australian hegemony in the region is Impaired by France's impe­
rial interests. Regional antagonism zmong the advanced coun­
tries, probably have, at bottom, a very strong connection to 
competition over raw smterials. It is not unreasonable to
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suspect that France's efforts to hold on to its colonies are 
based, at least in part, on its fear of Australian designs on 
usurping France’s considerable control of raw materials in the 
region. Just as inter-imperial rivalry vas a major factor in 
the taking of colonies in the last century, it continues to 
play a major role in considerations on decolonisation. As 
such, it often contributes to the appearance of revolutionary 
class action in oppressed countries.
France is currently facing challenges to its impe­
rial domination in two of its Pacific colonies, in at least a 
half dozen of its former colonies in Africa, and in its Car­
ibbean colonies- Libya, an actively anti-imperialist state, 
has provided moral and material assistance to soi^ of these 
anti-imperialist movements. Twenty Melanese from Nev Caledonia 
attended a "summit of liberation movements" in Tripoli in July, 
1987 and are thought to have received training in guerrilla 
warfare techniques (see Kessinq's Record of World Events, p. 
34999 and p.35777. France and Libya do not have “friendly" 
relations in any case: the two have been in indirect war con­
cerning a territorial dispute in Chad. The fear of “Libyan 
terrorism" in the Pacific increased calls from all sides for 
France to move quickly to resolve the decolonization crisis 
in Nev Caledonia. The FLNKS relations with Libya also got 
the former branded "coi^inist" and "terrorist".
In sum. New Caledonia’s unique endowment of mineral 
resources, especially nickel, a “chokepoint" raw material, has 
certainly contributed to France’s avoidance of granting inde-
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pendence. This too-long colonial status —  way past the point 
when independence should have been given historically -- and 
the state's persistent stalling and diversionary tactics in 
response to the initial constitutional efforts to achieve indo- 
If^ndence —  have caused the progressive radicalization of the 
independence H»ve^nt. From the beginning, the state has been 
very nakedly coercive of the indigenous population; the highly 
profitable nickel industry had top priority and the market­
place had to be "cleared" of any impedi^nts in this endeavor. 
This Is how the Melanese with their traditional culture and 
subsistence stone-age mode of production were viewed by the 
state and the settlers alike : as an impediment to "progress". 
The social closure maintained by the settlers has ensured that 
the Melanese would find all paths to upward mobility effective­
ly blocked. Thus, the indigenous population was marginalized: 
left behind and excluded from the benefits of capitalist devol- 
op^nt in their own country. The recognition by the state, 
after the second world war, of the Melanese as full French 
citizens has not resulted in their structural assimilation in­
to the dominant society and economy. Now the state finds it­
self confronted by an angry, class conscious, and embittered 
people. As Stavrianos (1981:792) observes:
The new permanently unemployed are manifestly less willing 
to accept their lot in life than were their parents. The 
psychological factors behind current global disorders are 
as important as the economic factors.
The old, out-moded colonial-style class and ethnic re­
lations do nothing to contribute to the l^itimacy of the state 
or to the hegemony of the ruling class. The result has been
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constant latent class conflict and ethnic antagonism. The in­
evitable political consequences casæ to a head in the 1980s 
vhen the situation blew-up into open violent class and "race" 
confrontation, if not all-out class warfare. In order to ful­
fill its foresajst function —  guarding the permanent interests 
of capitalism —  the state will have to modify the former sys­
tem of internal class and ethnic relations, or at least the 
superficial, outward appearance of these. Reforms can go a 
long way, as the state is evidently well aware, of changing 
people's perceptions of the real nature of the state, and of 
the socio-economic system it represents. This is the only way 
to achieve the social peace needed by capitalism; otherwise 
the orderly pursuit of capital accumulation will continue to be 
severely compromised by regular disruptions, h careful analy­
sis of the decolonization crisis in Nev Caledonia supports the 
contention that the state is not an autonomous, neutral, bur­
eaucratic actor. On the contrary, the workings of the state 
are very much linked to the class structure and are “determined® 
by the imperatives of the mode of production —  with all its 
contradictions —  and as such the state acts in the defense of 
the ruling (property-owning) class. In so doing, the state 
itself sometimes inadvertently creates the "background vari­
ables" that favour the occurrence of revolutionary situations.
The actions of the state during political legltiamcy 
crises illustrate the decisive role the imperial state plays 
in world develo^ent. For this reason, it is imjksrtant to un­
derstand the functions the state must serve and how these func­
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tions are constrained by the permanent needs of the economic 
system itself. For instance, all state "top-down" reforms will 
be limited vithin the logic of the requlrei^nts of capitalism. 
But as Marx pointed out, while people make their own history, 
they do not do so just exactly as they wish- The state's ef­
forts to realize its intentions —  to "get its way" —  arc 
never unproblesatic. From the state's f^int-of-viev, challen­
ges from "lÆlow® are not the only social force that periodic­
ally necessitate modifications in its policies and constrains 
its behavior. "Outside pressures" are a m>re or less constant 
threat in the contemporary era. Inter-imperial rivalry and 
anti-imperialist states also place limits on the imperial 
state's ability to act in the way that would be most expedient 
to the requirements of the economic system. Furthermore, the 
state that suffers a chronic inability to legitimate itself 
cannot easily carry cut its economic functions. The state that 
cannot carry out its economic functions cannot legitimate it­
self. Thus, instituting neo-colonial reforms —  in order to 
preserve core/periphery relations —  becomes unavoidable if 
the state is to defend its long-term interests. Imperial self- 
interest is the ultimate origin of the state's colonial and 
foreign policies. It is out of all these contradictory social 
forces that have originated decolonization crises and that 
have given rise to revolutionary anti-i]^)erialist movements 
throughout the Third World,
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The State and the "Social Basis of Oi^dience and Revolt" 
in Nev Caledonia (The State’s Role as Mediator in 
Internal Social Conflicts —  Maintaining the Social Peace)
As discussed above, the state’s major function is 
to create the political conditions that i^rmit capitalists to 
accumulate- Thus, the state must preserve capitalist class 
relations —  there must be a class of productive vage laborers. 
The state must take steps to maintain the social peace —  so 
that the orderly pursuit of profit is possible. In order to 
do all this, it helps if the state is vieved as legitimate by 
those who are subject to its authority- The state must have 
the consent, or at least the passive cooperation, of the ruled. 
However, no state can function without having powerful, and 
preferably disguised, means of social control at its disposal. 
Thus, the question is not "Does the state rule by coercion or 
consent"? The state must constantly maintain a delicate bal­
ance in its application of coercion. Forcible coercion, when 
necessary, has to be employed carefully, selectively —  only 
in "emergency" situations. "Too much" coercion, too naked, 
too open is counter-productive: it risks radicalizing the ex­
ploited and other "problem ^xjpulations". If all else falls, 
the state will declare "class war". But, skillfully hidden 
"soft" coercion is much m>xe functional for the long-term pre­
servation of the state and the class relations of capitalism.
Ideological domination, mystifying people, instil­
ling and encouraging false consciousness: this is the "first 
line of defense" of any ruling class. This is oi« of the major 
latent (unstated) functions of the educational system in advan­
IA4
ced capitalist societies. Through schooling, via the hidden 
curriculum (the very manner by which the knowledge is "deliv­
ered”, the unquestioned assumptions of the teachers and the 
texts, the often active discouraging of critical modes of 
thinking), and the formal curriculum, children’s minds are 
formed such that the system is taken for granted —  social in­
equalities are seen as "natural". The mass media serve a sim­
ilar function; they fill people's heads with a bourgeois world­
view. As Cohen and Young (1973) point out:
The mass media provide a major source of knowledge in a 
segregated society of what consensus actually is and what 
is the nature of the deviation from it. They conjure up 
for each group, with its limited stock of social knowledge, 
what "every one else" believes.
Of course, ideological domination is seldom "complete". But, 
once mystified, people tend to be highly resistant to re-ed­
ucation.
Ideological domination of the colonized masses —  
through the mass media and formal schooling —  is conspicuous 
by its absence in colonial societies. Imperial state's have 
tended to undertake very little "investment" in developing the 
human capital of their colonies through education. In most 
cases, well under ten per cent of the colonized ever received 
much in the way of education during formal colonialism. For 
one thing, formal education is a very expensive way of social­
izing the costs of production. Apparently, this was not an 
expense parent-states were willing to carry. Coercion was 
probably cheaper —  and more profitable. So instead, the 
state's domination was (and is) maintained through fairly open
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coercion in the colonial context. But this is not a viable 
mode of rule for the long terms failure to construct the insti­
tutional means in civil society for ideological domination and 
instead resorting to open repression is an ideal formula for 
creating a “proto-revolutionary" class. If the other pre-con­
ditions are right, a revolutionary situation may well ensue.
The ever-worsening dilemma for the imperial state is 
how best to pursue its self-interests across national bound­
aries, i.e., in its spheres of influence in the periphery —  
colony or neo-colony —  while still maintaining the social 
peace. So, in practice, varying degrees and different tyj^s of 
coercion — “soft" and hidden or brutal and naked —  are employed 
to obtain the acquiescence of oppressed and exploited groups de­
pending upon what each situations calls for at the tiaæ. Peo­
ple can be —  and are —  coerced without clearly perceiving it.
Maintaining the Social Peace
The state's ability to fulfill its various functions 
has historically proven very problematic in the settler-colon­
ial setting. Nev Caledonia is no exceptions. Imperialism's 
primary economic interest in the colony is as a provider of 
raw materials, mainly minerals, (this does not mean that its 
other functions —  as a market for consusœr and capital goods, 
and as a place to invest capital at a high rate of return —  
are unimportant. However, New Caledonia does net function as 
a provider of cheap labour: it has the highest wages of any 
island in the Pacific.) New Caledonia's long-time status as
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a colony has enabled the state to have direct political control 
of the island's natural resources to the benefit of French 
mining corporations.
Here the state is acting expressly in the interests 
of TNCs. In New Caledonia, direct political control by the 
Imperial state has functioned impressively well for TNCs doing 
business there; albeit at the expense of contributing to the 
creation of revolutionary anti-colonialism. In any case, the 
state —  acting in the interests of TNCs —  has been instru- 
j^ntal in helping the latter to keep competitors out of the 
nickel industry in New Caledonia. This is very beneficial to 
TNCs: in an oligopolistic market, prices —  and therefore pro­
fits —  can be kept "artificially® high (sec Moran's discussion 
of oligopoly strategy in Blasier and Mesa-Lago, 1987:258).
Guy Rothschild, former chairman of Société Le Nickel, 
relates in his autobiography his corporate strategy in New Cal­
edonia. He reveals the kind of power the corporation held in 
the colony's economy:
Since 1884, my family had also had a stake in nickel. It 
had been associated with the founding of the Société Le 
Nickel for explorations in New Caledonia....
From the beginning of 1972, one could see a new depres­
sion coming in the metals market, and it became an urgent 
matter for us to obtain from the New Caledonian government 
a major change in the archaic and illogical tax system....
During the prosperous 1960s, we had formed an associa­
tion with Kaiser Aluminum for the purpose of considerably 
increasing the production capacity of our nickel foundry 
in Nouméa. At the time, extracting nickel from the rich 
mines in New Caledonia was very profitable.... At the 
first signs of another economic crisis, the Kaiser manage- 
^ n t  became alam^d and decided to pull out.. -
Our purjKJse [in our strategy of expansion] was three­
fold: to find a replacement for Kaiser; to prevent the 
arrival in New Caledonia of a competitor; and to obtain 
from the governrænt ... a new tax statute in New Cale­
donia.... The govem^nt gave its blessing by granting
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the tax modification we had been seeking...
At the time these complicated negotiations were going 
on, nickel was a highly coveted metal and our high-grade 
deposits were greatly envied...
The world situation of nickel has taken a most unfav­
orable turn [by 1980]---  [We] thus suffered all the ups
and downs of the particularly cyclical raw-material indus­
try, aggravated by a recession in the nickel sector, which 
had been so long considered the crown jewel.*
The point is, that while the state facilitated the 
SLNs' oligopolistic rents in New Caledonia —  thereby fulfil­
ling its economic function —  it unwittingly helped to bring 
into existence a serious legitimacy crisis- The SLN certainly 
benefited by its business in New Caledonia and during the boom 
the colony experienced rapid economic growth. But none of the 
benefits of this growth "trickled down" to the indigenous pop­
ulation. Rapid economic growth combined with no improvement 
in the living standards of the colonized (in fact they only
suffered); an increasing sense of relative deprivation by the
indigenous population as inequalities increased within the 
colony —  only "outsiders" were benefiting from the nickel in­
dustry while the Helanese themselves got nothing: these were 
the economic conditions that brought about the rebellion of the 
Melanese by providing concrete evidence that their poverty was 
neither "natural" nor "inevitable".
Thus, in the '980s, the state faced in New Caledonia 
—  for the first time in the modern sense (there had been pri­
mary resistance movements to colonization) —  the challenge of 
wide-spread rebellion by the indigenous population- New Cale­
* Guy de Rothschild, The Whims of Fortune, New York: Random 
House, 1985, pp. 222 - 231.
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donia was no longer "the land of the good neggar": passive, 
fatalistic acceptance of the status quo and patient waiting 
for "things to get better® was out; mass mobilization of pol­
itical resources to force the state to change the system was 
in. Colonialism had lasted intolerably long in New Caledonia 
and ESterial conditions were getting worse —  not better -- 
for the indigenous population. Capable people who had acquired 
a scientific understanding of society finally appeared to lead 
a sustained challenge to the authority of the state. It what 
is probably the last white-settler colony remaining in the 
world, the French state new has a complex problem: how to pre­
serve its own interests —  the interests of the imperialist 
state. In order to do this, it has to find a way to win the 
support of the indigenous population. It has to find a way to 
deradicalize them. In short, the challenge is how to find a 
way to regain the social peace; to prevent revolution. The 
achievement of sustained popular action against imperialism 
is a major turning point in the developEUsnt of capitalism in 
New Caledonia. It is the origin of the state's well-known 
strategy often applied during hegemonic crises: pacification 
of the oppressed with limited material benefits.
White-Settler Reaction Against Reformism
There is a positive relationship between the pres­
ence of white settlers in a colony and the degree of violence 
of the decolonization struggle {Stavrianos, 1981; Chaliand, 
1977; Smith, 1984; Emmanuel, 1972; Good, 1976; Guiart, 1982).
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The main reason for this is that settlers invariably oppose 
reforms intended to better the material condition of the colon­
ized. They do this, as Good (1976:603) says, “not simply out 
of sadistic racist fury". They do it because their positively 
privileged situation in colonial society requires the oppres­
sion, exploitation, and often landlessness of the colonized.
As Good points out: "Stark inequalities necessarily result in 
social change under settler colonialism" (p. 607). But in 
opposing reforms —  even in the face of violent collective 
action by the colonized —  the white settlers are, in fact, 
opposing the long-term interests of their "own" state, that is, 
the imperial parent-state. This is the predicament of the 
white settler. Good sums up the behavior of white settlers in 
Africa :
Through its rigidity and wide-ranging intransigence, aided 
by the non-intervention of the métropole, the settler state 
itself ensures that the new African classes have no way 
forward other than by a revolutionary path. The achieve- 
^ n t  of popular armed struggle, however, causes a signif­
icant reassessment of metropolitan interests and, on this 
basis, brings about the overthrow of the settler state.
(p. 613)
New Caledonia is not a Third World country as far 
as the setters' experience is concerned. This contrasts 
sharply with the material situation of the colonized, which 
will be discussed below. Sixty per cent of settlers now live 
in the capital, Nouméa. Nouméa is a modern city in every way 
with a developed infrastructure: state-of-the-art hospitals.
good schools and housing, clean streets, safe water, etc. The |
p
settler in New Caledonia does not do without the necessities 
(and eouæ of the luxuries) of life. Nouméa is overwhelmingly a
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"white" city: very few Melanese can afford to live there. The 
settlers who remain in the countryside, known as "bush set­
tlers" own their own land; many own and operate small tourist 
facilities, others are petty comn»dity producers of agricult­
ural products for the local market. According to Britannica 
Book of the Year, 1987:715, the average annual income per 
household in New Caledonia was 20,600 (OS $) in 1980 —  very 
high by world standards —  most of it accruing to the settler 
population. Going by the physical quality of life of the set­
tler community, one hesitates to call New Caledonia a "Third 
World country", even if it is a colony. In short, most set­
tlers live very well in New Caledonia by world standards. Oth­
erwise, one supposes, they would not be there, since they have 
the option of "returning" to France whenever they choose. (Of 
course, many were born in New Caledonia, have never seen France) 
Considering all of this it is not surprising that al­
most all settlers oppose the Melanese version of independence. 
They have faithfully voted against independence in every refer­
endum so far. Seventy-five per cent of settlers vote right in 
territorial and French national elections. Fifteen per cent of 
them vote ultra-right. These people feel that they benefit by 
colonialism —  and they do. This is why they do not want it 
to end. (Except for a small ultra-reactionary fringe group, 
many of whom were one-time Algerian settlers, and who want a 
"Shodesian-style" i.e. white-settler-led independence). The 
settlers of New Caledonia put one in mind of an observation by 
Strindberg:
To be conservative as a speculation is the worst sin a
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man can commit- It is an attempt against vorld development 
for the sake of a few shillings, for the conservative tries 
to hinder progress, he plants his back against the whirling 
earth and says: stand still! It has only one excuse: stu­
pidity. Poor circumstances are no excuse, but certainly a 
motive.*
Not only do the settlers staunchly oppose indepen­
dence —  which as far as they are concerned would be they end 
of them —  few have been willing to accept reforms. This is 
the greatest danger to the state —  and to themselves. Their 
reluctance to "compromise”, resulting in the progressive rad­
icalisation of the independence forces, has made them their 
own worst enemy. Knowing from experience the danger of settler 
reaction, the French state has stepped in to Impose reforms 
whether the settlers like it or not.
Proposals for "sweeping reforms" were broached by 
the state in 1979, as the anti-colonial movement was growing 
and consolidating its political resources. The next decade 
saw the progressive escalation of social conflict in New Cale­
donia. It went like this: the Melanese grew ever more vocif­
erous in their demands for independence (they were the only 
Helanese country without independence, one of the last colon­
ies in the world, and their "eaiseration had remained steady 
if not increased” as Good (1986:509) says). The French state 
responded by increasing the range of the reform package and 
by delaying —  holding référendums which they knew the Melan­
ese could only lose. Each new proposal for more reforms 
brought increasing settler reaction —  they would brook no re-
August Stindberg, The Red Room, London: Dent, 1967, p. 265-
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froms. The state's stalling and the settlers' reaction caused 
the radicalisation of the Melanese. Violence in the colony 
increased to unprecedented proportions. The state response: 
thousands of military and policy re-enforcements vere flown 
into the territory. The following news reports give an indic­
ation of the growing level of Melanese militancy, state re­
pression, and settler reaction;
In August and September 1979 anti-French demonstra­
tions in Nous^ by supporters of the Independence Front 
[FI 3 parties resulted in 100 extra riot police being 
brought in from metropolitan France, the unrest developing 
into serious clashes between police and demonstrators on 
September 24 (the 126 anniversary of the establishment of 
French rule). Further tensions arose in January 1980 
after a Melanesian youth had been shot dead during the 
night of January 5-7 by an off-duty police inspector... 
Speaking in Paris on Oct 29, 1979, the FI leader ... de­
nounced "French colonialism and imperialism in the Pacific" 
and declared that “by its obstinate refusal to grant the 
Kanak people sovereignty in their own country" the French 
governBKnt bore full responsibility for the "inevitable" 
confrontation to come. (Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 
June 1981, p. 30900)
Rioters broke into the legislative assembly of New 
Caledonia ... and attacked politicians there July 22 [1982], 
Later they clashed outside the building with police in 
what was described as the worst disturbance the island 
territory had ever witnessed.
The rioters had broken off from a demonstration of 
perhaps 4,000 right-wingers, chiefly of European descent, 
who were protesting against ... reforms.... The reforms 
backed by the Paris government called for expropriating 
some of the worthwhile land —  almost all of which was 
held by whites —  and returning it to the Melanesian 
native. (Facts on File, August 1982, p. 570}
In renewed violence in New Caledonia early in 1983, two 
policenæn were killed and four injured in a clash near 
Sarraa^ on January 10, when a large contingent of Melan­
esian tribesmen ambushed a lorry convoy carrying equip­
ment to a timber plant in the La Foa area some 60 miles 
to the north of Nouméa.... This incident served to height­
en inter-cosmmnal tensions within New Caledonia, which 
were further exacerbated when a Melanesian pro-independ­
ence activist was killed on May ll [1983] and a European 
was subsequently charged with his murder. (Keesing's Record 
of World Events, pp. 32386 - 32387)
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The most serious incident to date occurred on December 
5 [19843, when nine Kanaks were killed at a Caldoche [set­
tler] roadblock in Hienghine, on the Kanak-dominated east­
ern coast of the main island. Another three were serious­
ly wounded, one dying of his injuries on December 7....
Six Kanaks were arrested on December 19 and charged 
with the arson of a store at Bourail, on the west coast, 
on December 16. One man died in the blaze and five were 
injured, including two who died later...
It was later reported that, in the jœriod from Novem­
ber 13 to December 31 [1984], a total of 107 roadblocks had 
been erected ... 15 bombs had exploded, 96 buildings or 
cars had been burnt, 41 buildings had been ransacked and 
16 people, including 12 Kanaks, had died in jxîlitical vio­
lence. (Kessinq*s , p. 33725)
A substantial force of police raided three villages in 
Thio on March 5 and 6 [1985] and detained 30 Kanaks, eight 
of whom were charged with sabotage, arms offences and the 
January 11 murder. The raids were followed by stoning at­
tacks on police and by further arson at houses and at the 
nickel mine; the FLNKS called a "day of protest" on March 
8, with a demonstration in Nouméa ...and several road­
blocks. A gendarme ... was killed on îfeirch 8 by a machete 
thrown during a clash with Kanaks manning a roadblock at 
Pouebo.
On April 6 fighting broke out on the northern island 
of Belep between Melanesian supporters and opponents of 
the FLNKS. One nmn ... was killed.
A teacher was killed on April 8 when her car, along 
with several others vas stoned by Kanak youths.... Six 
others were injured in the stonings.... The FLNKS con­
demned the killing, which occurred as an anti-independence 
demonstration was taking place in Nouméa, with 5000 attend­
ing, The territory’s teacher staged a one-week strike, 
joined by petroleum workers, and a protest meeting on 
April 11 attracted 2,000 people.
The next demonstrations in Nous^ took place on April 
20, when heavy policing prevented contact between 1,500 
FLNKS supporters and 3,000 people ... at a rally organized 
by the anti-independence [supporters].
Several right-wing activists were arrested [in] June 
... and a quantity of arms, ammunition and explosives were 
seized. Three of those arrested, rejx>rtedly connected 
with a clandestine "crisis committee" fomed ... by ex- 
pieds noirs [Algerian settlers], were charged in connect­
ion with three bombings. (Keesing's, p. 33727)
Several violent clashes and Ixjmblngs had occurred in the 
months and days leading up to the election.... On Septem­
ber 25 [1985], shortly after loyalist settlers rallied at 
city hall in Noumea, three Ixambs exploded. One of them 
demolished two flcNSrs of a French govem^nt building. 
Police and firefighters descrilæd that explosion as the 
worst in the city's history-... (Facts on File, p. 744)
15^
Several bombs exploded in Nouméa on September 25 
[1986], destroying the Land Office {which was largely 
responsible for procuring land for Kanak development} 
and the Office of the Development of the Interior and the 
islands {which encouraged development projects in Kanak- 
dominated areas. Although no group claimed responsibility 
for the bomb, the choice of targets indicated that it had 
been planted by elements opposed to the independence move­
ment.
During the night of October 25-26, 1985, the building 
containing the newly situated Land Office was destroyed in 
an incendiary attack. Several small explosions in the cap­
itol preceded the complete destruction of the main court­
house in the early of hours of December 3, in the largest 
and most adroitly conducted bombing to date.... (Keesing *s, 
p. 34999).
The worsening violence and Increasing radicalisation 
of the independence forces seems to have persuaded the UN to 
finally agree to officially recognise New Caledonia as a colony 
by re-enlisting it with the Special Committee on Decoloniza­
tion in December of 1986. But this recognition did nol end 
the violence. Settler-initiated violence continued. As 
Keesing*s (July 1985) reports: "Despite its unilateral pro­
clamation of independence, the FLNKS generally maintained bet­
ter relations with the representatives of the French state 
than did the anti-independence movement" (p. 33727). Here are 
some examples of the worsening violence, some of it state-re- 
pression of the independence movement, and much of it perpe­
trated by settler groups opposing reforms:
[In August 1987] some 7,300 soldiers and riot police 
were sent to New Caledonia to prevent - -. the recurrence 
of violence of the kind that broke out in the elections of 
1984, when about 20 people were killed in violent clashes 
between French settlers and Kanaks.
There were violent clashes between police and demon­
strators in Nouméa ... when atwut 300 FLNKS supporters 
defied the ban on demonstrations and staged a peaceful 
but illegal sit-down protest. The desaînstrators were 
forcibly dispersed by riot police using tear gas and 
truncheons.... {Keesing's, p. 35776).
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A l7-year-old Kanak ... vas shot dead by police on 
November 6, 1987.... The shooting vas folloved by a con­
frontation between police and Melanesian youths and tvo 
policemen vere injured. {Keesing's, p- 35778)
  On February 22, 1988 ... Kanak militants, armed
with only clubs, stones and petrol bombs, overpowered 
[some] gendarmes, injuring 15 of them and taking hostage 
the remaining 10. The hostages, vere, however, freed 
within a matter of hours-
At least 28 people vere killed in New Caledonia in 
late April and early May 1988, in a series of violent 
clashes between the French colonial authorities and rep­
resentatives of the indigenous Melanesian population.
The violence ... was the worst since 1984. (Keesing's 
p. 35976)
Disruption of the Social Peace, the Economic Effects 
and State Response
A decade of severe disruptions of the social peace 
put a severe strain on the economy: nickel mining and logging 
of^rations vere negatively effected by bombings and roadblocks 
Tourism dwindled and was reduced to a standstill in early 1985 
when France declared a state of emergency —  the first time 
since 1961 during the Algerian decolonization crisis. (Travel 
insurance cannot be purchased by travels going to countries 
under a state of emergency). Capital accumulation in the luc­
rative tourist industry was seriously disrupted throughout the 
1980s.
Settlers have been extraordinarily obtuse in grasp­
ing the realities of the political situation in New Caledonia. 
They themselves have suffered greatly because of it. For one 
thing, settlers who owned tourist acco^iodations lost business- 
All manner of retail shops and restaurants also lost business, 
not just by the absence of tourists but tecause of a curfew
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imposed during the state of emergency. Yet even though they 
had a material reason to give at least so^ half-hearted sap- 
ïxïrt for reforms —  to keep the social peace —  most remained 
steadfastly opposed to reforms.
The French state, on the other hand, has had a much 
EHjre realistic view of the crisis. It is ironic that while the
independence movement wants France out of New Caledonia the
crisis has had the opposite effect. France has dismissed loc­
ally elected officials {for refusal to follow French policies),
and has instead appointed officials in France who were dis­
patched to oversee the implementation of reforms. In December, 
1981, it was announced that France would rule by decree for a 
period of one year to permit the reforms. French involvement 
in New Caledonia is, in fact, stronger than it ever was. This 
was the only way to overcome the resistance of the settlers to 
reforms in an attempt to deradicalize the anti-colonial movo- 
E%nt.
The Material Conditions of Life 
of the Indigenous Population
For the indigenous population New Caledonia is a 
Third World country. For the vast ^jority the physical 
quality of life is poor. Compared to the settler population, 
it is deplorable. According to statistics from a few years 
ago, sixty per cent of Melanesian households had no electricity. 
That i^ans, of course, no electric lighting, no refrigeration, 
no washing machine, no television —  conveniences roost settlers 
take for granted- On the reserves, the typical dwelling is a
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cane hut. The huts have no indoor plumbing, no indoor hot and 
cold running vater. People have outdoor privies. Water is 
hauled by bucket from rivers. Perhaps some (myre fortunate) 
î^ople have veils and pumps. Cooking is done outdoors ov^r an 
open fire. And, as with poor people almost everyvhere, trans­
portation is a problem. In all, life is very hard for the 
80% of the Melanese population vho live on the reservations- 
With very little purchasing power they do not have the money 
to buy better housing, modem conveniences, etc. Those few who 
live in towns generally live in low-quality rented housing. In 
Nouméa, there is a slum area of rental housing where son® Mel­
anese and other poor people live. The Melanese were poor be­
fore the Europeans came —  but they did not know they were 
IKJor. Now, the knowledge of a better way, and experience of 
great suffering, of pain and humiliation, and understanding of 
the social causes of their misery have engendered revolutionary 
understanding and action in the colonized population.
These bad material conditions have taken their toll on 
the people's health. A Melanese person in New Caledonia is much 
more likely to become seriously ill than a European person.
There are still (or were until very recently) tuberculosis and 
leprosy sanatoriur^ in New Caledonia, Given the extreme in- 
eguaiities there, most of the patients are (and were) certain­
ly Melanesians. Leprosy is one of the least contagious of all 
the contagious diseases: one has to be in really poor health to 
get this disease. Well nourished people with access to proper 
sanitation and housing do not contract TB or leprosy. These are 
diseases of extresæ poverty: they are associated with over-
158
crovded living conditions, poor nutrition, and poor hygiene. 
Also, Melanese have a higher fertility rate and a higher in- 
fant/maternal death rate than do the Europeans. Even if Mel­
anese have equal access to medical care as Europeans —  and 
they probably do not —  their poor material conditions mean 
that over all, their health is much poorer than the average 
European’s.
As for education, Melanese suffer here too. Of the 
older generation, many are illiterate in the colonizer's lang­
uage. Some older people cannot understand spoken French well. 
Many of these people had virtually no formal schooling. It is 
a little better for younger people. Most can read, write, 
speak and understand French. Still, they do not have equality 
in education, Lionel Jospin, French Minister for National 
Education, Youth and sport has reported in 1988 that : "Only 38 
per cent of young Melanesians currently entered into secondary 
education, and of these only 14 per cent vent on to university' 
(Keesing’s Record of world Ehrents, p. 36702). The educational 
reforms are aimed at (among other things) redressing this sit­
uation.
According to Susanna Ounei, a founding leader of 
the Kansk and Exploited Women's Group in Struggle, a component 
organization of the FLNKS, in 1984 only 7000 Melanese had 
paid employment (out of a population then of about 60,000, 
probably aixîut 25,000 of vhom vere of working age). Thus, 
the majority of indigenous people vere either unemployed or 
undere^loyed on the reserves obtaining a subsistence from 
agriculture or subsisting on welfare paytænts.
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Only colonized people themselves can really under­
stand the psychological damage caused to them by colonialism- 
Susanna Ounei, (who sentions that as far as she knows, she is 
the only Melanese from New Caledonia who is speaking English 
and living in the English-speaking world —  in New Zealand as 
an English student under the sponsorship of Corso and as the 
official representative of FLNKS in New Zealand), writes about 
the devastating psychological harm colonialism is doing to her 
people.* Poor people everywhere —  including in the advanced 
capitalist world —  suffer great psycholexical damage and prob­
lems because of their poverty. The problem is not simply just 
tæing poor; that condition is exacerbated by the fact of social 
inequalities. Seeing how other people have more causes deeply- 
ingrained feelings of inferiority in most poor people. As 
Stindberg put it: "[This is] earth's most bitter misfortune, 
the humiliation of poverty".** How much worse it must be 
still for a colonial people whose very minds have been colon­
ized; who have been told in a thousand ways that they are noth­
ing, they never were anything, and they never will be anything, 
that their culture is worthless, that they have contributed 
nothing to human civilization, that —  on the contrary —  they 
have been a drag on human progress, that they are so naturally 
inferior that they were meant to die out- All of this shock­
ing misery visited upon the majority of the world's people by
* "The Kanak ^ople’s struggle for Independence in New Caledon­
ia", 1985.
** The Red Room, London: Dent, 1967, p. 255.
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colonialism —  which effects must still be felt despite de­
colonization —  is the well-spring of the rage, bitterness 
(remenü&er that scene from “A Raisin in the Sun" where the hero 
is accused of being bitter and he replies: "Bitter!? I'm a 
volcano!"?), frustration, desire for revenge that can move 
people to revolutionary action. Steinbeck is right when he 
says that the causes (of revolution) "lie deep and simply, 
the causes are a hunger in a single stomach, multiplied a mil­
lion times" etc. And as Frantz Fanon wrote of the colonized, 
marginalizee masses:
It is within this mass of humanity, this people of the 
shantytowns, at the core of the lunrpenproletariat, tljat 
the rebellion will find its urban spearhead. For the 
lumpenproletariat, that horde of starving men (sic), up­
rooted from their tribe and from their clan, constitutes 
one of the most radical revolutionary forces of a colon­
ized people.*
Aside from its political effects, certainly colonialism is one 
of the greatest tragedies of the human race.
Oscar Lewis (1966) has written how colonialism has
created a subculture of poverty in the colonized masses. He 
argues:
The subculture of poverty is likely to be found where 
imperial conquest has smashed the native social and econ­
omic structure and held the natives, perhaps for genera­
tions, in servile status.**
Taking ail these sorts of things into consideration,
one can see more clearly some of the logical errors Lawrence
* Fanon quoted in Poverty in Canada, John R. Hofley and John 
Harp, eds., Scarborough, Ontario: Prentice-Hall, 1971, p. 227.
** Lewis quoted in Poverty in Canada, 1971, p. 228.
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Harrison made in his book Underdevelopiaent is a State of Mind. 
Perhaps Harrison has not experienced the psychological effects 
of class and racial oppression nor the poverty caused by econ­
omic exploitation. If he has, he has not, apparently, perceiv­
ed it- But just because Lawrence Harrison, or anyone else, 
has not perceived oppression and exploitation does not mean 
those social phenocœna do not exist. Unfortunately they ^  
exist, and they are very real in their consequences. He men­
tions laziness, lack of trust in others, lack of drive to ach­
ieve, a present-time orientation —  an "unwillingness to defer 
gratification", absence of a willingness to Invest time, money 
and effort in bettering one’s condition ("nothing ventured, 
nothing gained" as the old cliche says), holding on to "trad­
itional values", etc., as major causes of poverty in the Third 
World. What Harrison does not seem to understand is that 
these are the deplorable results of poverty and not the causes 
of it. In class societies, that is, almost everywhere in the 
world today, people are poor because they are exploited and 
oppressed by the ruling (capitalist) class. Monopoly capital­
ism, including the phenomenon of Imperialism, has caused and 
is perpetuating the underdevelopment of the Third World.
Of course, these notions about the alleged causes 
of poverty as Harrison sees it are common middle class beliefs. 
It would seem that most Europeans in New Caledonia, if they 
have thought about it at all, hold these beliefs about the 
causes of the poverty of the Melanese people. If pressed, 
they might agree, begrudgingly, that certain reforms are need­
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ed. But they vould probably express outrage at. the use of 
"violence” on the part of the Melanese and insist that change 
can and should be sought within the legal channels provided 
by the state. Hypocritically, thev would claim that any vio­
lence on the part of the settler population is purely in self- 
defense. They vould probably not understand that a system 
that perpetuates poverty is the greatest violence of all.
They would certainly be horrified by any suggestion that revo­
lutionary change —  a change of the system and not merely a 
change within the system —  is the only real way to get rid of 
poverty, inequality, social conflict, etc. Obviously, settlers 
cannot countenance any termination of colonialism. Nor can 
they easily tolerate reforms that would actually go so far as 
to "even the score" between colonised and settler- Perhaps 
it is for all these reasons and many others, that middle class 
people, when confronted by evidence that the world is not a 
just place, always invoke some idealistic myth that amounts to 
blaming the victim. This seems to be an almost universal ele­
ment of middle class psychology. This class is, in the vast 
cmjority of cases, profoundly anti-revclutionary. Of course, 
in New Caledonia, as in most of the other white-settler colon­
ial social formations, there are, objectively, class divisions 
and inequalities within the European cormunity. And, no doubt, 
the white elite is manipulating, for its own political purposes, 
the white middle-class and the white proletariat. The Europ­
ean population in New Caledonia, despite objective class div­
isions, is "sticking together", four-square against the indig-
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cnous population. As Good {1976:611-612) argues:
Though it may be divided along class lines ... the vhite 
community has a common and overriding interest in continu­
ing the exploitation of the black majority.... Europeans 
collectively, if unequally, derive their wealth and posi­
tion from the exploitation of the colonized. [Substitute 
the wori *'®arginalizaion” for the word "exploitation" in 
the cast of New Caledonia.]
The Economic Position of the 
Other Ethnic Groups in New Caledonia
New Caledonia is an ejœmplar of the "plural" colon­
ial society that Gail Omvedt (1973) has described. Wallisians, 
Tahitians (French Polynesians), Indonesians (Javanese), ni- 
Vanuatu, and Asians (mainly Vietnamese) make up over twenty 
I^r cent of the population of New Caledonia. Most are recent 
immigrants —  a part of the flow of people from the smaller, 
less developed islands of the Pacific to the more developed 
areas —  in search of work. Some are the descendents of those 
who came decades ago to New Caledonia as contract labourers.
according to Harold Brookfield (1972), this traffic 
in human labour, in human beings, directed and controlled by 
the state, and available only for the use of French nationals, 
took place into the 1920s. New Caledonia suffered a labour 
shortage so imported workers were needed. This system of 
labour recruitment had the advantage of providing very low- 
paid workers to the mines and to the planters (for instance)- 
(Brookfield quotes wages of one to three dollars per month! 
in 1935). Also, in "bust" times, when they were no longer 
needed, the workers could be deported. They vere not allowed
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to own land and were not thought of as permanent settlers.
New Caledonia was to be “white man's country". The immigrant 
workers functioned as a docile, highly-exploitable labour force 
They often lived in even worse conditions than the indigenous 
population-
Today the immigrant population numbers about 30,000- 
Most still do not own land. Some (generally Indonesians) arc 
share-croppers on European-owned land. Some own restaurants 
and small shops in Nouméa- Soe^  are employed in the nickel 
industry- Many are unskilled, manual labour, but some arc 
skilled and mental labour. In any case, they have at least 
one thing in common: they have generally been opposed to 
independence.
Overall, they have played the role of the "bribed 
tool of reactionary intrigue". Wallis Islanders, for instance, 
have been “employed" by settlers as "guards" -- with order:: to 
shoot to kill any Melanese seen encroaching on their property. 
The Wallis and Futuna Islands are a French colony in the Pac­
ific and one of the few French colonies that does not Ijavc 
an anti-colonial movement. France keeps a military airport 
there. It is very underdeveloped and Wallis Islanders fear 
that if the Melanese obtain independence they will be repatri­
ated —  and on Wallis there are absolutly no jobs- The ni- 
Vanuatu people fear the same prospect, as do the other ethnic 
groups. Back on Vanuatu, where 80 per cent of the population 
lives hand-to-mouth subsistence, there are few —  if any -- 
jobs paying the kind of wages they can get in New Caledonia.
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Of ccurse, the other ethnic groups have been encour­
aged by the local bourgeoisie and imperialist-controlled s^dia 
to believe that they would be repatriated if independence ever 
comes. But the leaders of the independence movement have 
insisted that people would not have to leave New Caledonia 
after independence. As Jean Marie Tjibaoul, (assassinated 
in 1988 as were two of his brothers in 1984) former leader 
of the Indejændence Front said in 1982:
We want an independent country based on our historic 
rights to the land- The Euroj^ans are perfectly welcome 
to stay if they accept that we want to control our own 
destiny. We are not a racist movement/ we want economic 
justice. (quoted in Facts on File, August 1982, p. 507.)
Colonial pluralism (ethnic divisions) has proven a 
serious political problem for the independence movement. There 
has been a tendency for the non-European immigrant population 
to vacillate between siding with the settlers and siding with 
the Melanese. The state has been practicing the well-known 
strategy of "divide and conquer". Ethnic differences have 
been compounded by the fact that the Melanese are not struct­
urally integrated into the wage-labour force, so that forging 
solidarity among ethnic groups has been very difficult. Here 
is an excerpt from Susanna Ounei's* account of the FLNKS inspir­
ing efforts to overcome the ethnic divisions that were crip­
pling the anti-imperialist forces:
The majority of workers in New Caledonia are against our
* "The Kanak people’s struggle for independence in New Cale­
donia", Auckland: CORSO, 1985, pp. 11 - 12.
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struggle because the French brought them there from their 
own countries and gave them good jobs. And when they have 
good jobs they forget where they came from and what has 
happened in our country. We have got Wallisians... Tahit­
ians/ Vietnamese, Chinese, Javanese, and others. They all 
have good jobs while the Kanaks have nothing. Wc have no 
jobs.
... These people voted for the organization of the 
right. To help overcoE^ this problem we created a Kanak 
trade union, the Kanak and Exploited Workers Union in 1981, 
because we felt that we must try and explain to these peo­
ple that we are not racist. We see the problems of inter­
national imperialism and we must work together with them.
When we talked to the people, the mass media said that 
we vere cosmmnists, we were Marxists. [A daily nevspapt'r 
at the time was La France Austral owned by Société Le Nick­
el], The right vent on a campaign against us in their news­
papers, telling the people never to follow those who talked 
about independence because they were communists. They said 
that when we talked against capitalism, we were against God. 
And the people from Wallis are a strongly Christian people.
But on November 18, 1984, in the elections, the FLNKS in 
Thio [a mining town on the Kanak-dominated east coast] were 
in control of this area. The majority of the people who 
work in Thio are Wallisians, Tahitians or whites. Tiie 
FLNKS, led by Eloi Machoro [a former school teacher and pub­
lic servant, he was assassinated in 1984], vent to meet the 
Wallisians to tell them that they were not our enemies. We 
explained the problem of capitalism and colonialism to them 
—  how it divides us in order to control our resources. We 
also explained this to the whites who have no resources, no 
riches, in New Caledonia and who work for a hose. Wo said 
to them that we are not racist, and that we want to build 
up New Caledonia with them...
We wanted the people of Wallis to understand our prob­
lem because, ... if they have some resources in Wallis the 
French will probably bring the Kanaks to Wallis to take the 
jobs of the Wallisians. So we must work together and make 
the international links against capitalism, and build sol­
idarity iiÆtween the workers and those of us in the tribes 
who have no jobs.
The caldoches [settlers] refused to follow us and the 
army came to Thio with their helicopters and took them 
away to Nouméa. But the majority of the Wallisians, the 
same people vho voted against our movement last year, 
came in to support our struggle. They came to help in the 
barricades. That was really encouraging for us...
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Chapter 4 
THE STATE’S EEFOBMSs HKÎ CALEDONIA’S 
NEO-COLONIAL FDTDHE
The development of capitalism in New Caledonia has 
been characterized by the marginalization of the indigenous 
population, that is, by their exclusion from enjoying the bene­
fits of relatively advanced development; and by "polarized 
accumulation”, that is, by the monopolization of these bene­
fits by some sectors of the settler and immigrant communities. 
This internal class/ethnic inequality combined with the state’s 
delay in redressing these problems and its insistence on main­
taining an antiquated colonial system have led to a serious 
legitimacy crisis for the state that during the 1970s and 1980s 
escalated to a revolutionary situation.
Constitutional attempts to gain reforms and independ­
ence throughout the 1950s, 1960s, and l970s failed. The 1970s 
witnessed the simultaneous appearance of some of the first Mel­
anese who had the opportunity to study Marxism in Paris and 
develop a scientific understanding of imperialism and capit­
alism; the end of the nickel boom with the end of the Vietnam 
War; and the beginnings of active protests against colonialism 
through acts of civil disobedience. The imperial state and the 
settler regime answered the demands for reforms with reaction­
ary repression. The 1980s saw the subsequent radicalisation of 
the independence movement- This process unfolded as a response 
not only to reaction but because of the independence in 1980 
of Vanuatu and because of jNspulatiun growth on the reserves.
The indigenous population felt the need for independence and
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for the return of their land more and more urgently.
The 1980s was a decade of almost constant violence, 
protests, overt class and ethnic conflict that seriously dis­
rupted the social peace and thereby had a negative effect on 
the process of capital accumulation. The French state quickly 
intervened with a counter-insurgency program of reforms and 
repression in order to coopt the revolutionary forces in Nov 
Caledonia. The current "development programs'* underway in New 
Caledonia are actually a product of the decolonization crisis. 
These neo-colonial reforms constitute a "passi\'e revolution" 
through which the material basis of capitalist class hegemony 
will be constituted.
There is no such thing as non-political reforms.
All reforms have political motives and political consequences. 
But it takes a certain period of time to implement reforms, 
especially in the colonial context where settler reaction 
presents steadfast oppositions to any reforms that attenuate 
their privileges. It also takes a while for reforms to have 
the desired effect, that is, to deradicalize the supporters of 
revolutionary change through improvements in their material 
conditions of life, and to channel social conflicts into in­
stitutional forms that serve to preclude the achievement of 
revolutionary views and class action. Reforms within the logic 
of capitalism need not bring a really major change in the 
lives of the oppressed and exploited groups in order to serve 
the state's purposes. But they must change the perceptions 
these people have about the nature of society, the state and 
the system. It may take several decades for the state to
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install the appropriate institutions and to defeat the forces 
of revolutionary change. These are the reasons for the state’s 
various stalling tactics during a decolonization crisis.
The State's Reforms in New Caledonia
The counter-revolution is veil underway in New Cale­
donia. In fact, remodeling the old obsolete bare-faced colon­
ial system and replacing it with a more sophisticated, insid­
ious —  and effective —  method of political control is a re­
gion-wide project. France has interests to protect in Wallis, 
(where no real opposition to colonialism yet exists), neo-col­
onial interests in Vanuatu, and continues to hold New Caledonia 
and French Polynesia despite decades of demands for indepen­
dence. The imperative of maintaining imperialist interests 
have prompted some really major "develop^nt projects® in 
both New Caledonia and French Polynesia.
In New Caledonia, landlessness has contributed much 
to the breakdown in social peace. The state has marked 10,000 
hectares for re-distribution, at least for now. As mentioned 
above, this land is not all going to indigenous people. The 
intention of the land reform is obviously to create a multi­
ethnic class of landowners —  "kulaks® —  on whom the state can 
count as a social base of support. The state's version of land 
reform is the complete opposite of the land reform the indepen­
dence iKjves^nt had been seeking. The independence forces have 
long suspected that the state is intending to gradually phase­
out the reserves. This is opposed on the grounds that it will
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severely undermine native cultural traditions and values by 
destroying tribal institutions —  hence the term “black colon­
isation” - What many Melanese had envisioned by land reform 
was the return of the ancestral homelands to each tribe- Of 
course, the revolutionary leadership is veil avare of the 
state’s political motives and of what the political consequen­
ces will be.
Also, these new farmers -- petty commodi ty producers 
—  resulting from the reform, are not going to be like the old- 
style white-settler with his/her archaic, money-losing, un­
profitable methods. The old-style settler mode of production 
has long-since fallen by the way-side, really. Relatively high 
wages in the nickel industry and its "spin-offs" iiac’ lead many 
small settler-farmers to abandon farming years ago. These are 
reasons that land ownership had fallen into fewer and fewer 
hands. The point is that the counter-revolutionary reforms act­
ually involve a whole new model of development. More on this 
will be discussed below. In farming, the new model of devel­
opment involves the application of up-to-date scientific advanc­
es in the production of agricultural conaaodities, including 
livestock, fruits, vegetables, rice, wheat and corn- New, 
"intensive” methods of production as opposed to the old “exten­
sive" techniques are being developed. Land will be used much 
more efficiently: more food will be produced more cheaply. In 
agriculture, the new model of production is being described as 
"import substituting". Before, much of New Caledonia’s food­
stuffs were imported from Australia and New Zealand.
Fishing and forestry are also being developed through
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applications of aquaculture and silviculture —  no more "cut 
and run". If all this development of non-mineral primary 
commodity production is successful, non-urban employment will 
return to New Caledonia after its virtual disappearance with 
the expansion of the nickel industry since the second world 
war- This apparently is what the state means by its proposals 
for the "development of the interior" and "job creation". In 
fact, it promises to create 10,000 new jobs —  well paying 
permanent jobs over the next few years-
The state has obviously recognized the need to di­
versify the local economy. Dependence on the nickel industry 
made the economy too vulnerable to the extreme and frequent 
fluctuations in nickel prices and in the demand for nickel on 
the world market- In short, the economy was too narrowly based, 
Booms and busts in the nickel industry translated into economic 
and political crises in New Caledonia. The new model of devel­
opment is being designed to eliminate this problem- The econ­
omy of New Caledonia is not only in for a major re-vamping, it 
is going to become a veritable show-case of capitalist develop­
ment in the Pacific region-
Income tax was not introduced to the French colonies 
of the South Pacific until 1982 —  despite furious settler pro­
test. The state explained this was necessary in order to fin­
ance the developiænt of the interior and in order to provide a 
wider distribution of mining revenue. The state has also 
expressed its intentions to embark on a major construction 
project of highways, housing, hospitals and schools. Highway 
construction has involved completing and improving the coastal
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highway and building roads to connect the east and west coasts 
which have been largely cut-off from each other physically fby 
the central mountain range) as well as in ethnic, social, and 
economic terms. Improvesænts in transpmrtation will of course 
benefit the tourism industry as well. Tourism, which had been 
neglected in favour of nickel development, is hv ing expanded, 
with the intention that in the future it will constitute a 
mainstay of the economy. Construction of better housing is 
said to be taking place all over the islands, but especially 
in towns- This is described as "habitation loyer modéré" 
{moderate rent housing) and "habitation bon marché" (low rent 
housing). The state is preparing for an irreversible trend: 
the influx of more and more young Melanese to urban areas as 
they leave the reserves and seek jobs in towns.
Thus, the new model of development coming out of 
the decolonization crisis involves the diversification of the 
economic base with the development of tourism and non-mineral 
primary commadity production; creating a new multi-othnic 
petty-bourgeois class of landowners as a social base for the 
hegemony of the ruling class (settler and metropolitan); and 
deradicalizing the Melanese by structurally integrating them 
into the dominant society and economy, really for the first time.
These new structural arrangements were formally insti­
tutionalized with the ratification of the Matignon Accord in 
June, 1988. Keesing’s describes the accord as a "programme of 
institutional, social, and economic measures" {volume 35, num­
ber 5, p. 36702). The accord, signed by French "Socialist"
Pri^ Minister Eocard, Tjibaou of the FLNKS and La Fleur,
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head of the settler bourgeoisie party and a millionaire petit 
mineur, vas worked out in Paris and was approved by a French 
national referendum- After the signing, France ruled Nev Cale­
donia directly for one year. Three nev provincial assemblies 
were created and the FLNKS are dominant in two of these. FLNKS 
representatives have since been elected in these areas to over­
see the reform measures in their area. This is in "preparation** 
for a referendum on "self-determination® scheduled for 1998.
In other words, the independence movement is veil on its way to 
being coopted and deradicalized.
Tjibaou, a former Catholic priest, who had not re­
nounced his vows, agreed to the accord against the wishes of 
most FLNKS supporters. It appears that he wanted to end the 
violence which was getting even worse leading up to the accord. 
The political situation vas escalating, in the words of one 
observer, to a "war-like situation", and Tjibao recognized the 
accord as the guickest way of stopping it. He was assassinated 
May 1989, apparently by a “left wing coEmmnist". Nevertheless, 
the reforms appear to be working: there is a noticeable improve­
ment in the social peace. As one French statesman put it, the 
signing of the accord marked a new era of "fraternity, justice 
and progress" for New Caledonia.
Educational expansion is an important aspect of the 
pre-emptive counter-revolution. This is, in fact, only a part 
of a region-wide initiative of the French state’s efforts to 
secure its hegemony in the Pacific. This effort includes the 
establishment of new military and navel bases throughout the 
region- A naval base and another military base are being built
17 A
in New Caledonia. Others are planed for French Polynesia.
In January 1986, France also created its own "Council of the 
South Pacific* staffed by experts on South Pacific issues and 
apparently designed to act as a counter-organization to the 
South Pacific Forum, the South Pacific Commission and the Mel­
anesian Spearhead Group, and to promote French interests in 
the region. Régis Debray was appointed secretary-general of 
the council, which also includes, according to Keosing's the 
"French President, leading members of the Cabinet, senior dip­
lomats and military officers with experience of the region" 
(March 1987, p. 35001). An interesting aspect of the Council's 
work is the founding of a new university with campuses in 
French Polynesia and New Caledonia:
The Council emphasized its determination to accelerate 
creation of a South Pacific university based in Tahiti 
and New Caledonia. This university, M. Debray suggested, 
would help to counter the "Anglo-Presbyierian morality" 
emanating from the regional University of the South Pac­
ific based in Fiji, which he held to be responsible for 
the growing regional hostility towards France, particular­
ly with regard to its policy of continuing to conduct 
nuclear tests on Mururoa atoll. (Keesinq's Record of 
World Events, March 1987, p. 35001)
Soon colonized people will be able to receive a French Univer­
sity education without leaving the region and from a pro-status 
quo ideological perspective. This will permit the creation of 
a basically pro-imperialist native elite in the Pacific. With 
aîxDut a dozen Pacific countries having now ratified the Treaty 
of Saratonga (the 1985 South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty), 
including Australia, New Zealand, Solomon Islands, Papua New 
Guinea and Vanuatu, France is increasingly coming to be seen 
by indigenous and European people alike as an aggressive out-
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üide force. France continues to defy the treaty, which has 
been operative sinc^ 1985, by continuing to conduct nuclear 
tests. Franco's policies in the Pacific are clearly aimed 
<it preserving core/pcriphery relations between itself and 
it colonics and former colonies and at counter-opposition 
from the regional imperial satellites. {As of April 1992, 
France has announced it is suspending its nuclear-testing 
program in the Pacific for at least the remainder of the year.)
CONCLUSION
An historical analysis of the development of capital­
ism in New Caledonia is necessary for an understanding of the 
present decolonization crisis. The "export of capital” to 
New Caledonia and the establishment of a vhite-settler colony 
has transformed the territory from a pre-class stone-age so- 
cioty and economy i..to the most developed island in the South 
Pacific. For French imperialism. New Caledonia is a highly- 
valued raw-material-producing colony that is only a part of 
its world-wide imperial network.
The relatively advanced capitalist development and 
class formation of the colony are typical of colonies of 
white settlement. Everywhere, colonies of exploitation and 
conquest remained much more underdeveloped than the colony of 
settlement. But New Caledonia’s capitalist development has 
been more unlike the development of the African colonies of 
white settlement than it has been similar. In New Caledonia, 
native labor was not the basis of imperialist profits, unlike
] "C
in Africa. The Indigenous population of New Caledonia was 
divested of its land but it has been transformed into a wagi- 
labor force only incompletely. Relegation to reserves iias 
left the indigenous people marginalized in a subsistence econ­
omy —  not structurally integrated into the dominant capital itt 
economy —  in their own country. European settlers and im­
migrant ethnic groups are the principle beneficiaries of the 
present model of development. In this plural society it is 
these "outside" ethnic groups that have been allied acs;insl 
the indigenous population's efforts to obtain reforms and lo 
achieve national independence.
The indigenous population of New Caledonia came laLi- 
to the anti-colonial struggle compared to the situation of 
African colonialism. This can be explained by the extreme 
oppression suffered by the Melanese and by the negative effc-i-t 
of direct colonialism on the creation of a native elite. Theie 
was no Melanese in New Caledonia with a university education 
until 1971, and no Melanese had graduated from b ’gis school 
until the 1950s. Several other reasons account for this: th(- 
indigenous population is not long back from the- brink of r-x- 
tlnction; extreme French repression well into the 1950s made 
the formation of modern anti-colonialism all but impossible; 
and being that the colony consists of islands. New Caledonia's 
indigenous population has been isolated. Not until the 1960s 
did a modern arti-colonial movement appear. In the early 
years, a gradualist reformist approach was pursued. The 1970c 
and 1980s witnessed a rtpid escalation of violence in the- col­
ony as reformism failed- State and settler reaction to the
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independence movement caused the rapid radicalization of the 
the latter. Despite thirty years of efforts to obtain inde­
pendence, New Caledonia will remain a colony of France at 
least until 1998.
The decolonization crisis in New Caledonia has taken 
the form of a revolutionary situation. The appearance and 
timing of the crisis and its social-revolutionary form can be 
explained by the following factors: (1) Direct colonialism 
and white settlement precluded the creation of a conservative 
native elite to whom independence was granted peacefully else­
where. {2) Colonialism in New Caledonia has lasted veil past 
the time most of the world was decolonized and the indigenous 
population is not content with this anomaly. (3) Rapid pop­
ulation growth on the reservations without accompanying en­
largements of the reserves has made subsistence more and more 
precarious. (4) All constitutional attempts to achieve indepen­
dence were rebuked. (5) Rapid economic growth during the nickel 
boom of the 1960s and early 1970s was characterized by **polar- 
ized accumulation” and increasing relative deprivation and 
social inequalities. The indigenous population, with a skil­
led revolutionary leadership, did not view their poverty and 
marginalization as a "normal” situation. They subsequently 
organized against vested interests- These were some of the 
objective and subjective forces that contributed to the revolu­
tionary anti-colonial crisis.
The increasing social conflict among the many ethnic 
groups In the colony brought an almost total breakdown of the 
social peace. The smooth operation of the capital accumulation
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process ■sas threatened. In the face of this serious hegemonic 
crisis the French state responded vitU a veil-planned counter­
insurgency program- The anti-imperialist movement has been re­
pressed and reforms have been introduced to derndicali-e and 
gradually coopt the movement. These reforms, in fact, consti­
tute a nev model of development for the colony {hat vill per­
mit the continued development of capitalism while allovino the 
structural integration c the indigenous population, 'jhis 
vill create the socio-economic conditions for the further dove] 
opment of the productive forces and for neo-colonialism in 
the next century.
The analysis of the development of capitalism in 
the vh it e-set tier colonial setting and of decolonization erit:e;. 
allow us to see some of the social forces that can contribute 
to the appearance of revolutionary understanding and action.
But racial divisions and racist ideology in the colonial con­
text and the superior coercive capability of the imperialist 
state spell the defeat of the progressive forces. It remains 
to be seen if the state's reforms and now model of develop­
ment can prevent the resurgence of the revolutionary movement. 
If the state succeeds in creating the social, economic, polit­
ical and institutional features of center capitalist forma­
tions, social conflict —  ubiquitous in class societies —  
will be channelled into non-revolutionary “peaceful" paths.
179
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Abercrombie, Nicholas, Steven Hill and Bryan S. Turner.
Dictionary of Sociology, New York: Viking Penguin, 
Inc, 1984.
Alavi, Hamza, et al. Capitalism and Colonial Production, 
I.ondon: Croom Helm, 1982.
All ahar, Anton- Sociology and the Periphery: Theories and Is­
sues , Toronto: Garamond Press, 1989.
Alland, Alexander Jr. To Be Human: An Introduction to
Anthropology. New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1980.
Alley, Rewi. Oceania; an outline for study, Christchurch: 
Caxton Press, 1971.
Almond, Gabriel A. and Morris Watnick. "The Appeal of Com­
munism to the Underdeveloped Peoples", in Political 
Change in Underdeveloped Countries, edited by John 
H. Kautsky, New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1967.
Amnesty International, Annual Report, London: Amnesty 
International.
Anderson, Perry. Imagined Communities, Reflections on the 
Origin and Spread of Nationalism, London: Verso, 
1983-
Andrain, Charles F- Political Life and Social Change,
Belmont, California: Duxbury Press, 1971.
Banks, Arthur S., Editor. Political Handbook of the World 
Binghamton: State University of New York, 1989.
Barnes, H.E. World Politics in Modern Civilization; the 
contributions of nationalism, capitalism, 
imperialism, and militarism to human culture and 
international anarchy, Nev York: Knopf, 1930.
Barone, Charles, A. Marxist Thought on Imperialism; Survey 
and Critique, Nev York:M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 1985.
Barratt Brown, Michael. "Imperialism Yesterday and Today",
Nev Left Review, No. 5, Sept.- Oct. 1950, pp.42-49.
Barratt Brown, Michael- The Economics of Imperialism, 
Harmondsvorth: Penguin Books, 1974.
Baylson, Joshua C- Territorial Allocation by Imperial Rivalry, 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987.
1 ao
Bedford, R-D. Perceptions of a Futare for Melanesia, Christ­
church: University of Canterbury, 1980a.
Beishaw, C.S. Island Administration in the South West Pacific: 
Government and Reconstruction in New Caledonia, the 
Nev Hebrides, and the British Solomon Islands, 
London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 
Published in Co-Operation with the Internationaî 
Secretariat, Institute of Pacific Relations, 1950,
Benda, Harry J. "Non-Western Intelligentsias as Political 
Elites", in Political Change in Underdeveloped 
Countries, edited by John H. Kautsky, New York:
John Wiley and Sons, 1967.
Betts, R. F. Assimilation and Association in French Colonial 
Theory 1890 -- I9l4, Nev York: Columbia University 
Press, 1961.
Betts, R . F. The False Dawn: European Imperialism in the 19th 
Century, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 
1975.
Betts, R. F. Europe Overseas: phases of imperialism. New York : 
Basic Books, 1968-
Borgese Mann, Elisabeth and Norton Ginsburg, eds. Ocean Year­
book 1, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978,
Boswell, Terry, ed. Revolution in the World System, London: 
Greenwood Press, 1989.
Bottomore, Tom, ed. A Dictionary of Marxist Thought, Cam­
bridge: Harvard University Press, 1983.
Boudon, R . Education, Opportunity and Social Inequality:
Changing Prospects in Western Society, New York:
John Wiley and Sons, 1974.
Bradley, John. The Russian Revolution, London: Bison 1988.
Braudel, F. On History, Chicago: Chicago University Press,
1980.
Bravennan, Harry. Labour and Monopoly Capital, New York: 
Monthly Review Press, 1974
Brewer, Anthony. Marxist Theories of Imperialism: a critical 
survey, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1980.
Britannica Book of the Year, Chicago: Encyclopaedia Britan­
nica Inc., 1987.
Brookes, Jean Ingram. International Rivalry in the Pacific
Islands 1800 - 1875, Nev York: Monthly Review, 1972.
181
nrookfield, H. C. Colonialism, Development and Independence 
The Case of the Melanesian Islands in the South 
Pacific, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972
Brookfield, H. C. and Doreen Hart. Melanesia: a geographical 
interpretation of an island yorld, London: Metheun 
Publishers, 1971.
Brookfield, Harold, ed. The Pacific in Transition: Geograph­
ical Perspectives on Adaptation and Change, Nev 
York: St. Martin’s Press, 1973.
Drookstone, Jeffery H. The Multinational Businessman and 
Foreign Policy, New York: Praeger, 1976.
Brunschwig, Henri. French Colonialism 1871 - 1914, Myths and 
Realities, London: Pall Mall Press, 1966.
Bukharin, N. I. Imperialism and World Economy, New York: 
International Publishers, 1929.
Bunge, Frederica. Oceania; Area Study Handbook, Washington: 
Supt. of Documents, 1985.
Burger, Julian. Report from the Frontier: the State of the 
World’s Indigenous Peoples, London : Zed Books and 
Cultural Survival, 1987.
Burgess, Hayden. Traditional Territories of the Earth,
London: World Council of Indigenous Peoples, 1987.
Carroll, Des. Tahiti and the French Islands of the Pacific 
in pictures. Visual Geography series. New York: 
Sterling Publishing Company, 1967.
Chaliand, Gérard. Revolution in the Third World: Myths and 
Prospects, Sussex: Harvester, 1977.
Chesneaux, Jean. Kanak Political Culture and French Polit­
ical Practice; some background reflections of the 
Nev Caledonian crisis, Canberra: Research School 
of Pacific Studies, Australian National University, 
Peace Research Center, 1987.
Chomsky, Noam and Edvard Herman. Political Economy of Human 
Rights. 2 vols. Montréal: Black Rose Books 1979.
Clifford, James. Person and Hvth; Maurice Leenhardt in the
Melanesian World, Berkeley; University of California 
Press, 1982-
Cohen, Stanley and Young. The Manufacture of News, London: 
Constable, 1973.
18:
Coleman, James and Donald Cressey. Social Problems, London: 
Harper and Row, 1984
Collins, R , "Functional and Conflict Theories of Educational 
Stratification", American Sociological Review, 36 
(6), pp. 1002 - 1019.
Collins, R. "Where are Educational Requirements for Employment 
Highest?", Sociology of Education, 47 (4), pp. 419 
- 442.
Connell, J. "Urbanisation and Labour Mobility in the South
Pacific", Essays on Urbanisation in South-East Asia 
and the Pacific, edited by Richard Bedford, Christ­
church: University of Canterbury, 1984.
Connell, John. Nev Caledonia or Kanaky?: The Political 
History of a French Colony, Canberra: National 
Centre for Development Studies, Research School of 
Pacific Studies, the Australian National University, 
1987,
Connell, John. Migration, Employment and Development in the 
South Pacific: New Caledonia, A Country Report, 
Noumea: International Labour Office and the South 
Pacific Commission, 1987.
Craig, Robert and Frank P. King, editors. Historical Dic­
tionary of Oceania, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 
1981.
Crary, David. "Tribal Conflicts: Byproduct of Colonialism", 
Chronicle-HeraId, March 3, 1986, p. 7.
Crocombe, Ron. The South Pacific: An Introduction, Auckland: 
Longman Paul, 1983.
Crocombe, Ron and Ahmed All, eds. Politics in Melanesia, Fiji 
University of South Pacific, 1982.
Cultural Survival Quarterly (various issues).
Danielsson, Bengt. "Poisoned Pacific: The Legacy of French 
Nuclear Testing", The Bulletin of the Atomic 
Scientists, Yol 46 , No 2 , March 1990.
"Death Count Hits 21 in New Caledonia", Chronicle-Herald, May 
6, 1988-
Debray, Regis. "Marxism and the National Question", Nev Left 
Review, 105, Sept. - Oct., 1977, pp. 25 - 41.
Degenhardt, Henry W., Editor- Revolutionary and Dissident
Movements : An International Guide, United Kingdom: 
Longman, 1988.
183
%-sai T Raj, and Harry Eckstein- "Insurgency The Transforma­
tion of Peasant Rebellion", World Politics A 
Quarterly Journal of International Relations,
Vol XLII, No 4, July 1990, pp. 441- 465,
Dcutscher, Isaac, The Age of Permanent Revolution: A Trotsky 
Anthology, New York: Dell, 1954.
Dix, Robert, "Why Revolutions Fail: And Succeed" Polity, 16 
pp. 423 - 426.
Dodge, Ernest. Islands and Empires: Western Impact on the 
Pacific and East Asia, Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1976,
Dornoy, Miriam. Politics in New Caledonia, Sydney: University 
of Sydney Press, 1984.
Douglas, Bronwen. "Ritual and Politics in the Inaugural
Meeting of the High Chiefs From New Caledonia and 
the Loyalty Islands", Social Analyses, 18, 1985.
Dousset, Roselene, and Etienne Taillemite. The Great Book of 
the Pacific, New Jersey; Chartweli Books, Inc., 1979.
Dunmore, John. French Explorers in the Pacific, Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1969.
Dyson, John. South Seas Dream; An Adventure in Paradise, 
Boston; Little, Brown and Company, 1982.
Easton, David. A Systems Analysis of Political Lite, Nev 
York; John Wiley and Sons, 1965,
Eckes, Alfred E. Jr. The U.S. and the Global Struggle for
Minerals, Austin; University of Texue Press, 1979.
Emmanuel, Arghiri. "White Settler Colonialism and the Myth
of Investment Imperialism®, New Left Review, No 73, 
May-June, 1972, pp. 35 - 57.
Enloe, Cynthia. Ethnic Conflict and Political Development, 
Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1973,
Europa Year Book 1988, A World Survey, London : Europa Public­
ations, 1989-
Evans, Peter. Dependent Development, Princeton, New Jersey: 
Princeton Dnivesity Press, 1979.
Facts on File (various issues).
Fairbairn. T.I.J. Island Economies; Studies from the South 
Pacific, Suva: Institute of Pacific Studies, 
University of the South Pacific, 1985,
184
Far Eastern Economic Review (various issues).
Feis, Herbert. Europe^ the World's Banker, 1870 - 1914: An
Account of European Foreign Investment and the Con­
nection of World Finance with Diplomacy Before the 
War, New Haven: Yale Dnivesity Press, 1930,
FieldhousCr D . K. The Colonial Empires : A comparative study 
froro the Eighteenth Century, London: Weidenfeld and 
Nicolson, 1965.
Fieldhouse, D. K., ed. The Theories of Capitalist Imperialism, 
London: Longmans, 1967.
Foior's South Pacific, Melanesia, Micronesia, and Polynesia,
New York; Fodor's Travel Publications, Inc., 1909.
Forsyth, W.D. "Nickel or Liberty?", Nev Zealand International 
Review I Narch-April, 1972.
Forsyth, W.D. "Nickel Boom Finds New Caledonia", Australian 
Miner, 29, June 1970.
"France Resumes Nuclear Testing" Mail-Star, May 12, 1989.
Fraser, Helen. Nev Caledonia: anti-colonialism in a Pacific 
To n  itorv, Canberra: Peace Research Centre, Re­
search School of Pacific Studies, The Australian 
National University, 1988.
Freiburg, J.W. The French Press, Class, State and Ideology,
Nev York: Praeger, 1981.
Furnivali, J.S. Colonial Policy and Practice, New York:
New York University Press, 1948.
Galper, Jeffry. "Social Welfare in Capitalist Society: A Soc- 
alist Analysis", Catalyst, Vol 1, No 1, pp. G - 23.
Galtung, J. "A Structural Theory of Imperialism", Journal of 
Peace Research, vol. II, 1971.
Giddens, Anthony. Capitalisa and modern social theory, London: 
Cambridge University Press, 1971.
Gilbert, S.^ and H.A. McRoberts. "Differentiation and Strat­
ification; The Issue of Inequality", in An Intro­
duction to Sociology, D. Forcese and S. Richer, eds., 
pp. 91 - 135.
Gorodey, Deve. "A Brief History of the Kanak Struggle for
Self-determination", Suva; Conference for Nuclear- 
Free Pacific, April 1975, mimeo.
185
Gollwitzer, Heinz. Europe In the Age of laperialisa 1880- 
1914f London: Thames and Hudson, 1969.
Gouibourne, Harry, ed. Politics and State in the Third World, 
London: Macmillan, 1979.
Gourguechon, Charlene. Journey to the End of the World, New 
York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1977.
Grattan, C. R. The Southwest Pacific to 1900; A Modern His­
tory , Ann Arbor, 1963.
Green, B. C- and M. Kelly, eds. Studies in Oceanic Culture 
History, Bishop Museum, Pacific Anthropological 
Records, nos 11 - 12, Honolulu, 1970 - 1971.
Green, R.H. "Things Fall Apart: the world economy in the
1980s", Third World Quarterly, 5(1), January, 1983.
Greene, Thonms H. Comparative Revolutionary Movements, New 
Jersey: Prentice-Hali, 1974.
Grocott, Paul, editor. Readings in Pacific Politics, Port 
Morseby: University of Papua New Guinea, 1976.
Guiart, Jean. "Forerunners of Melanesian Nationalism"
Oceania 22, 1951.
Gurr, Ted Robert. Why Men Rebel, Princeton: Princeton Univer­
sity Press, 1970.
Hamnett, M.P., et al. "Unbalanced Books: Economic Vulner­
ability in the Pacific”, Perspectives, 2 (3), Win­
ter, 1981.
Harding, Thomas G. and Ben J. Wallace, eds. Cultures in the 
Pacific, New York: Free Press, 1970.
Hayes, Peter, Lyuba Zarsky, and Walden Bello. American Lake 
Nuclear Peril in the Pacific: Sow the nuclear 
build-up in the cause of "peace" fuels the threat 
of war, Harmondsvorth, Middlesex, England: Penguin, 
1986.
Hazareesingh, Sudhir- "From Being to Nothingness: The Extinc­
tion of the Conmunist Intellectual in France",
World Politics, Vol 13, No 2, April 1990, pp. 216- 
233-
Kempenstall, P. and N. Rutherford. Protest and Dissent in 
the Colonial Pacific, Suva: Institute of Pacific 
Studies, 1984.
186
Henige, David P. Colonial Governors from the 15th Century to
Present, Madison; The üniversitv of Wisconsin Press,
1970.
Henry, Paget. Peripheral Capitalisca and Dnderdevelopment in 
Antigpa, Nev Brunsvick, OSA; Transaction Books,
1985.
Himelfarb, Alexander, and c. James Richardson. Sociology for 
Canadians, Toronto; McGrav-Hill Ryerson, 1982.
Hobson, J. A. Imperialism: A Study, London: Allen and Dnwin, 
1954.
Hofley, John R. and John Harp, eds. Poverty in Canada, Ontario: 
Prentice-Hall, 1971.
Horowitz, D. Imperialism and Revolution, London: Allan Lane,
The Penguin Press, 1969.
Horowitz, David, ed. Corporations and the Cold War. New York: 
Monthly Review Press, 1969
Hunter, David E. K. and Phillip Whitten, eds. Anthropology: 
Contemporary Perspectives, Boston: Little, Brown, 
and Company, 1982.
Independent Commission on International Humanitarian Issues- 
Indigenous Peoples; A Global Search for Justice, 
London: Zed Press, 1987-
"Inquiry Ordered into Nev Caledonia Deaths", Chronicle- 
Herald , May, 1988.
Insurgent Sociologist. "Special Issue: Imperialism and the 
State", Vol.7, no. 2 (Spring), 1977.
“Is mining in Canada collapsing?". All easily accessible de­
posits developed. The Mail-Star, Tuesday, March 
1992, p. B3-
Jalee, P. The Pillage of the Third World, Nev York: Monthly 
Review Press, 1969.
Jencks, C. Inequality: A Reassessment of the Effects of Fam­
ily and Schooling in America, New York: Basic, 1972.
Johnson, Chalmers. Revolutionary Change, Boston: Little,
Brown and Company, 1966.
Kautsky, John H. Communism and the Politics of Development, 
New York; John Wiley and Sons, 1968.
Kay, Geoffrey. Iteveloimænt and Dnderdevelopment: A Marxist 
Analysis. London; Macmillan, 1975.
187
Kossinq's Contemporary Archives (various issues).
Kcesingr Roger. “Kastom In Melanesia: An Overview”, Mankind 
13, 1982.
Keesinq’s Record of World Event (various issues).
Kemp, Tom. Theories of Imperialism, London: Dobson Books,
1967.
Kiernan, Victor Gordon. The Lords of Humankind: European 
Attitudes to the Outside World in the Age of 
Imperialism, London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1969.
Kircher, Ingrid A- The Kanaks of New Caledonia, Minority 
Rights Group Report 71, London: Minority Rights 
Group, 1985.
Koebner, R. and H. Schmidt. Imperialism: The Story and 
Significance of a Political Word 1840 - 1960, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1964.
Kolko, Gabriel. The Roots of American Foreign Policy, Boston: 
Beacon Press, 1969.
Kolko, Gabriel. Confronting the Third World; US Foreign Policy 
1945 - 1980, New York: Pantheon, 1988.
Kuper, Leo. "Theories of Revolution and Race", Comparative 
Studies in Society and History, XII January I97i.
Kuper, Leo. "Race, Class and Power: Some Comments on Revolu­
tionary Change", Comparative Studies in Society and 
History, XIV Septeroiær 1972.
Langness, Lewis L. Melanesia: Readings on a culture area, 
Scranton: Chandler Publishing Company, 1971.
Leiden, Carl and Karl Schmitt. The Politics of Violence,
New Jersey: Prentice-Hali, 1968.
Lemarchand, Rene. "Revolutionary Phenonæna in Stratified Socie­
ties", in Revolution and Political Change, C.E, Welch 
and M.B. Taintor, eds., Massachusetts: Duxbury Press, 
1972, pp. 282 - 299.
Lenin, V. I. Imperialism; The Highest Stage of Capitalisa, 
Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1975.
"Le Pen Stirs French Hostility to Arabs®, Daily News, April 
16, 1988, p. 15.
Lewis, Oscar. The Culture of Poverty. Nev York: Random, 1966.
188
Lichtheim, George. Imperialism, New York: Praeger Publishers,
1971.
Lockhart, A. "Educational Opportunities and Economic Opportun­
ities —  The New Liberal Equality Syndrome", in 
Economy, Class and Social Reality; Issues in Contemp­
orary Canadian Society, Toronto: Butterworths, 1979, 
pp. 224 - 237.
Lofche, Michael. Zanzibar; Background to Revolution, New York: 
Princeton University Press, 1965.
Lowry, Bullitt and Elizabeth Ellington Gunter. The Red Virgin, 
Memoirs of Louise Michel, Alabama: University of 
Alabama Press, 1981.
Lowy, Michael. "Marxists and the National Question”, New Loft 
Review, No. 96, March - April, 1976 pp. 81 - 100.
Lyons, Hartyn. The Totem and the Tricolour; A Short History 
of New Caledonia Since 1774, Kensington, New South 
Wales: New South Wales University Press, 1986.
MacKenzie, B.W. Nickel —  Canada and the World, Mineral Re­
port 16, Ottawa: Mineral Resources Division, Dep­
artment of Energy, Mines and Resources, 1968.
NacTaggart, D. "New Caledonia and the French Connection", 
in Oceania and Beyond, P.P. King, editor, London: 
Greenwood, 1976.
Magdoff, Harry. The Age of Imperialism, New York: Monthly 
Review Press, 1959,
Magdoff, Harry. Imperialism From the Colonial Age to the 
Present, New York: Monthly Review Press, 1978.
Mandel, Ernest. Europe vs. America: Contradictions of Imper­
ialism. Nev York: Monthly Review Press, 1970.
Mandel, Ernest. Late Capitalism, London; New Left Books, 
Atlantic Highlands: Humanities Press, 1975.
Handel, Ernest. "The Laws of Uneven Development", New Left 
Review, No. 59, Jan. - Feb. 1970, pp. 19 ~ 38-
Mander, L.A. S o ^  Dependent Peoples of the South Pacific,
New York, 1954.
Kargolis, Susanna. Adventuring in the Pacific, The Sierra 
Club Travel Guide to the Islands of Polynesia, 
Melanesia, and Micronesia, San Francisco: Sierra 
Club Books, 1988.
189
Marshall, Bruce D. The French Colonial Myth and Constitution 
Making in the 4th Republic, Connecticut: Yale 
University Press, 1973.
Martin, Wilfred, and Allan J. Kacdonoll. Canadian Education, 
Ontario: Prentice-Hall, 1982-
Marx, Karl, and F. Engels. On Colonialism, London: Lavrcnco 
and Wishart, 1960-
Marx, Karl. “Social Classes and Conflict", in Sociological 
Perspectives, edited by Kenneth Thompson and 
Jeremy Tunstall, Nev York; Penguin, 1971.
May, K.J. and H- Nelson, Editors. Melanesia; Beyond Diversity 
Canberra; Australian National University, 1982-
KcArther, N. Island Populations of the Pacific, Canberra, 1967
McNeill, H. The Rise of the West: A History of the Human Com­
munity , Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963.
Hemml, Albert. The Colonizer and the Colonized, New York:
Orion Press, 1965.
Milligan, Chris, eo. Guide to Asia, Australia and the Pacific, 
Nev York: Facts on File, 1982.
“Mitterrand attacks Chirac in TV duel". The Mall-Star, April 
29, 1988, p. 5.
Mommsen, Wolfgang J. Theories of Imperialism, Nev York:
Random House, 1980.
>toon, Parker Thomas. Imperialism and World Politics, New 
York: Macmillan, 1947.
Moore, Barrington, Jr. Reflections on the Causes of Human
Misery and Upon Certain Proposals to Eliminate Them, 
Boston: Beacon Press, 1970.
Moore, Barrington, Jr. The Social Bases of obedience and
Revolt, White Plains, Hew York: M.E. Sharpe, 1978.
Morales, Walthraad Q. Social Revolution: Theory and Hist­
orical Explaination, Denver, Colorado: The Social 
Science Foundation and Graduate School for Inter­
national Studies Monograph Series in World Affairs, 
Denver University, 1973.
Horan, Theodore, H. "International Political Economy of Cuban 
Nickel Development", in Cuba in the World, Colo 
Blasler and Carmelo Mesa-Lage, eds., Pittsburgh; 
Pittsburgh University Press, 1979.
190
Horgonthau, Hans J. Politics Among Nations; the struggle for
pover and peace, Nev York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1960.
Murphy, Agnes. The Ideology of French Imperialism. 1871-1881, 
Nev York: Howard Fertig, 1968.
Nabuderc, Dan. The Political Economy of Imperialism, London:
Zed Press, 1977.
Nadei, George, and P. Curtis, eds. Imperialism and Colon­
ialism, New York: Macmillan, 1964.
Narayan Jay. The Political Economy of Fiji, Suva: South 
Pacific Review Press, 1984.
Naturoan, J. "Land Rights of Tannese in Nev Caledonia", in
Land Tenure in Vanuatu, edited by P. Larmour, Suva: 
University of the South Pacific, Institute of 
Pacific Studies, 1984-
"Now Caledonia", Encyclopedia Britannica.
"New Caledonia Separatists Free Hostages to Negotiate", 
Chronicle-Herald, April 29, 1988.
"New Caledonia", Far East and Australasia, London: Europa 
Publications, 1990.
Nev Internationalist (various issues),
Oberschall, Anthony. Social Conflict and Social Movements, 
Englewood Cliffs, Nev Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1973.
O'Brien, Denise and Sharon H- Tiffany, editors. Rethinking 
Women's Soles: Perspectives From the Pacific, 
Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984.
Oceania (Journal —  various issues).
Offe, Claus. "The Theory of the Capitalist State and the
Problem of Policy Formation", in Stress and Contra­
diction in Modern Capitalism, L.N. Lindberg, et al., 
eds., Lexington: D.C. Heathe, 1975.
Omvedt. G. “Towards a Theory of Colonialism”, in The Insur­
gent Sociologist, Vol, III, No. Ill, Spring 1973, 
pp. 1 - 2 4 .
O'Neill, Bard, et al. Insurgency in the Modern World, 
Colorado: Westview Press, 1980.
Osborne, Charles, editor- Australia, Nev Zealand and the
South Pacific, A Handbook, London : Anthony Blond, 
1970.
193
Oun v i , Susanna. For Kanak Independence; The Fight Against 
French Rule in Nev Caledonia, Auckland: Labour 
Publishing Co-operative Society Limited and COlîSO, 
1985.
Oven, Roger and Bob Sutcliffe, eds. studies in the Theory of 
Imperialism, London: Longman, 1972.
Pacific Bulletin, Havaii: Pacific Concerns Resource Center, 
(various issues).
Pacific Islands Monthly (Journal), April 1982.
Pacific Islands Yearbook (various years),
Palma, Gabriel. "Dependency: A Formal Theory of Underdevelop­
ment or a Methodology for the Analysis of Concrete 
Situations of Underdevelopment?", World Development, 
Vol 6 1978, pp. 881 - 924.
Perdue, William D. Terrorism and the State; A Critique of
Domination Through F e a r , London; Praeger, 1989.
Petras, James. "Nev Perspectives on Imperialism and Social 
Classes in the Periphery", Journal of Contemporary 
A s i a , 5, No 3, (1975), p. 307.
Pover, Thomas F. Jr. Jules Ferry and the Renaissance of 
French Imperialism, Nev York: 1944.
Priestly, Herbert. France Overseas: A Study of Modern Imperial­
ism, Berkeley; Dnivesity of California Press, 1938.
Rand McNally Atlas of the Oceans.
Rav Materials R e p o r t , Sveeden (Journal).
Rhodes, R. I., editor. Imperialism and Dnderdoveloy^ont:
A r e a d e r . New York: Monthly Review Press, 1970,
Richardson, C.J. Contemporary Social Mobility, London: Francos;
Pinter, 1977.
Richardson, John. "Nev Caledonia", The Asia and Pacific Review, 
Lincolnwood, Illinois: NTC Business Books, 1988.
Ritzer, George. Contemporary Sociological T h e o r y , New York: 
Alfred A. Knopf, 1983.
Rob e r t s , Stephen, H . History of French Colonial Policy 1870- 
1925, Connecticut : Archon Press, 1963,
Robertson, R. "Nationalism, Protest and the Dialectic of
Development", Journal of Pacific Studies, 11, 1985.
192
Robnrtson, R.T. The Making of the Modern World, An Intro­
ductory History, London: Zed Books, 1986.
Rodman, Margaret, ed. Pacificification of Melanesia, Lanham, 
MD: University Press of America, 1983.
Roomer, J. E. A General Theory of Exploitation and Class, 
Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1982.
Rothschild, Guy de. The Whims of Fortune: The Memoirs of Guy 
de Rothschild, New York: Random House, 1985,
Roux, J.C. Le dernier "bourn" du Nickel et ses repercussions 
humaines et spatiales sur la société de la 
Nouvelle-Caledonie, Nouméa: Office de la Recherche 
Scientifique et Technique Outre-Mer, 1975.
Rowthorne, Bob. "Imperialism in the Seventies —  Unity or 
Rivalry?", New Left Review, No. 69, Sept.- Oct.
1970, pp. 31 - 54.
Runciman, H.G. "Relative Deprivation and the Concept of Ref­
erence Group", in Sociological Perspectives, edited 
by Kenneth Thompson and Jeremy Tunstall, New York: 
Penguin, 1971.
Salort, Barbara. Revolutions and Revolutionaries, Nev York: 
Elsevier, 1976.
Sandbrook, Richard. Proletarians and African Capitalism: the 
Kenyan Case, 1960-1972, Cambridge, 1975.
Saussol, Alain. "New Caledonia: Colonisation and Reaction", 
in Land Tenure in the Pacific, Ron Crocomlæ, éd.. 
New York: Oxford University Press, 1971.
Schmidt, Vivien A. "Engineering a Critical Realignment of 
the Electorate: The Case of the Socialists in 
France", West European Politics, Vol 13, No 2,
April 1990, pp. 192 - 215.
Seton-Watson, Hugh. The Imperialist Revolutioîarles, Trends
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